Problems of Communism

Essay-Reviews

Robert V. Daniels

Jan Feldman

C. Montgomery Broaded

Edward Friedman

Dennis M. Hanratty

Martin C. Spechler

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1989



TIANANMEN 1989
A Symposium

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The Sino-Soviet Summit

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Historiography

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COVER: Students carrying the head of the "Goddess of Democracy" into Tiananmen Square. Photo by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Tiananmen Square, 1989

A Symposium

Lowell Dittmer, Andrew J. Nathan, Andrew G. Walder, and June Teufel Dreyer analyze salient aspects of the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989 and their violent suppression, and attempt to place these events in the context of political, military, economic, intellectual, and social developments in China.

Diplomacy Amid Protest: The Sino-Soviet Summit

Steven M. Goldstein

The dramatic developments in Chinese politics in the spring of 1989 played a paradoxical role with respect to the sixth Sino-Soviet summit. On the one hand, by taking world attention away from somewhat lackluster meetings, these developments masked the potential for further progress in Sino-Soviet relations. The hectic nature of the summit, the distraction of many of its participants, and its meager diplomatic output tended to obscure the fact that the basic scaffolding for a broadly-based and full bilateral relationship that had been constructed over the past decade remains intact. On the other hand, these same developments emphasized the salience of domestic politics and ideology for the future direction of these relations.

Note

Problems of CPSU Historiography

George M. Enteen

Under the influence of *glasnost'*, some historians of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have begun to question the traditional assumptions of their approach and advocate changes in the methodology of party historiography. Party historians have sought expanded access to party documents, attempted to reconcile the quest for objectivity with the concept of party-mindedness, and devised new approaches to the periodization of party history. However, recent examples of party history show that despite historians' efforts to probe more deeply into the party's past and to marshal new kinds of evidence, the Stalinist paradigm of party history—imposed in the early 1930's—remains essentially intact.

Essay-Reviews

Stalin: Revolutionary or Counterrevolutionary?

Robert V. Daniels

Recent works on Stalin and Stalinism pose a serious challenge to the interpretation that the Soviet dictator was a revolutionary and his "revolution from above" an effective way of modernizing the Soviet Union and helping to elevate it to superpower status. They reveal that Stalin's military-political approach to industrialization not only failed to achieve planned targets, but proved to be an absolute detriment to economic growth. They portray Stalin not as a man guided by a revolutionary plan, but as a shrewd opportunist who manipulated revolutionary traditions and sentiments in order to aggrandize personal power and destroy those whom he resented or hated.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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The Propagation and Impact of Ideology in the USSR

Jan Feldman

The Bolshevik Party took power in Russia with the intention of effecting a cultural revolution and creating a new socialist man. Instead, Marxist-Leninist ideology has become a means of enforcing political control in the USSR and legitimating an oppressive social order. Wide segments of society have been involved in disseminating and studying official doctrine. Saturated with ideology the "new socialist man" has emerged compliant, cynical, and dependent, lacking the kind of civic-mindedness and initiative that the political and economic modernization of the Soviet Union now demands.

Education and Cultural Transfer in China

C. Montgomery Broaded

Since the late 19th century, the Chinese have turned to foreign educational models in the course of their efforts to modernize their country. After the Cultural Revolution in particular, the regime stepped up educational transfers from abroad. But exposure to Western educational models has encouraged Chinese to question the legitimacy of Communist Party political hegemony. In the wake of the government's crackdown on the mass demonstrations in June 1989, the regime has restricted educational contacts with the West and is imposing new political controls on education. The government has also used its job-allocation system as a means to subject intellectuals to regime control. Consequently, intellectuals now believe they have no realistic chance for meaningful participation in government decision-making processes in the foreseeable future.

Decollectivization and Democratization in China

Edward Friedman

Decollectivization of Chinese agriculture removed one of the significant bulwarks of party-state despotism in China. Collectivized agriculture, introduced with a moralistic, pseudoreligious fervor not observed in the Soviet collectivization drive, was an economically inefficient system that undergirded the system of state terror. However, as long as the Stalinist state structure remains intact, decollectivization can be reversed. Hence, peasants could have a stake in the democratization of the system as a means of ensuring their recent gains and eliminating the oppressive aspects of the state that yet remain.

Differing Perspectives on Castro's Cuba

Dennis M. Hanratty

Mainstream Cubanology gives generally negative assessments of Cuba's achievements in the areas of economic reform, health care, and housing, and of the role of the organs of People's Power in Cuba. By contrast, critics of the mainstream evaluate positively Cuba's accomplishments in these areas. Although the two approaches each have their own strengths and weaknesses, the mainstream generally offers the more accurate analyses of political, economic, and social realities in Castro's Cuba.

Gorbachev's Economic Reforms: Early Assessments

Martin C. Spechler

Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms seek to introduce a greater amount of personal responsibility into the economic system, reduce state orders, implement decentralized contracting and wholesale trade, and limit central interference in the routine decision-making of the enterprises, all while retaining overall central direction of the economy. Most Western economists are pessimistic about the prospects for economic *perestroyka*. They cite as impediments to change the inability to carry through price reform, and the unwillingness of the leadership to tolerate unemployment and inflation, overcentralization, and high rental charges. But in addition to the economic obstacles, political problems, such as national unrest and widespread dissatisfaction with the communist regime, will also hinder the progress of economic restructuring.

Photo on opposite page: Pro-democracy demonstrations on Tiananmen Square, on May 17, 1989. Photo from Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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Tiananmen Square 1989

EDITORS' NOTE: Like "Hungary 1956," "Prague 1968," or "Gdańsk 1980," "Tiananmen Square 1989" will stand out as a critical milepost in the history of communist states. The peaceful demonstrations by tens of thousands of Chinese students on behalf of reform, the massive outpouring of sympathy and support for them by a wide spectrum of citizens not only in Beijing but in other major cities, and the brutal use of armed force on June 3–4, 1989, to repress the demonstrations in the capital, shocked the world and provoked a reassessment of the world's most populous state.

Among the salient questions raised are the following: What forces led to the demonstrations, and what did the demonstrators want? What did the official reaction say about cleavages within the political leadership? What is the future for China's economic reform? Can legitimacy be maintained by force? What will be the future political role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)?

In the symposium presented below, four distinguished scholars attempt to answer some of these questions. Lowell Dittmer of the University of California, Berkeley, sets the events within the broader context of questions about mass participation, systemic reforms, and political legitimacy. Andrew J. Nathan, of Columbia University, analyzes the antecedents of the 1989 democracy movement, its demands, and the reasons why, even after the repression of June 3–4, Chinese democrats continue to position themselves as remonstrators, not as opponents of the party. Andrew G. Walder, of Harvard University, examines the social, political, and economic factors that touched off the largest popular challenge to party rule in the history of the People's Republic. June Teufel Dreyer, of the University of Miami, Coral Gables, explores the part played by the People's Liberation Army in the Tiananmen massacre and the ramifications of this participation for political-military relations and for the PLA's public image.

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The Tiananmen Massacre

Lowell Dittmer

"No!" cried his father, cutting short the answer, threw the blankets off with a strength that sent them all flying in a moment and sprang erect in his bed. Only one hand lightly touched the ceiling to steady him. "You wanted to cover me up, I know, my young sprig, but I'm far from covered up yet. And even if this is the last strength I have, it's enough for you, too much for you."

—Franz Kafka, *The Judgment.*

The suppression of democracy activists in and around Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3–4, 1989, at the cost of at least several hundred and possibly well over a thousand lives, was unprecedented in many ways. Political repression is, or course, not unheard of in the People's Republic of China (PRC). But never before had the regime unleashed the full firepower of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) against unarmed civilians.[1] Never before had the regime been confronted with such a shrewd and tenacious opposition, which seems to have utterly outmaneuvered the government in the play for public opinion. Never before had the reform regime that emerged after the Cultural Revolution been so seriously split within its own ranks (the rumor of impending civil war was, however, a great exaggeration).

Although unique in these and other respects, this watershed event in the history of the PRC can be rendered somewhat more comprehensible if it is seen in the context of a number of recent developments. The upheaval might be said to mark the convergence of three unresolved and festering questions: the role of the "masses," the future of reform, and the basis of political legitimacy (which subsumes the other two).

In contrast to the situation in most other socialist countries, in China, the "revolutionary masses" have always played an integral role in politics, though the form of their political mobilization has changed over time. During the first 17 years of the PRC, it took the form of the "mass movement." This was a sort of controlled unleashing, under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), focused on a clearly defined set of negative and positive targets. And it seems to have been relatively successful, achieving the ideological objectives of the regime (i.e., "socialization of the means of production") while still achieving rapid economic progress.

During the Cultural Revolution period (1966–76), the masses could, of course, still be mobilized, but the apparent exhaustion of positive objectives (and the inability of the regime to control the masses once aroused) brought mobilization and economic production into increasing friction. Although Deng Xiaoping himself benefited from spontaneous agitation by the masses to regain power, his regime, too, has recognized this friction. On the one hand, it has attempted to deny or repress spontaneous mass movements; on the other hand, it has promoted occasional quasi-campaigns to mobilize the masses against "bourgeois liberalization" or "spiritual pollution." Yet, the first course left a vacuum between leadership and masses, while the second again precipitated friction between production and mobilization.

Lowell Dittmer is Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley). He is the author of Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution *(1974),* China's Continuous Revolution *(1986), and other studies of contemporary Chinese politics.* *The author would like to thank the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California for the financial support necessary to conduct the research on which this article is based.*

[1]This is one of the reasons adduced for the otherwise puzzling nostalgia for Mao Zedong, who once said that whoever suppressed the students would fall.

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In the post-Cultural Revolution era, the students have stepped into the breach, reviving an old Chinese tradition of youthful idealism, utilizing appropriate ceremonial occasions and slogans to revive reform momentum when it seemed to flag. This student activism has evoked in the minds of China's leaders nightmares of Red Guard chaos and has split the reform leadership—first, in 1987 with the purge of Hu Yaobang, now again in 1989—between those most concerned with maintaining control and stability and those in search of a mass constituency for further reform.

The reforms began with the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, in December 1978, which in effect returned control of the agricultural sector to individual families under a leasehold arrangement. This policy resulted in an impressive increase in agricultural productivity. The focus of reform shifted to the urban industrial sector at the Third Plenum of the 12th Congress, in October 1984. Although urban reforms also stimulated rapid economic growth, the leadership became divided over whether to press on to ownership reform (which aroused strong ideological reservations) or further marketization. The latter route was chosen in the spring of 1988 when Zhao Ziyang, with the support of Deng Xiaoping, initiated retail price reform. However, this reform unleashed an unprecedented bout of inflation (official figures for 1988 were 18.5 percent; unofficial figures, double that), resulting in bank runs, commodity stockpiling, and a general financial panic. The retreat from price reform left the leadership in a quandary about how and where to pursue economic reform.

The crisis of legitimacy is in part the result of the stifling of mass participation and frustration of the reform impulse already noted, and in part a predictable consequence of the systematic undermining of Maoist ideology that Deng's regime has conducted since 1977 in order to permit greater latitude for pragmatic experimentation. But the regime has been dismayed to see egoistic consumerism replace ideological dogmatism, not to mention a growing wave of crime and corruption. In the absence of any vision or plan for development beyond "moving from stone to stone to cross the river" (*mozhe shetou quo ho*), the intellectual community had tacitly begun to adopt models of "bourgeois" electoral reform and parliamentarism. Orthodox attempts to defend the "leading role" of the Communist Party and other Leninist tenets were intellectually unconvincing and failed to sway the masses. This contributed to a crisis of legitimacy so severe that in the spring of 1989, it was unclear whether the army would respond to the political leadership, and a cashiered Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary—who had clearly violated the rules of "democratic centralism"—could appeal to ideals of parliamentary democracy to try to have the National People's Congress (NPC) repeal martial law.

In order to see how these three questions or crises culminated in the tragedy at Tiananmen, I would like to begin *in medias res*, focusing on the maneuvers of the leadership, to whom the population remained responsive even while attempting to act autonomously. My purpose is simple but not easy: to puzzle together what actually happened. Such an examination will show that the Tiananmen massacre in China was not inexorable. Rather, it was the outcome of a subtle interplay of developments whose complexity must be thoroughly examined. This contention refutes Deng Xiaoping's somewhat self-serving declaration at the June 30, 1989, meeting of the NPC Standing Committee:

The storm was bound to come sooner or later. This was determined by the macro climate of the world and the micro climate of our country. Its inevitable arrival was independent of man's will.[2]

Leadership Cleavages

As of the beginning of 1989, the CCP leadership was riven by two overlapping cleavages: one, ideological; the other, generational. Ideologically, the party leaders were divided between a still powerful minority committed to reform (but accepting the need for temporary retrenchment), and an ascendant majority determined to use the necessary retrenchment to reverse reform policies and shore up the centrally planned economy. Generationally, the leadership was divided between, on the one hand, the Politburo, consisting of Premier Li Peng (60 years of age), Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission Chairman Qiao Shi (65), Propaganda Department Chief Hu Qili (60), State Planning Commission Chairman Yao Yilin (72), and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (70), and on the other hand, a shadow cabinet of senior veterans—none of whom had seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, only one of whom (Yang Shangkun) was on the Politburo, but most of whom had seats in the Central Advisory Commission (CAC). In declining rank order of power, this elder group included Deng Xiaoping (85), chairman of the party's Central Military Commission (CMC) as well as its governmental counterpart; Chen Yun (84), chairman of the CAC; Yang Shangkun (82), president of the state and executive vice-chairman of the CMC; Li Xiannian (80), chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's

[2] *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), July 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

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Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); Wang Zhen (81), vice president of the state and a CMC vice-chairman; Bo Yibo (81), executive vice-chairman of the CAC; Song Renqiong (80), vice-chairman of the CAC; Peng Zhen (87), retired chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; and Deng Yingchao (85), widow of Zhou Enlai, and a former Politburo member and ex-chair of the CPPCC National Committee.

Although the older generation was generally more "leftist"—i.e., more ideologically orthodox and less reformist—than the Politburo members, the two cleavages were to some degree cross-cutting: some of the younger Politburo members (e.g., Li Peng) were also orthodox, while some of the members of the older generation (e.g., Deng Xiaoping) supported reform. The main reason for this was that as a condition of their "retirement," the senior veterans had exacted the right to name their successors to the Politburo; thus, Yao Yilin was beholden to Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang to Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng to Deng Yingchao (and to Chen Yun). Hu Qili, an "orphan" of Hu Yaobang's China Youth League group, seems to have been "adopted" by Zhao Ziyang. These bonds of obligation ensured that the party did not have two centers but one. In fact, when important issues were at stake, the Politburo often met in "expanded" session, to which the gerontocrats were invited in their capacity as CAC members (or simply ad hoc). The elders took full advantage of their seniority and experience to weigh in on critical issues and, according to some reports, even had voting rights at these meetings.[3]

By the end of 1988, a strong leftist, anti-reform wind was blowing within the CCP leadership. The reform forces, stymied from further movement on the economic front by an uncontrollable double-digit inflation (which affected with particular severity reform-minded students and bureaucrats, who lived on fixed incomes), sought to counterattack on the political front. In December 1988, Hu Qili, Wang Renzhi, and Hu Sheng jointly planned and convened a seminar of reform intellectuals to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the December 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, which had effectively launched the post-Mao reforms. Among the more than 300 attendees were reform intellectuals Yu Guangyuan, Wang Ruoshui, Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi, and Tong Dalin. Su Shaozhi delivered a bold speech attacking the conservatives' campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization and calling for a reversal of verdicts on one of their victims, Wang Ruoshui. This speech was too bold even for the seminar's organizers, Hu Qili and Wang Renzhi, who as officials of the party propaganda apparatus, decreed that Su's presentation should not be published. Nonetheless, it appeared in Qin Benli's outspoken Shanghai newspaper, *Shijie jingji daobao* (*World Economic Herald*), together with an editorial contending that in building socialist democracy, "there is a need courageously to draw lessons" from "modern democratic forms" that "have developed in Western capitalism . . . ."[4]

In February and March 1989, the reform forces shifted their attention to human rights as the regime imposed martial law on Tibet for the first time since 1959.[5] Fang Lizhi petitioned Deng Xiaoping to release all "political prisoners" (the regime denies that any exist) and sent a similar letter to the Western press.[6] In the same period, two young literati, Bei Dao and Chen Jun, collected the signatures of some 33 scholars and writers (including prominent overseas Chinese) on a petition demanding amnesty for Wei Jingsheng, a Democracy Wall activist imprisoned since 1981 for his crusade on behalf of the "Fifth Modernization" (i.e., political democracy). Another "letter of opinion," signed by 44 scientists and scholars (including nuclear experts Wang Ganchang, Lu Liangying, and others), demanding the release of political prisoners and proposing structural reform of the political system, was submitted to the Standing Committee of the NPC.[7]

These pro-reform intellectuals had, for the most part, been protégés of Hu Yaobang, who was ousted from the CCP general secretaryship in January 1987 in the wake of the December 1986 student demonstrations. With him gone, they tended to look to Zhao Ziyang for protection. By early 1989, staunch opponents of liberalization were already holding Zhao responsible for the behavior of the reformists. Chen Yun reportedly circu-

[3]This inference is based on the fact that authoritative decisions issue from such "expanded" meetings, at which nonmembers are reputed to play an active role. Thus, a Politburo meeting was held on May 22–24, 1989, at which Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, and Wang Zhen, all "older veterans with great prestige" (but only one of whom is a Politburo member), decided to reaffirm the hard-line April 26 editorial and denounce Zhao's May 4 speech. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter, *FEER*), June 15, 1989, p. 13; *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), May 30, 1989. My supposition that the votes of these veteran leaders are counted is based on a conversation with Feng Shengbao, a former member of Bao Tong's Commission to Restructure the Political System.

[4]"New Realm in the Emancipation of Thinking," *Guangming ribao* (Beijing), Dec. 31, 1988.

[5]Martial law was imposed in Lhasa in March following the sanguinary suppression of riots touched off when police opened fire on a small group of monks involved in a peaceful demonstration on behalf of Tibetan autonomy. Some 60,000 PLA troops were brought in to help the police with mass arrests and house-to-house searches. *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), July 7, 1989, pp. 26–31.

[6]*Cheng Ming*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 6–10.

[7]*Ching Pao* (Hong Kong), Apr. 10, 1989, pp 22–23; *Cheng Ming*, Mar. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

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lated "Eight Opinions," accusing Zhao of a "failure to perform public opinion, ideological, and theoretical work properly," as well as neglecting grain production and central planning. Chen claimed that "the entire ideological front is occupied by the bourgeoisie, and nothing proletarian is left." Bo Yibo, who had prepared the indictment against Hu Yaobang in January 1987, submitted a "letter of appeal" to Deng Xiaoping complaining about the above-mentioned decennial conference (which he characterized as an "attack on the party Central Committee") and asking that publication of the *World Economic Herald* be suspended and its editor subjected to public criticism. Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo reportedly proposed three times to Deng that Zhao make a self-criticism for mistakes in his work.[8]

The criticism of Zhao from this conservative group (which, in addition to Chen, Wang and Bo, included Li Xiannian, Deng Yingchao, Yao Yilin, and Li Peng) continued to mount during the early spring. In March, Li Xiannian reportedly flew to Shanghai for secret talks with Deng Xiaoping, in which he urged that Zhao be pressed to make a self-criticism and to step down at the imminent Fourth Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee in order to clear the way for Li Peng to move into the general secretary slot, Yao Yilin to become premier, and Zou Jiahua (another leader who, like Li Peng, had studied in the Soviet Union) to replace Yao as vice-premier and head of the State Planning Commission. It was proposed that Zhao be allowed to stay on as vice-chairman of the state CMC for six months, as a sop. However, Deng decided to postpone the plenum and what promised to be a stormy leadership showdown until after the Sino-Soviet summit in May.[9]

Zhao thus was caught in the cross-fire between would-be constituents and factional antagonists. In response, he equivocated, adopting a tough rhetorical stance vis-à-vis reformist dissent without permitting a mass-criticism campaign or sanctions with teeth in them. His stance seemed to enjoy the continued protection of Deng, who on January 17, had delivered a speech contending that "we have made great achievements in reform over the past 10 years" and decrying the "trend toward taking the road back" (in economic policy).[10] Zhao and Hu Qili summoned Qin Benli, the editor of *World Economic Herald*, to Beijing for a reprimand following publication of Su Shaozhi's article, and Hu proclaimed a six-month moratorium on publishing anything written by the 33 protest signatories. But Su was not expelled from the CCP, and the case of Yu Haocheng (a jurist who had written an article in defense of human rights) was not investigated.[11] In addition, Zhao decided that Chen Yun's "Eight Opinions" need not be "transmitted throughout the country," and made it stick. In response to Bo's letter to Deng, Zhao remarked: "Intellectuals have their own understanding of problems. What is there to be surprised at?" Although the Propaganda Department compiled a list of targets for criticism, Zhao said at the last minute, "Just ignore it; there is no need for us to handle the case."[12]

However, Zhao did convene several Politburo meetings, during which he denounced Fang Lizhi and the various petition drives mentioned above as tools of international human rights organizations. At an enlarged Politburo meeting on March 5, Zhao gave what was labeled an "important speech" lambasting critics of China's Tibetan policy.[13] Moreover, large Public Security stations were established at major university campuses in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Xi'an, Wuhan, and Chengdu (Peking University reportedly had the largest one in the nation), and the State Council's Education Commission was encouraged to send work teams to various college campuses to see what the students were up to and to prevent signature-gathering on petitions, the affixing of inflammatory wall posters, or the formation of protest movements.[14]

Catalyzing Events

The second session of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which convened in March, brought new hope to reform advocates and also set in motion a chain of events that brought the struggle over reform to a head. To be sure, the session introduced no noteworthy policy initiatives. It hewed to the policy of "curing and rectification" set out in Premier Li Peng's work report, and it sought (not entirely successfully) to prevent the sort of spontaneous expression of unsolicited complaints or proposals that had characterized the first session in 1988—particularly taboo were suggestions for further privatization or calls for a multi-party system. However, the session witnessed the political reappear-

[8] *Ching Pao*, Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 22–23.

[9] *Cheng Ming*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9. The Fourth Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee originally expected to take place before the March 1989 meeting of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress, did not take place until June.

[10] *Cheng Ming*, Mar. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

[11] See Yu Haocheng, "Defending Human Rights," *Shijie zhishi* (Beijing), No. 23, 1988.

[12] *Cheng Ming*, Mar. 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

[13] Ibid., Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 9–10.

[14] Ibid.; *Ching Pao*, Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 22–23.

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ance of Hu Yaobang, who had not been active in policy forums since his January 1987 dismissal as general secretary.

Hu's real "comeback" came on April 8, at an enlarged Politburo meeting focusing on problems of education. Hu not only attended the meeting, but registered to address it. In carefully prepared remarks, he made an impassioned plea for greater support of education and for stabilizing the intellectuals' position in the life of the state so that this social force would rally around the party. During his speech, Hu fell into an altercation with his old nemesis Bo Yibo and was stricken with a heart attack. On April 15, Hu died. In a conversation with Li Rui shortly before his death, he reportedly confided that one of the things he most regretted was having submitted a self-criticism in January 1989 in which he had implicated others.[15]

Hu's death presented the leadership with two thorny problems: namely, what line to take on Hu and his 1987 "resignation," and how to respond to spontaneous demonstrations that broke out upon his death (might one say "martyrdom"?). Zhao and some colleagues proposed a compromise that would praise Hu as a "great Marxist" but not open the question of his resignation. Although Deng agreed to this compromise, some of the other elders refused to commit themselves. The memorial speech had to go through several drafts before winning approval.[16]

While the debate over the tone and content of the memorial speech went on, student protesters began to prepare for Hu's April 22 funeral. On the evening of April 19, thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square, where they staged a sit-in before the Xinhua gate and demanded the right to "petition" the CCP leaders. Their petition included demands for a reevaluation of the December 1986 student movement, a reassessment of Hu Yaobang's resignation, repudiation of the 1987 anti–spiritual pollution campaign, granting of freedom of the press, provision of more funds for students, and a crackdown on corruption. This demonstration was forcibly dispersed by armed police.[17]

Despite an official ban on demonstrations in the central square on April 22, the date of the official memorial service for Hu in the Great Hall of the People, an estimated 100–150,000 students occupied the square the night before and staged a sit-in, despite threatening troop and police movements and leaks to the effect that the Ministry of Public Security had already prepared a blacklist of student leaders from universities throughout the country. On the morning of April 22, more contingents of students began marching toward the square to reinforce their comrades. That evening, the Politburo held an urgent meeting at which it was resolved: not to relent on the campaign against bourgeois liberalization, not to permit the mourning to put pressure on the government, and to end the mourning for Hu.[18] In response, on April 24, the students declared a classroom boycott of indefinite duration and announced the formation of a "national students' federation preparatory committee"—the first step toward establishing autonomous student and labor unions.[19]

Zhao Ziyang had departed on April 23 for a scheduled week-long visit to North Korea for consultations with the Korean Workers' Party, leaving only vague instructions on how to cope with the escalating situation in Tiananmen Square. As soon as he was out of the country, party hard-liners began to respond to the demonstrations as if confronted by a national emergency. Li Peng convened the Politburo Standing Committee (Yang Shangkun also attended) on April 24 to discuss the situation. The next day Li and Yang reported to Deng Xiaoping, who came over to their way of thinking and gave a response that was recorded verbatim and widely circulated to cadres:

We have set a very high value on Hu Yaobang, . . . but some people do not feel satisfied with this. They want to build him up as a "great Marxist." We are not qualified to be "great Marxists." I am not qualified either. . . . Hu Yaobang was irresolute and made concessions in combating liberalization. The drive against spiritual pollution lasted only a little over 20 days. If we had vigorously launched the drive, the ideological field would not have been as it is today, and would not have been so tumultuous. . . . This is the same old stuff as was prevalent during the Cultural Revolution: Some people are craving nothing short of national chaos. . . . We must take a clear-cut stand and forceful measures to oppose and stop the upheaval. Don't be afraid of students, because we still have several million troops.[20]

Deng further claimed the demonstrations were led by

[15]See *Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26; also, *Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1989, pp. 11–12.

[16]*Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1989, pp. 10, 94–95; *Ching Pao*, July 10, 1989, pp. 42–48.

[17]*Cheng Ming*, May 1, 1989, pp. 94–95.

[18]*Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26. There seems to have been a split at the April 22 meeting, as Wan Li expressed the view that "we must not confront the tough with toughness." *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89.

[19]*Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10.

[20]*Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26.

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"people with ulterior motives" engaged in a "premeditated conspiracy" aimed at negating the socialist system, and he warned, as he had in December 1986, of the lessons learned from the Polish developments of 1980–81: "Events in Poland prove that making concessions provides no solutions. The greater the concessions the government made, the greater the opposition forces became."

The gist of Deng's views was incorporated into a now-famous editorial broadcast on April 25 and published on April 26 in the party daily, *Renmin ribao,* under the title: "It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against the Disturbance." It was immediately evident, however, that Deng's hard line was not going to be the solution to the growing crisis. On April 27, the largest spontaneous demonstration in 40 years of CCP rule was launched to protest the editorial. Although the authorities had warned that "troops will be dispatched when necessary" to enforce the official prohibition of demonstrations, security forces made only token efforts to halt the 50–100,000 students who marched all day through the streets of Beijing and finally broke through police lines to surge into Tiananmen Square. An estimated 1 million Beijing residents also poured out of their offices and factories to applaud and support the demonstrators.

Although Deng's remarks did not head off the demonstrations, they may have had one important effect: the protest organizers maintained tight discipline over their ranks to avoid provoking what appeared to be an imminent crackdown. They formed a human chain on either side of the eight-kilometer-long procession to maintain order and prevent outsiders from joining in or from suppressing the action and to prevent acts of vandalism. The marchers interspersed their protests with patriotic songs and slogans and in their vanguard carried banners proclaiming "Long Live Communism" and "Support the Correct Leadership of the Party."

The leadership was taken aback by these tactics and, in the absence of a consensus on how to cope with the situation, began to split into two factions—"hawks" and "doves." At an April 28 Politburo meeting on how to respond to the demonstrations, some of the younger members (reportedly including Yan Mingfu, Bao Tong, and Li Tianming) counseled against a crackdown. Yuan Mu, spokesman for the State Council, in a televised meeting with students on April 29 said that the target of the provocative April 26 editorial had been not the broad masses of patriotic students but "a small minority" of "behind-the-scenes plotters."[21]

[21]*FEER*, May 11, 1989, pp. 11–12.

Although Zhao Ziyang had reportedly originally approved the April 26 editorial by telegram from Pyongyang, upon his return from North Korea, he traveled to Beidaihe to apprise Deng of his misgivings about its "strident" tone. Deng, perhaps chastened by the miscarriage of his own preferred hard-nosed solution, reportedly told Zhao: "The most important thing you should do is stabilize the situation. . . . If the situation is under control, you can implement your plans if they prove feasible, disregarding whatever I have said."[22] Armed with this conditional endorsement, Zhao made an impromptu speech on May 4 to representatives of the Asian Development Bank assembled in Beijing, in which he set forth a new, softer line. Estimating that the majority of the students "are in no way opposed to our basic system; they only demand that we correct malpractices in our work," he called for further reforms to improve the legal system and for popular supervision over the party. "Now we must most urgently keep calm, exercise reason and restraint, and maintain order," he said. "We must solve problems on the track of democracy and legality."[23]

Zhao's soft line remained in effect for two weeks, although hard-liners disavowed it.[24] Unfortunately, it neither solved the immediate problem of removing the demonstrators from the square, nor succeeded in converting them into a mass base of support for long-term reforms. Zhao reportedly put forward two proposals to deal with the student movement—a return to the political line of the 13th CCP Congress (which had proposed reforms of the political structure) and the retirement of all senior cadres over the age of 75—but was unable to gain Politburo endorsement for them.[25] Yet, even these proposals (probably inadequate from the demonstrators' viewpoint) infuriated the hard-liners, who had been diverted from the crackdown on the demonstrators and were now watching for a sign of failure in the soft line so as to justify the purge of Zhao that they had already contemplated earlier in the year.

The period was a difficult one for the demonstrators. They had to cope with the regime's efforts to minimize differences between the government and the demonstrators and to co-opt them. These efforts fragmented the movement's leadership, leading to an escalation of student demands in an attempt to forestall attrition of

[22]*South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong—hereafter, *SCMP*), May 29, 1989; *Ming Pao*, May 26, 1989.

[23]*Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10.

[24]Li Peng and Yao Yilin complained that the Zhao speech had not been discussed in advance by the Politburo's Standing Committee. "Zhao Ziyang acted as a fine man, landing us in a passive position," Jiang Zemin reportedly remarked at a Politburo meeting during this period.

[25]*Ming Pao*, June 1, 1989.

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China's democracy movement in action, clockwise from above: thousands of students mourn former party leader Hu Yaobang; a demonstrator with a sign denouncing Premier Li Peng after he declared martial law in Beijing; students parade the "Goddess of Democracy" through Tiananmen Square on May 30; Qin Benli, editor of the World Economic Herald, *a Shanghai-based reform newspaper.*

—Photos by Magnum, Wide World, Gamma-Liaison, and Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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Drama in Beijing, clockwise from top left: nurses tend to student hunger strikers; a courageous Beijing citizen faces army tanks advancing toward Tiananmen Square on the Avenue of Eternal Peace on June 5; Jiang Zemin, secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, who was elevated to the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party on June 24, 1989; Zhao Ziyang, then party general secretary, speaks to the hunger strikers after martial law had been declared.

—First three photos by Magnum, last two by Eastfoto.



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the movement and maintain the opposition stance that gave the students' movement its identity. The students demanded a "dialogue" with the authorities, but when various representatives of the regime (including Yan Mingfu and Li Tianming) acceded to this demand, the students further demanded that the talks be televised. There resulted at least two such discussions on live TV (a four-hour session with Yuan Mu on April 29, and a meeting with Li Peng, Yan Mingfu, Chen Xitong, and others on May 18). After the first TV discussion, the students demanded that the government spokesmen meet exclusively with representatives of their autonomous student union (thereby conferring recognition on this group), and on May 13, some 1,000 students began a sit-in and hunger strike in Tiananmen Square to protest the refusal of the authorities to conduct such a dialogue.[26]

Enter *Glasnost'*

The hunger strike was doubtless timed to coincide with the scheduled May 15–18 summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and top Chinese leaders. The presence of large numbers of representatives from the Western news media in Beijing to record the summit not only gave the demonstrators reason to assume that there might not be any crackdown for at least three days, but it also provided them an international audience. They ignored Zhao's appeal not to disrupt the summit, thus forcing the authorities to shift the locus of several of the scheduled events of the summit, including the official welcoming ceremony for Gorbachev.

Perhaps also related in some measure to the summit, Hu Qili decided to accede on May 16 to a demand by Chinese journalists for greater press freedom, and China's central media promptly began to report on the demonstrations factually and prominently, disseminating this information throughout the land. In Beijing, the movement swelled to more than 1 million people.[27] Around the country, some cities, such as Xi'an and Shanghai, had already experienced unrest following Hu Yaobang's death; now, the democracy movement spread to more than 20 provincial capitals.

These developments spelt the doom of Zhao's conciliatory approach. Deng Xiaoping now threw his support to the hard-liners, and with Yang Shangkun, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian, arranged an expanded meeting of the CMC in the Western Hills of Beijing on May 16. The meeting rejected the declaration of nation-wide martial law, but apparently decided to impose it on parts of the capital and worked out a detailed plan to assemble the requisite troops.[28]

When leaders of some military regions said they would have difficulty in dispatching troops, Yang brought the problem to Deng, who traveled to Wuhan to meet with commanders and political commissars of the major military regions. Deng succeeded in getting troops transferred from Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, and Sichuan; 13 group armies out of a total of 24 in the country's seven military regions sent a total of some 100,000 well-armed soldiers to ring the capital. It was the first time since 1949 that main force units had been sent to Beijing (which is normally out of bounds for all but the Beijing garrison).[29]

At a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on May 16, Zhao made a "Five-Point Proposal" for concessions to the demonstrators: this included retraction of the April 26 editorial, assumption by Zhao of personal responsibility for its original publication, establishment of an organization under the NPC empowered to investigate corruption on the part of high officials or their relatives (including Zhao's two sons), and publication of details about the finances of high-level cadres (at the level of vice-minister and above), and elimination of their special privileges. This proposal was defeated by a vote of 4 to 1.[30]

That Zhao and Deng were now at loggerheads became evident later the same day, when Zhao met with Gorbachev. Zhao commented in the course of their talk that on the whole, political reform should keep up with economic reform, otherwise the latter could not succeed. Then, looking straight into the TV camera, he noted that "Since the 13th Party Congress, we have always made reports to and asked for opinions from comrade Deng Xiaoping while dealing with most important issues."[31] This remark, construed as flattery at the time, made Deng furious, since it revealed him to be the man pulling the strings behind the scenes at a time when very tough decisions were about to be made.

At a Politburo meeting on May 17, Zhao again argued that the April 26 editorial be disavowed, but Deng countered, "We cannot retreat. One retreat will lead to

[26] *FEER*, May 28, 1989, pp. 10–11, and June 1, 1989, pp. 12–18; *SCMP*, May 13, 1989.

[27] From May 16 to May 27, more than 200,000 students from other provinces poured into Beijing. The government sent more than 100,000 of these by offering them free tickets. See *Ming Pao*, May 26, 1989.

[28] *Asiaweek*, June 9, 1989, p. 24; *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89.

[29] *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89. See the transcript of the May 22 meeting containing Yang Shangkun's speech (which attributes responsibility for the fatal decision squarely to Deng Xiaoping), as published in *Ming Pao*, May 29, 1989.

[30] *FEER*, June 1, 1989, pp. 12–18; *Ming Pao*, May 21, 1989.

[31] *SCMP*, May 17, 1989.

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another," and added, "Comrade Ziyang, your speech to the Asian Development Bank officials on May 4 became a turning point because after that the students created more serious disturbances." Zhao replied, "Let comrade Xiaoping make the final decision."[32] But Zhao also wrote a letter addressed to Deng, the Politburo, and its Standing Committee, in which he said that he wanted to resign from his post of general secretary because his ideas were "different from yours, and I cannot go along with your decision; if I continue to work with the Standing Committee, I might be an obstacle to the Standing Committee's implementation of the ideas of several senior colleagues, including Chairman Deng."[33] His resignation was refused at the time, apparently for fear that it would strengthen his popularity and cast Deng and other leaders in a bad light.

At a Politburo meeting early on the morning of May 19, Zhao offered to take full responsibility for the demonstrations and, at the same time, called once again for an investigation into corruption by top leaders and their relatives, including his own sons. This apparently led to an argument between Deng and Zhao in which threats were exchanged. Zhao again offered his resignation, which Deng again rejected. Zhao then returned home, ordered a car, and drove out to the square to talk to some of the hunger strikers; he was followed by a suspicious Li Peng. "We've come too late," Zhao told the demonstrators. "I'm sorry. You criticize us and blame us. It is reasonable that you should do so."[34] Zhao then returned to Zhongnanhai (the leadership's special compound), where he refused to see visitors, claiming to be ill.

Shortly after Zhao's visit to the square, the military moved to occupy television and radio stations and the premises of the official print media, and large troop contingents began entering the capital. At midnight, Li Peng declared martial law in a nationally televised speech before an audience of several thousand party and military officials at a military hotel. Zhao's conspicuous absence from the group of five on the stage (which included the other four Politburo Standing Committee members, plus Yang Shangkun) made the split in the leadership public.[35]

Deng and the Politburo Standing Committee moved to strip Zhao of all his power and placed him under virtual house arrest. On May 23, the party's CMC sent a cable to the whole army, stating that only Deng and Yang had the right to transfer troops (as vice-chairman of the parallel state Central Military Commission, Zhao could conceivably have issued counteracting orders). Meanwhile, Zhao withdrew his resignation and defiantly refused to back down.[36]

In contrast to 1986–87, when dismissal of a sympathetic CCP general secretary (Hu Yaobang) left students alone and cowed, regime actions in May 1989 triggered a massive outpouring of support for the demonstrators. An estimated 1 million people flooded into the streets to protest martial law and prevent the military from marching to Tiananmen Square to evict the students. Throughout the weekend of May 20–21, there were equally impressive demonstrations of support in many other cities throughout China, including Guangzhou, as well as outside the PRC, e.g., in Hong Kong.

Even though Zhao was now powerless, his refusal to make a self-criticism may have heartened his supporters. The CCP leadership began to splinter. There are reports that Yan Mingfu and more than 150 other top party cadres wrote a joint letter to the Central Committee, urging it not to use force to suppress the pro-democracy movement. In the ministries of justice and public security, too, there was pro-Zhao (or anti-Li) sentiment. Some 260 high-ranking officers from the CMC, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department of the PLA, and the Beijing Military Region wrote a letter to Yang Shangkun arguing against any use of force to clear the square. On May 21, about two dozen veteran military officers tried in vain to get an audience with Deng Xiaoping; instead, Yang Shangkun met with a five-man delegation for about 30 minutes and asked them to take the overall situation into account and resolutely and unconditionally carry out CMC decisions. Later the same day, seven senior generals, including former Defense Minister Zhang Aiping and retired chief of staff Yang Dezhi, reportedly drafted a petition (signed by more than 100 other officers) calling on troops not to fight civilians, and sent it to the CMC; China's two surviving marshals, 90-year-old Nie Rongzhen and 88-year-old Xu Xiangqian, also expressed opposition to deploying PLA forces in civilian areas. Deng Yingchao issued a statement that refused to recognize martial law. Finally, some 57 of the 135 members of the NPC's Standing Committee demanded that the group's chairman, Wan Li, convene an emergency session of the parliament to deal with the crisis.[37]

[32] *Ming Pao*, May 30, 1989.

[33] *FEER*, June 8, 1989, pp. 14–18.

[34] *Asiaweek*, June 2, 1989, pp. 23–29, quote on p. 27.

[35] Yang told an emergency meeting of the CMC on May 24, "The students feel there is a person in the Party CC who supports them, and therefore, they stir up greater trouble. . . . Without the participation of the General Secretary, people could immediately discern the problem." *Ming Pao*, May 29, 1989.

[36] *Asiaweek*, June 2, 1989, pp. 23–29.

[37] *Cheng Ming*, June 1, 1989, pp. 6–10, 89. In response to the bidding of the NPC, a cautious Wan Li returned prematurely from a trip to the United States on May 25, but he then accepted Deng Xiaoping's invitation to "rest" in Shanghai until the situation sorted itself out in Beijing. *Ming Pao*, May 31, 1989.

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The initial euphoria over the unexpected failure of the authorities to enforce martial law did not last long. Once the authorities had informed the demonstrators that their acts were now illegal and had regained control over the news media, the movement's momentum seemed to slacken. After Zhao's removal, the government replaced negotiations with a cold silence. The student demonstrators, who had numbered some 200,000 at the height of the protest, dwindled to approximately 10,000 on the eve of the June 3–4 crackdown, and the movement's leadership was riven by disputes over what the next step should be. Nevertheless, sustained by a stream of cash donations from China's private sector and from overseas sympathizers, and reinforced by recruits streaming into the capital, the movement was hard put to dissolve itself.

The CCP leadership was similarly unsure about how to proceed. The failure of the hard-line strategy to remove the demonstrators seemed to validate Zhao's arguments. Because his opponents seemed to have willy-nilly adopted his Fabian strategy, it would be hard to expel Zhao from the party leadership for violations of party discipline. To charge Zhao with the more serious offense of being a counterrevolutionary would subject him to a possible death penalty, and there were fears that the accusation that the Secretary General was splitting his own party would be greeted with ridicule and would probably not win acceptance from a majority in the Central Committee. Hence, the Fourth Plenum was delayed further.

Finally, the hard-liners decided to accuse Zhao of links to a "counterrevolutionary rebellion" of their own making. On the afternoon of June 2, Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin held a meeting at Deng's home to finalize preparations for the forcible dispersing of the student demonstrators. Upon learning of the decision, Zhao made phone calls to Yang, Li, and other Standing Committee members to appeal to them not to carry out the crackdown. On the same evening, he apparently staged his own brief hunger strike.[38]

The Massacre and Sequel

Once the decision was made to use armed military troops to remove the demonstrators from Tiananmen, it was carried out swiftly and brutally. On the night of June 3–4, the PLA, which had been stationed in and around Beijing, used its overwhelming firepower to clear the streets, killing at least several hundred civilians in and about Tiananmen. As in 1987, the move against democratic forces in the capital was immediately generalized throughout the country, only in much harsher terms than before. The number of officially reported arrests as of early July 1989 exceeded 2,500; unofficial estimates put the figure at more than 10,000. Officials have announced at least 27 executions. Secret lists of intellectuals whose thinking was considered to be a source of the students' misbehavior were compiled for systematic pursuit and purge. As in the campaigns of the 1950's, units have been assigned quotas of purge targets in at least some instances.[39]

Following the bloodbath of June 3–4, there was a brief hiatus during which few members of the central leadership were to be seen. Then on June 9, Deng, looking radiant, made a surprise TV appearance (his first since the Gorbachev summit). Together with other gerontocrats and a covey of military officers he paid tribute to the soldiers who had died defending the capital against "anarchy." His speech on that occasion has been quoted more extensively than any other document since the days of Chairman Mao.[40] At roughly the same time, in preparation for the convening of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee on June 23, all full and alternate members of the CCP Central Committee were invited to a meeting to see doctored documentaries on the "counterrevolutionary rebellion," listen to reports, and study Deng's speech; this was followed by group discussions of the materials.[41]

According to officials charged with preparing for the Fourth Plenum, more than 50 Central Committee members and alternate members asked for sick leave or a leave of absence so as not to have to attend the plenum, an indication of continuing sharp division within this important party body. Zhao Ziyang's request for an opportunity to speak at the plenum was rejected.[42] Fittingly enough, it was Li Peng who presented the Politburo report that expelled Zhao from all his party posts. A special group was also set up to "look further into his case," leaving open the possibility that Zhao may yet be expelled from the party and placed on trial (the former is a precondition for the latter, because party members cannot be tried). Through the summer and fall of 1989, this possibility steadily receded, as Deng Xiao-

[38] *Cheng Ming*, July 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

[39] *FEER*, July 6, 1989, pp. 10–13.

[40] Ibid., June 29, 1989, pp. 10–12.

[41] *Cheng Ming*, July 1, 1989, pp. 6–9.

[42] Ibid. Zhao was allowed to make a statement in his own defense to an expanded Politburo meeting convened before the plenum; in this speech, he denied criminal links to "counterrevolutionaries" and insisted that he had acted out of what he had believed were the best interests of the party and the people.

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ping finally rallied to the defense of his own economic reforms, whose survival would have been jeopardized by a public trial of one so closely associated with them.

To replace Zhao as secretary general, Chen Yun nominated Yao Yilin, while Peng Zhen recommended Qiao Shi. Deng broke the resulting stalemate by nominating Jiang Zemin, former party secretary of Shanghai, who won by only a slight majority of seven votes. Jiang studied in Moscow in the early 1950's, where he was almost certainly a classmate of Li Peng, and he is said to be very close (rumored to be a son-in-law) to Li Xiannian. Widely perceived a supporter of reform when deputy secretary of the Shanghai Municipal CCP Committee, Jiang came to Deng's attention for the hard line he took against the *World Economic Herald* (firing editor Qin Benli when he published minutes from a restricted briefing on Hu Yaobang in April), and his successful suppression of Shanghai's democracy movement. After the Beijing massacre, he took charge of a nationwide propaganda campaign that blanketed the country with very skillfully assembled videos and photographs that purported to prove that the capital had been threatened by a counterrevolutionary insurrection.

The plenum purged Hu Qili from the Politburo, but he retained his seat on the Central Committee. It also removed from the secretariat, in addition to Zhao, Rui Xingwen, formerly in charge of ideology, and united front chief Yan Mingfu, who had borne overall responsibility for negotiations with the democracy demonstrators. Also apparently purged were Wan Jiabao (head of the CC's General Affairs Department), Du Rensheng (director of the CC's Rural Policy Research Center), An Zhiwen (vice-minister of the State Commission for Reform of the Economic Structure), and Bao Tong (head of the Institute for Reform of the Political Structure).

Chief beneficiaries of this purge include Song Ping, 72, a former chief of the Organization Department, vice-minister and then minister of the State Planning Commission (a Cultural Revolution "survivor" and protégé of Chen Yun); and Li Ruihuan, 55, an energetic former mayor of Tianjin (rumored to be the son-in-law of Wan Li). Both became full members of the new six-man Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, together with Li Peng, Jiang Zemin, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin. Li Ruihan was also given the propaganda portfolio and promptly initiated a purge of *Renmin ribao*.

On June 30, the NPC Standing Committee, on which the reformers had staked their last desperate hopes, finally held its Eighth Session, to "study and discuss" the decisions of the previous week's Central Committee Plenum. The NPC Standing Committee's Chairman, Wan Li, called the military crackdown "legal, correct, and necessary," noting pointedly that "proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation represented by comrade Deng Xiaoping had played a significant role in this struggle." Hu Jiwei, a member of the Standing Committee and president of the journalism confederation, came under criticism for having led a signature campaign to petition the NPC Standing Committee to convene a special session to abrogate martial law. Deng Xiaoping personally moved to dismiss Zhao Ziyang from his last remaining governmental position, that of vice-chairman of the state Central Military Commission (the shadow body of the party CMC). The motion carried overwhelmingly, although three of the 132 Standing Committee members, resisting strong pressure to make the vote unanimous, abstained from voting altogether, and three others failed to activate the voting mechanism.[43]

Tiananmen in Perspective

The hard-liners' actions were swift and "effective" in obtaining their immediate objectives of ending the demonstrations and removing Zhao from power. The long-term impact of the crackdown remains to be seen. At this point, one can offer only a tentative assessment of the consequences of these events on the Chinese political system, on economic performance and policy, and on China's relations with the outside world. Let us explore these three subject areas in reverse sequence, which reflects their ascending order of importance.

Impact on China's "open door." Although the new leadership has reaffirmed China's interest in continued economic openness to the outside world, such relations have been seriously damaged because of the crackdown. This is not an inconsequential matter. In the period 1978–87, the share of foreign trade in China's total gross national product had increased from 10.2 percent to 29.7 percent, making the PRC more trade-dependent than the United States.[44] In response to US President George Bush's call on international lending institutions to postpone issuance of new loans to the PRC as a sign of outrage at the Beijing massacre, the World Bank and Japan froze aid projects worth some US$10 billion; the Asian Development Bank postponed decision on new loans worth some $1 billion; and the International Monetary Fund also suspended action on loan applications from China. It is unlikely that private commercial banks will extend additional loans until international aid agencies decide to make new commit-

[43] *SCMP*, July 1, 1989.
[44] *FEER*, Mar. 2, 1989, p. 49.

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ments. Although moral compunctions may play some role in the decision whether or not to resume lending to China, a more important factor by far is how lending institutions perceive the prospects for China's economic stability over the next several years—witness the announcement by Moody's Investors' Service that it would review China's credit rating.[45] Over the next six months, foreign investment and loan agreements signed before June 3 will provide a steady capital inflow to China, but by the second half of 1990, as the sanctions take hold, the country will face a liquidity crisis.

Western firms already involved in China will presumably try to make good on existing investments, but firms that were on the verge of investing are now likely to think twice. The tourist industry, an important source of hard currency ($2.2 billion in 1988), has most obviously been adversely affected: major hotels in the PRC reported occupancy rates of 7–10 percent in June.[46]

Yao Yilin apparently has suggested in an unpublished speech that China deal with its sudden financial ostracism by turning its back on the United States and Japan and seeking closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.[47] However, the USSR has its own budget deficit at present and may not be prepared to offer appreciably better trade terms than the West, despite the recent normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.[48]

Retrenchment and reform setbacks. China is likely to experience budget and trade deficits in the coming year and well beyond. The crackdown has clearly reinforced the economic retrenchment that has been under way since the Third Plenum of the 13th Central Committee, in September 1988. To the extent that the retrenchment has succeeded in cooling the overheated Chinese economy, it has reduced state revenues. The PRC seems to be heading into its fifth consecutive year of agricultural stagnation, which will probably require it to import as much as 15–16 million tons of grain in 1989.[49] The Chinese government forecast a $2 billion deficit for the year in March, but the figure is now likely to be higher, due to expenditures for the maintenance of martial law troops and for price subsidies and worker bonuses approved in the hope of quelling social discontent. To slow continuing price rises, the authorities have been both diverting exports to the domestic market and importing more. These two steps had already resulted in a $4.6 billion trade deficit for the January–May period.[50] If more money is printed to cope with the twin deficits, inflation will accelerate.

The difference between the current retrenchment and earlier ones, as Zhao Ziyang pointed out,[51] is that this is the first to be superimposed on a two-tiered price system, so it is quite possible to get a slowdown of economic growth without any decline in inflation, a phenomenon known in the West as "stagflation." Indeed, this seems to have been the impact of the "curing and rectification" campaign so far—inflation has remained high or even escalated (it was running at an annual rate of 28.5 percent from January through May 1989), despite an economic slowdown, bankruptcies, growing unemployment, and budget deficits.[52]

It is possible to argue that a period of political repression is more consistent with this particular phase of China's "business cycle" than would be the initiation of ambitious new reforms, economic or political. Throughout the last decade, periods of reform vitality have consistently coincided with economic expansion, blatant appeals to material appetites, and rising living standards. By contrast, during periods of economic retrenchment, the reform process has slowed or given way to campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and other forms of corruption, to repudiation of materialism in favor of "thought and political work" and selflessness, as symbolized by Lei Feng.

If the bleak economic forecast given above is accurate, one might reasonably expect this period of economic retrenchment to be relatively short. In the past, when such upheavals resulted in the deferral of reforms, the balance always eventually swung back in favor of new reforms, with the apparent help of Deng. However, this time, Deng's commitment to reform seems less certain, and his position may be much weaker without Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili. Moreover, given Deng's complaint that the cause of present difficulties is the failure to carry out thorough anti-liberalization campaigns in the past, one might reasonably expect

[45] *Asiaweek*, June 30, 1989, pp. 28–34.

[46] Based on a conversation with an American teacher who remained in Shanghai through late June 1989.

[47] *Asiaweek*, June 9, 1989, p. 2. In September 1989, a new "half-half" policy was announced, according to which future Chinese foreign trade will be equally divided between Western capitalist countries, on the one hand, and various socialist countries, on the other. *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 14, 1989.

[48] Indeed, one of the reasons that the USSR has been so willing to allow its East European allies to find their own path to socialism is that the Soviet Union can no longer afford to subsidize them. From a personal communication with Oleg Bogomolov, director the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System.

[49] *Kuang Chiao Ching* (Hong Kong), Apr. 16, 1989, pp. 22–25, *FEER*, July 13, 1989, p. 71.

[50] *Asiaweek*, July 7, 1989, pp. 26–31.

[51] Xinhua (Beijing), Apr. 11, 1989, as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Apr. 12, 1989, pp. 13–14.

[52] *Asiaweek*, July 7, 1989, pp. 26–31; *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 1385, May 15, 1989; *FEER*, Oct. 20, 1988, pp. 70–71.

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this latest campaign to be more protracted.

The price reform launched in the spring of 1988 proved politically disastrous, and ownership reforms have encountered ideological objections from those with whom Deng chose to align himself to crack down on the democracy activists. There does not seem to be a very coherent policy program to return to, and surviving reformers may well be too shell-shocked to stick their necks out for new experiments.

Conservatives within the leadership have sought—increasingly so after the elimination of both Hu and Zhao—to utilize the retrenchment to gut market reforms and restore the planning apparatus. The rectification campaign launched under the auspices of Jiang Zemin has focused its attacks on private businesses, services, and rural enterprise—all areas associated with Zhao Ziyang—claiming that these are the source of corruption and inequality. The government has also renewed its monopoly over the pricing and distribution of some major commodities—such as cotton, steel, and grain—reimposing single fixed prices in hopes of thereby curbing inflation. Since the Third Plenum of the 13th CC, the number of commodities over which the government has resumed monopoly control has risen from a dozen or so to 32. The central planning system, led by the powerful State Planning Commission, has regained the importance it enjoyed before the reforms. The wings of enterprises are being clipped as the People's Bank of China tries to limit the expansion of credit. In foreign trade, all unauthorized companies are targeted for closing.

Political system. As for the political system per se, the prospect of "structural reform" can probably be dismissed for the foreseeable future. Even the credibility of those modest political reforms that have been achieved (particularly the notion of the CAC as a solution to the problems of superannuated cadres and, more generally, of political institutionalization) has been left in shambles by this latest episode.

The line of political succession has also gone awry for the second time in as many years. In July, Deng Xiaoping again expressed his desire to step out of the limelight, and in September, he indicated that Jiang Zemin was his candidate for the succession.[53] Yet, Deng has also been quoted as refusing to resign from the chairmanship of the party's CMC until the CAC, chaired by Chen Yun, is dissolved.[54]

Beyond the problem of which individual is to succeed to power, China will also continue to face for the next decade or so the issue of the death of an entire generation of leaders. Until their successors are firmly in place, the CCP leadership may well remain unstable.

Of even greater significance, perhaps, is the question of legitimacy. That the legitimacy of the regime was severely damaged by the bloodbath is a journalistic cliché. Even before the Tiananmen massacre, legitimacy was seriously attenuated, explaining the difficulty the regime had in deciding how and when to use the army. According to Deng Xiaoping's conceptualization—namely, that legitimacy is based on the credibility of the threat to use violence—the crackdown should have bolstered legitimacy.[55] But if legitimacy is based on any notion of the reasoned consent of the governed, the use of violence to compel obedience signals a failure. We may well have an opportunity over the next few years to see which of these theories is most relevant.

By way of conclusion, it would seem that the majority of the top Chinese leadership, facing very serious and complex problems for which no easy solutions presented themselves, succumbed to the temptation to translate these problems into moral and ideological terms with which they were more familiar. But the betting at this point is that this translation was not appropriate to contemporary circumstances, i.e., that the suppression of the democracy demonstrators and purge of the reformers will not solve, but rather will exacerbate, the underlying problems of contemporary China. The most basic of these underlying problems, it seems to me, is the need to construct a credible vision of the nation's future economic development, around which a political consensus can be built.

[53]Deng's most recent succession scenario was publicly disclosed in a commentary by Yuan Mu in *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 10, 1989. See *Oakland Tribune*, Oct. 11, 1989, p. C/10.

[54]*SCMP*, Apr. 12, 1989.

[55]Deng, a strong advocate of the use of violence to teach lessons, whether to Vietnam, to Democracy Wall activists, or to potential criminals (he once called capital punishment an indispensable educational technique), believed that the legitimacy of the communist system had been eroding largely because of the failure of weaklings like Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang to maintain the credibility of the regime's willingness to use force. Deng's disappointment in Hu was quite evident in his posthumous remarks of April 25; see *Ching Pao*, May 10, 1989, pp. 22–26.

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Chinese Democracy in 1989: Continuity and Change

Andrew J. Nathan

In the late 1960's millions of Red Guards, who had earlier taken to the streets full of faith in Mao, found themselves discarded in the countryside where they discovered that the peasants were still living in primitive conditions after two decades of socialist development. In 1971, Mao Zedong's "closest comrade-in-arms" and trusted successor Lin Biao perished in the course of his alleged military coup attempt against the Great Helmsman. These events provoked a sense of moral outrage among significant numbers of Chinese, as they began to ask themselves how such things could have happened.

All over the country, thousands formed small groups to discuss what had gone wrong with the political system. Some wrote letters of protest or advice to Chairman Mao; a few may have plotted violent action against the regime. These groups were rooted out by the police in campaigns called "cleansing of class ranks" (1968–69) and "one-strike, three-anti" (1970–71). Hundreds of their members were executed.[1] Although the regime surmounted this particular crisis of political control, its ideological control continued to weaken.

Only one group of dissidents of the early 1970's became known in the West, after its members hung a wall poster in Canton in 1974 under the pseudonym Li Yizhe. The poster attacked Maoist autocracy in the thin disguise of what it called the "Lin Biao system." As a solution to the flaws of dictatorship, the Li Yizhe group called on the National People's Congress (NPC) to exercise its powers.[2] The Li Yizhe group thus introduced what was to become a consistent strategy of Chinese democrats, namely, attempting to ameliorate or circumvent one-party dictatorship by taking seriously the provision, found in every constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC), that the National People's Congress is the supreme organ of government. This strategy was prominently reflected in many articles written during the debate over political reform in 1986–87. It surfaced again during the May 1989 crisis when Cao Siyuan, a self-styled lobbyist affiliated with the Stone Group Corporation (a privately-owned computer company in Beijing), and Hu Jiwei, a reformist member of the NPC Standing Committee, attempted to convene a meeting of the Standing Committee to overturn Premier Li Peng's May 20 declaration of martial law. After the crackdown on June 4, Cao was arrested and Hu subjected to political denunciation.

By 1989, what had started as congeries of small, isolated, clandestine groups which did not know of each other's existence, had grown step by step—through the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1976, the Democracy Wall movement of 1978–79, and the student demonstrations of 1985 and 1986–87—into a national force that apparently had the participation or sympathy of almost all urban residents in China. In the process, the movement for Chinese democracy became more complicated in its social composition and in its mix of political goals and tactics.

Although the movement crossed a major watershed in 1989, when many intellectuals gave up hope that the regime of Deng Xiaoping was capable of reforming itself politically from within, both before and after June 4, the democratic movement of 1989 retained strong continuities in personnel, goals, and tactics with its prede-

Andrew J. Nathan is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University (New York). He is the author of Chinese Democracy *(1985) and* China's Crisis, *to be published in 1990.*

[1]Interviews by author in New York on Aug. 12, Oct. 25, and Nov. 20, 1987; *Chung-kung nien-pao* (Yearbook of Chinese Communism), Taipei, Chung-kung yen-chiu tsa-chih she, 1969 and 1971.

[2]*Chinese Law and Government* (Armonk, NY), Vol. 10, No. 3, Fall 1977, pp. 15–62.

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cessors. The mainstream democratic movement has always maintained hope that the authorities would initiate the changes for which it was calling. Indeed, the movement's moderation is striking. Chinese democrats have consistently positioned themselves as remonstrators rather than opponents, pressing the party to reform in its own interests and in keeping with its own ideals.[3] This position did not change in 1989. The movement's main organizations—comprised before June 4 of the Capital Federation of Autonomous College Student Organizations (*Gaozilian*), the Capital Federation of Intellectual Circles (*Beizhilian*), and the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (*Gongzilian*), and, after June 4, of the Chinese Democratic Alliance (*Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian*), the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States, and the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (also known as China Spring)—have all said that they do not seek the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even after the regime's use of force on June 4, the main elements of the democracy movement have not changed their commitment to nonviolent methods in bringing about political change.

Several factors account for the moderation of the democracy movement. The Chinese democrats have long believed that the regime was capable of reform from within, and the democrats themselves continued to believe in socialism, albeit of a democratic variety. But a moderate approach was also prudent, for the regime retained command over the police and the military, and it previously showed itself willing to use these instruments of coercion to suppress the opposition. Finally, the democracy movement was made up almost entirely of students and intellectuals, a small minority within Chinese society. These people lacked the numbers and the willingness to confront the regime head-on. These factors combined to incline Chinese democrats to press for a "self-limiting revolution" in the People's Republic of China.

Reform From Within

Perhaps the most important factor of those mentioned above is that the regime's ideology claims to be democratic and leaders of the opposition have thus had reason to hope for reform from within. All four constitutions of the PRC affirmed popular sovereignty, contained provisions for citizens to vote and run for office, and guaranteed the rights of free speech, assembly, petition, and demonstration. Even if largely rhetorical, such provisions pay tribute to the strength of democratic yearnings in China and set standards that the regime has to pretend to meet in some fashion.

Mao resolved the contradiction between rhetoric and reality with the concept of "democratic dictatorship," which held that the system was democratic because the totalitarian vanguard party was serving the highest interests of the people—whether they liked it or not. Those subjected to repression were not the people but their enemies. However cynical the argument, many Chinese believed in it and in Mao's benevolence and wisdom. Many blamed the problems that they encountered in their own lives on individual cadres rather than on the system and the assumption was widespread that Mao did not intend the abuses that were carried out in his name. Paradoxically, the practice of writing letters of remonstrance and appeal to Mao was common in the darkest days of his regime, perhaps more common than in his relatively lenient periods.

Such beliefs had faded by the time of the Tiananmen Square Incident of April 5, 1976, especially among the sophisticated factory and office workers and Communist Youth League members in the capital who formed the main force of the demonstrators.[4] But the demonstrators still directed the brunt of their criticism at those around Mao and not at Mao himself. This made it possible for Deng's regime, which never contemplated full de-Maoization, to reverse the verdict on the incident only two years after Mao's death.

Hopes for democratization from the top down revived after Mao's passing. Under Hu Yaobang's leadership of the CCP Organization Department, millions of individuals were exonerated from unjust criminal and political verdicts and rehabilitated, some posthumously. Property was returned, jobs restored, reputations cleared. Hu sponsored the "debate over practice as the sole criterion of truth," which opened the way for the expression of fresh ideas that party theorists had been nurturing in "cowpens" and May 7 cadre schools during the years when they were condemned to internal exile.

Most participants in the Democracy Wall movement in 1978–79 were convinced that Deng wanted democratization and welcomed their suggestions. Only a few like Wei Jingsheng argued that Deng was a "new dictator," that temporary tolerance for unsolicited advice was not equivalent to a restructuring of power, and that

[3]Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986, Chs. 1 and 2.

[4]Tens of thousands of demonstrators mourning the recently deceased Zhou Enlai and criticizing Mao and his close collaborators were forcibly dispersed on this day.

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a democratic climate without democratic institutions could easily dissipate whenever a change of course was initiated at the top. In the eyes of most intellectuals, the arguments of Wei and those who thought like him were premature. The intellectuals believed that reform is invariably a lengthy process; moreover, although Deng could not afford to move too fast because of conservative resistance in the party, he nevertheless was proceeding with deliberate speed in a democratic direction and had to be given plenty of time. Most democratic activists saw Deng's arrest of Wei and his fellow-thinkers as regrettable but inevitable. At the time it was felt by many that what Wei had said was true enough, but it was not the time to say it.

In 1980, Deng himself called for political reform, reviving the hope that he would pilot China toward democracy. In a major speech delivered in August, he set modest goals and stressed that political reform was meant to strengthen, not weaken, party leadership.[5] Some people around Deng, such as Liao Gailong, took the speech as license to argue for more far-reaching reforms, including the vitalization of the people's congress system.[6] For some of the democrats, reform of the people's congress election system opened the vista of a parliamentary road to influence. They competed vigorously in the county-level elections held in 1979–81.[7] Until 1989, Deng continued to entertain the notion of political reform and allowed it to be discussed sporadically. An especially vigorous public discussion took place during 1986–87, after Deng had stated that political restructuring must be part of the reform agenda.

It is clear in retrospect that Deng meant what he said when he warned that reform must not infringe on the four cardinal principles, namely, keeping to the socialist road, upholding the people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, but this warning was not so clearly understood at the time he issued it. His words and actions were ambiguous. His speeches contained little abstract political discussion, making it hard to determine the intellectual logic of his position. Some thought the ambiguity was tactical, as he maneuvered to maintain a fragile coalition of reformers and conservatives. Others viewed Deng as intellectually confused, unaware that he could not reform the economy without reforming politics. My guess is that Deng shared the assumption of many Chinese political thinkers, including Mao, that democracy is an instrument of mobilization whose function is to strengthen the links of citizens to the state, rather than a set of procedures for limiting state power to protect individual rights.[8] Thus, Deng did not see a contradiction between his vision of democracy and a benevolent dictatorship exercised by him and his party.

Although one may argue that Chinese democrats misread Deng, they were probably not entirely wrong in thinking that Deng's closest aides and designated successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were willing to consider relatively far-reaching measures of political reform. Hu, head of the CCP Organization Department in 1977–78 and CCP General Secretary from 1982 to 1987, sponsored a two-part "Conference for the Discussion of Guidelines for Theoretical Work" (*Lilun gongzuo wuxu hui*) in January–April 1979, at which liberal party thinkers he had rehabilitated or promoted began the overhaul of Chinese Marxism-Leninism needed to provide an ideological basis for reform.[9] Under a pseudonym, at least one of the works produced at this conference found its way into a publication at Democracy Wall.[10]

According to people who worked with Hu, his driving motive was to guarantee that another Cultural Revolution could never occur. Thus, he advocated subjecting the ruling party to outside challenges and criticism. Although his vision of political pluralism did not envisage a rotation in power between the CCP and other political parties, Hu was willing to consider a number of other suggestions, such as expanding the role of the NPC and dividing it into two or three chambers. Hu also believed that the women's organizations, the Communist Youth League, trade unions, and professional associations should have greater independence from the CCP, saying, "If we control them so tightly, why bother to have separate organizations?"[11]

Hu was popular among intellectuals for his openness to their ideas, and was criticized by the army newspa-

[5]Deng's August 18, 1980, speech, "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership," in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982)*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1984, pp. 302–25.

[6]Liao Gailong, "The '1980 Reform' Program of China," *Chiushih niantai* (Hong Kong), Mar. 1, 1981, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Mar. 16, 1981, pp. U/1–29.

[7]Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, Ch. 10.

[8]Ibid., Chs. 4, 6.

[9]Wei Shiqing, "History Will Not Forget This Meeting: Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Conference for the Discussion of Guidelines on Theoretical Work," *Huaqiao ribao* (New York), Feb. 1, 1989, pp. 2, 10.

[10]Yan Jiaqi wrote "The Secret of Modern Religion," under the pseudonym Bu Shuming in *Beijing zhi chun* No. 1, 1979, and "Democratic Self-Management and the Theory of the Withering Away of the State," under the pseudonym Wen Qi in ibid., No. 6. He had given the latter as a speech at the theoretical work conference in 1979. Personal conversation with Yan Jiaqi, New York, Aug. 1, 1979.

[11]Interview by author, New York, Aug. 28, 1989.

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per in 1982 for laxness in maintaining ideological discipline. He was purged from his party secretaryship in January 1987, after student demonstrations persuaded the party elders that he was allowing "bourgeois liberalization" to get out of hand. It was his death on April 15, 1989, that triggered the student demonstrations.

Zhao Ziyang's record was more ambiguous. His chief commitment was to economic growth, and for him the main question seemed to be what sort of political structures would best meet the needs of economic development. It seemed inevitable that the marketization he favored would lead indirectly to the eventual breakup of dictatorship. But beyond this some advisors found him receptive to the argument that development in the modern age would eventually require lifting constraints on information and tolerating social pluralism and its more open political conflict. Zhao was associated with the theory of the "primary stage of socialism," which legitimated a diversity of social interests. His aide Bao Tong articulated the concept of "the new order of the socialist commodity economy," which rationalized wider use of elections and more political openness.[12] In 1986, Bao Tong authorized the establishment in Beijing of the Fund for the Reform and Opening of China, financed by the American businessman George Soros, and operating, at least officially, independently of Chinese government control. According to one report, Zhao commissioned the preparation of a political reform proposal that included ideas for multi-party competition and an independent press.[13] These actions indicated that Zhao was interested in a substantial opening and pluralization of the political system, at least over the long term.

On the other hand, Zhao presented a notably cautious program in the section on political reform of his report to the 13th Party Congress in October 1987. In the months before his fall from power, people around him promoted a theory called the "new authoritarianism," which argued that in the present, relatively early state of development China needs an enlightened autocrat to direct economic development while keeping order and protecting people's rights. We will probably never know to what extent this argument reflected Zhao's technocratic convictions, and to what extent it was propounded as a means to induce Deng Xiaoping to hand over power to Zhao quickly and without dividing it among several successors.

In any case, during the May-June crisis Zhao's tactics shifted. According to the subsequent official charges against him, he supported Deng Xiaoping's hard line on the demonstrations while he was on a state visit to North Korea in late April. But upon his return he changed his position, calling for the withdrawal of the controversial *People's Daily* editorial that branded the demonstrations a "turmoil" and advocating other concessions.[14] His conciliatory words and actions in public indicated that calls for the resignation of Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping did not displease him. On the eve of the declaration of martial law, officials and intellectuals associated with Zhao issued a six-point statement blaming the crisis on Deng and calling for special NPC and CCP meetings to examine errors of the past and, by implication, to summon Zhao (who had already been unofficially purged) back to power. In the aftermath of the June 4 crackdown, many members of Zhao's liberal brain trust fled the country. They now appear to maintain links with the exile democratic movement headed by Yan Jiaqi, a political scientist and former advisor to Zhao. Because they represent a faction within the CCP that may some day return to power, their alliance with the democracy movement allows Chinese democrats to continue even now to hope for reform of the communist regime from within.

That Zhao's interest in democracy during the crisis may have been tactical does not render it insignificant. Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy normally come about when authoritarian rulers see tactical advantages in such shifts. If Zhao's effort to play the democracy card had succeeded, he might have reverted soon to a more authoritarian position in order to consolidate his power and address China's economic problems. But meanwhile, Zhao's behavior demonstrated that those who hoped for change of the Chinese communist system from within had some grounds for their hopes.

Whatever the personal views of various party leaders, by the end of 1988, the actual achievements of officially-sponsored political reform were meager. They included regularization and expansion of the role of people's congresses, direct elections of county-level people's congress deputies, limitations on terms of office for some party and state officials, establishment of

[12]Bao Tong, "Several Questions Concerning the Current Reform of the Political Structure," *Qiushi* (Beijing), July 1, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 19, 1988, pp. 21–26.

[13]*Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), June 1, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 31, 1989, p. 29.

[14]Chen Xitong, "Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion" (hereafter—"Report"), *Beijing Review*, July 17–23, 1989, pp. I–XX. More details of the charges against Zhao are contained in "Main Points of Yang Shangkun's Speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting of Central Military Commission on May 24, 1989 (edited from transcript of speech)," *Ming Pao*, (Hong Kong), May 29, 1989, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1989, pp. 17–20.

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employee councils in state-owned enterprises, and the enactment of several hundred laws conducive to procedural regularity. The reform program also endorsed collective leadership in the party, orderly succession, the rule of law, and independence of the judiciary, but these desiderata remained weakly institutionalized.[15]

There were signs that some in the leadership favored further steps toward political reform in 1989, including passing a law making the press more free and independent but still subject ultimately to party guidance; enacting a law on demonstrations permitting peaceful gatherings while still enabling the government to restrict their scope;[16] reducing the role of party officials in student organizations, trade unions, enterprises, and schools, while preserving the party organs in these units as watchdogs; and further strengthening the role of the National People's Congress as a legislative and oversight organ under overall party guidance. In the crisis of spring 1989, even such half-way steps might have sufficed to satisfy many of the demonstrators. In the long run, they were unlikely to satisfy Chinese democrats, any more than similar solutions seem to have satisfied Polish or Hungarian democrats. The push for real freedom of the press and of association, as well as for truly competitive elections would have resumed, probably sooner rather than later. But in the meantime, the liberal images of Deng, Hu, and Zhao, whether they were justified or not, helped to keep Chinese democrats looking for change from above.

The Democracy Movement's Ideals

The second reason for the Chinese democrats' long-standing posture of loyalty to the regime is the nature of their own ideals. With few exceptions, the opposition's vision of Chinese democracy has been compatible with a socialist order. At Democracy Wall in 1978–79, most of the proposals were made from the perspective of party members or non-party loyalists. They called for very modest measures of political openness and competition, more in the spirit of Mao's idea of a party with an "open door" to society than in the spirit of a Western multi-party system. In 1986–87, the high point of the intra-party and academic debate over political reform that had been initiated by Deng, major proposals included establishing a civil service system; strengthening the National People's Congress by reducing its size and enlarging its system of committees; separating the party from the government; giving a clear legal definition to vertical and horizontal jurisdictions in the bureaucracy; publishing more financial data to assure greater governmental "transparency"; providing firmer guarantees of an independent judiciary; consulting more systematically with experts and technocrats in policy-making; and paying more consistent attention to procedures in governmental decision-making.[17] The emphases were on openness and procedural regularity.

None of the 1986–87 proposals that I have seen was anti-socialist or calculated to lead to the overthrow of the party. To be sure, the idea of socialism had become so diluted that it would have been hard to identify an anti-socialist proposal unless its author labeled it as such. Most of the democrats' proposals dealt with economic structures indirectly if at all and, among the economic reformers, even proposals for privatization and marketization of the economy were cast as versions of socialism. (For example, a proposal for issuing stock in state enterprises was presented as promoting "ownership by the whole people.") After the purge of Zhao Ziyang, a *People's Daily* editorial charged that in a 1987 intra-party meeting even Zhao advocated abandoning the insistence on upholding socialism on the grounds that nobody knew any more what socialism was.[18] Similarly, proposals for competitive electoral politics would not have been cast as open challenges to the principle of party leadership even if they were intended as such. Indeed, the moderate guise of most proposals may signify little except that Chinese are adept at waving the red flag to oppose the red flag.

My own reading of the political reform debates and personal encounters with some of the participants, however, lead me to believe that in most cases the reformers wanted to keep China socialist as they understood the term. For example, Yan Jiaqi, Li Honglin, Su Shaozhi, and Cao Siyuan, who were named in Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's post-crackdown report as progenitors of the "turmoil" and "counter-revolutionary rebellion" in Beijing,[19] were among the leading participants in the 1986–87 discussions of political reform. All

[15]A useful summary of 10 years of political reform is Liu Zheng, Cheng Xiangqing, and Du Xichuan, "Important Accomplishments and Experiences of the Last 10 Years of Our Country's Democratic Construction," *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, (Beijing), Nov. 25, 1988, pp. 28–36.

[16]The law on demonstrations enacted in July 1989, on the contrary, makes autonomous demonstrations virtually impossible; see "People's Republic of China Law on Assemblies, Parades, and Demonstrations (Draft)," *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, (Beijing) July 8, 1989.

[17]See Benedict Stavis, *China's Political Reforms: An Interim Report*, New York, Praeger, 1988; and Stavis, Ed., "Reform of China's Political System," *Chinese Law and Government*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Special issue), Spring 1987.

[18]"Only Socialism Is Capable of Developing China," *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, July 22, 1989.

[19]Chen Xitong, "Report," pp. I–XX.

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were party members; all seemed to espouse some version of socialism.

With some individual variation, the vision of the reformist party intellectuals centered on a system in which the communist party continued to be dominant but was checked by competitive elections and a free press in order to keep it honest and close to the people. This dominant party would run its own affairs and those of the government with openness and in accordance with laws and established procedures. For most of these intellectuals, the idea of party pluralism owed little to admiration for the American political and social system, which they criticized for its disorderliness, polarization of rich and poor, and political apathy. Although all believed that China could emulate some aspects of the American political structure, few could conceive of, or really wanted, an American-style system for China. Rather, their expectation was that party competition would develop out of China's existing system of "democratic consultation" with the nine minor political parties.[20]

Cao Siyuan used the term "socialist parliamentary democracy" to describe his vision. Yan Jiaqi emphasized "proceduralism." The vision of these party intellectuals was not fully articulated in print, probably because its realization depended upon a step-by-step approach that could pass muster with the supreme autocrat. But it was probably not far from the vision held by Hu Yaobang and some of Zhao Ziyang's supporters, if not by Zhao himself. Marxists such as Su Shaozhi, Li Honglin, and Wang Ruoshui argued vigorously that democracy is not only a part of the Marxist tradition but its fundamental aim. In short, what the party democrats had in mind was not the overthrow of socialism but democratic socialism.

That the democracy movement's mainstream was not anti-communist does not, however, gainsay the fact that a fundamental conflict existed between the democrats and the regime over the nature of socialist democracy, as well as over the pace of progress toward it. This conflict sharpened markedly beginning in 1987. In retrospect, the purge of Hu Yaobang in January 1987 was a major turning point. His demotion was accompanied by suppression of the student demonstrations occurring at that time, and was followed by the expulsion from the CCP of three ranking intellectuals (Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan), soon followed by others, and by the initiation of a campaign to oppose "bourgeois liberalization."

The events of early 1987 radicalized a portion of the intellectuals, because the man in whom they rested many of their hopes for the party fell, and the influence of Wang Zhen, Deng Liqun, and others whom the intellectuals regarded as hostile increased. In 1989, the key initial demands of the student demonstrators in Beijing were to reverse the verdict on Hu and to denounce the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. An immediate sign of the serious impact of Hu's ouster was the unprecedented signing of an open letter to the party Central Committee by more than 1000 Chinese students in America, about 700 of whom used their real names. This open letter became the first of several such letters and established the network that was used in 1989 to mobilize the students against the Li Peng regime. Meanwhile, the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign was conducted so fecklessly that it created an atmosphere in which, as Fang Lizhi said, "no one is afraid of anyone any more" (*Shei ye bupa shei*).

More fires broke out than the party's ideological watchdogs could control. The Shanghai *World Economic Herald* published daring articles on the failures of reform and the need for more radical economic and political solutions. A magazine called *New Enlightenment* made its debut in October 1988, having evaded the party's control system for periodicals by registering itself as a book series. The four issues that were published before the spring crackdown contained essays by eminent theorists, many of them party members, who were at odds with the regime's ideological authorities. Contributors to these four issues, who were soon to play prominent roles in Tiananmen or who were arrested in the subsequent crackdown, included Liu Xiaobo, Bao Zunxin, Jin Guantao, Li Honglin, Yu Haocheng, and Wang Ruoshui. *The Chinese Intellectual,* long published overseas, produced its first domestic issue in January 1989, also as a book series.

Other constituents of a nascent civil society that was gradually working itself loose from effective CCP control were the Stone Group Corporation and its Institute of Social Development, the Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute (SERI), the Capital Steel Research Institute, and the Happiness Bookstore. These institutions had somewhat ambiguous relationships to the CCP. Most of them were nominally "hung" (*gua*) from some part of the CCP organizational network, but they operated independently. The same was true of some institutions that the party itself had established, such as the Economic System Reform Institute, the Rural Development Research Institute, some institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and some sections of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation. Politically-oriented intellectuals used these institutions as bases from which to test the bounds

[20]See James D. Seymour, *China's Satellite Parties,* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987.

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

Students and authority in China: above, in the traditional manner, a fasting student sits opposite the Xinhua Gate, entrance to Zhongnanhai, the party leadership compound, attempting to petition the government to enact democratic reforms and eliminate official corruption; below, Chinese Premier Li Peng on May 18, 1989, meets with Wang Dan, a prominent student leader of the pro-democracy movement from Peking University (Wang was arrested on July 2).

—Photos by Contact and Eastfoto.

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Hope and despair in Tiananmen Square, clockwise from top left: a jubilant student demonstrator flashes the "V" for victory on May 20, when martial law troops were prevented from occupying the capital; Wuerkaixi, chairman of the Autonomous Student Union, calls for a demonstration on the anniversary of the May 4th Movement to protest the government's refusal to talk with a student delegation; doctors and students remove a dead student from the square on June 4; students restrain an anguished protester reacting to the advance of soldiers toward Tiananmen Square on June 3.

—Photos by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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of tolerance more and more adventurously.

The regime was confronting the beginnings of a "desertion of the intellectuals," against a backdrop of rising inflation and corruption, the abortion of price reform, and the ever more intense, long-standing succession conflict.[21] Deng Xiaoping and Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong were not entirely wrong in attributing the origins of the "turmoil and rebellion" to the sharp challenge to the ethos of the regime presented by intellectuals using increasingly sophisticated tactics. But their analysis of events turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. By proclaiming the intellectuals' democratic socialism to be non-socialist, Deng set up a head-on conflict with the intellectuals who would have preferred to work within the system.

On January 6, 1989, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng calling for the release of political prisoners, including Wei Jingsheng, to mark the upcoming 40th anniversary of the PRC. Thirty-three noted intellectuals followed with a letter of support on February 16. Also in February, 42 leading Beijing scientists joined the call for the release of "youth imprisoned or sent to labor reform for ideological problems." And in March, 43 writers and theorists called on the NPC to grant amnesty to Wei Jingsheng and others.[22] A young democratic activist named Chen Jun, who had links with China Spring, was planning to use the scheduled April 1989 meeting of the National People's Congress to submit "A Report on Amnesty '89," amidst much publicity, which he was skilled in generating. Petition campaigns in Hong Kong, France, and the United States were launched in support of the amnesty request. A shift of many of China's most prestigious intellectuals to a pro-Wei position 10 years after his arrest signalled how far the conflict between the regime and the intellectuals had developed.

The intellectuals' impertinence annoyed Deng. He was confronted with a coalescing group of influential non-party and party intellectuals, informally linked to the hated China Spring, who were conducting a sophisticated international publicity campaign around an issue that was divisive within the regime and embarrassing to him personally. To hold firm would look churlish; to yield would legitimize an independent opposition. The regime felt trapped and its responses revealed as much. The regime declared the call for an amnesty illegal, clumsily blocked Fang Lizhi from attending the banquet in Beijing to which President George Bush had invited him, confiscated an international petition to the NPC delivered from Hong Kong in support of the amnesty drive on the grounds that it was propaganda, and used a weak pretext to expel Chen Jun from the country. Not only were these responses ineffective, they tarnished the regime's international image.

The student movement thus emerged against the background of a general crisis in the regime and a specific crisis in relations between the regime and the intellectuals. But in rhetoric, tactics, and demands, the students at first avoided pressing their advantage too aggressively. They positioned themselves within the established tradition of moderate democratic remonstrance. They cast themselves not as dissidents but as loyal followers, appealing to the authorities to live up to the values the authorities themselves had articulated. The purpose of the hunger strike, which was symbolically undertaken in front of the Mao Mausoleum, in the shadow of the monument to the martyrs of the communist revolution, was to force the leaders to recognize the movement as being patriotic. The message was that the students valued the welfare of the state above their own lives. It was thoroughly in the tradition of Qu Yuan, who had lived in the fourth century BC, and who committed suicide to show his loyalty to the ruler who failed to heed his advice. Indeed, Qu probably represented a more influential precedent for the opposition's tactics of non-violence than the examples of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Corazon Aquino, so often mentioned in the Western media.

The students' demands followed the logic of two decades of Chinese democratic activism. Absolute power corrupts, and a good socialist government must allow itself to be supervised by the people. The demonstrators asked that the Chinese government recognize popular sovereignty and the political rights that are guaranteed by the PRC constitution. They carried signs that read "We firmly support the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party" and "The people love the people's police."[23] They demanded that the government end corruption, overcome bureaucratism, promote reform, and improve education. In effect they paraphrased the words of the regime's spokesmen.

The two key demands were for a free press and for dialogue—the latter implying recognition by the authorities of the students' autonomous organizations. By a free press, the demonstrators did not mean entrepreneurial, commercial, unregulated mass media that

[21]For the term "desertion of the intellectuals," see Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York, Vintage, 1956, pp. 42–52; for the general crisis, see Andrew J. Nathan, "Politics: Reform at the Crossroad," in Anthony Kane, Ed., *China Briefing 1989*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 7–25.

[22]*Chiushih nientai*, Apr. 1, 1989, pp. 20–27.

[23]*The New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

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compete for readers and live off advertising, but simply a press that reports the truth. Except for such experiments as the *World Economic Herald*, in the spring of 1989 most Chinese media remained under the effective direct or indirect control of the CCP's Propaganda Department or its local bureaus. What was published or broadcast remained determined by the policy needs of the party, although Chinese journalists have long argued that both the people and the regime would be better served if Chinese journalists had the authority to publish what they knew to be true. Because corruption and special privilege are among the features of the communist system that most alienate the people, the students and the professional journalists who later joined them argued that a truthful press would be the best mechanism for cleaning up, and hence saving, the regime.

A draft press law defining the professional rights and responsibilities of Chinese journalists has been undergoing revision for years. According to some reports, the law was finally scheduled for enactment in late 1989.[24] The provisions of this law had been sharply debated, but even a relatively conservative version would have gone a long way toward meeting the demands of the demonstrators. The government needed only to have made some final revisions and handed the draft to the NPC to enact. But this possibility was overtaken by events.

The second key demand—for dialogue—was also ostensibly compatible with the regime's own logic. As part of its political reform, the government had promoted the development of the nine minority democratic parties and increased its practice of "democratic consultation" through the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and informal forums with "democratic personages." It was a CCP tradition for leaders to go to work units and solicit the people's opinions. In the course of Deng's reforms the party had re-established a system of offices for "letters and visits work" to which individuals could come with complaints. On April 4, 1989, the National People's Congress passed an Administrative Proceedings Law, which enabled citizens to take government organs to court to protect their rights.[25] Accordingly, the students' demand for dialogue received widespread support, including from school administrators and political hacks, and from the official trade union federation.[26]

The regime attempted to respond on its own terms to the demand for dialogue. Cabinet spokesman Yuan Mu received a student delegation for a nationally televised discussion on April 29. Li Peng held talks with student leaders on May 18. United Front Work Department director Yan Mingfu and other party leaders went to Tiananmen Square to speak with hunger-strikers. And finally, in his May 19 speech announcing the imposition of martial law, Li Peng emphasized that "dialogue between the party and government on the one hand, and the broad [masses of] students and personages of various circles on the other, including dialogue with students who have participated in parades, demonstrations, classroom strikes, and hunger strikes, will still be actively continued at many levels, through many channels, and in many forms, in order fully to hear opinions from various quarters."[27]

However, the dialogue that the authorities had already engaged in, as well as the type of dialogue they promised in the future, was not what the students demanded. The government attempted to treat its encounters with the students as opportunities to feel the public pulse without decentralizing power. Yuan Mu and Li Peng acted as hosts and as authority figures, avuncularly urging the students to return to classes, defending the government's position, and delivering threats. The students in turn stated that such encounters were unsatisfactory and acted out their dissatisfaction by behaving impolitely at the meetings. They demanded that the two parties be placed on an equal footing, that the government's representatives in the dialogue be of high rank, that observers and reporters be present, and that the government give prompt responses to the students' questions. The students also demanded that their representatives be elected by autonomous student groups distinct from the puppet student unions established under party sponsorship.[28]

Here was the Trojan horse that the regime could not accept. Had this demand been granted, the students would have achieved the legalization of the first completely independent political organization in PRC history, and the effective negation of Deng Xiaoping's four basic principles, as they were understood by Deng. This demand explains why Deng had early on "determined [the student movement's] nature" (*dingxing*) to be "a planned plot, a turmoil, whose essence is to negate fundamentally CCP leadership and the socialist system."[29]

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[24] *Huaqiao ribao*, Jan. 30, 1989.

[25] *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, Apr. 11, 1989.

[26] See, e.g., *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, May 19, 1989; *FBIS-CHI*, May 22, 1989, pp. 78–81.

[27] *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, May 20, 1989.

[28] Ibid., May 4, 1989.

[29] This is quoted from the crucial April 26 editorial. The words are thought to have been taken from an internal talk by Deng the day before. *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, Apr. 26, 1989.

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The Chinese leaders have been obsessed since 1956 with what they see as the deterioration of the Leninist system in Poland and Hungary. In this connection, the formation of a "Capital Autonomous Workers' Association" during the demonstrations was a particularly alarming development. Although it was a tiny group, its existence evoked the specter of a Chinese "Solidarity." Leaders of this group were arrested even before the general crackdown of June 4.[30] As Li Peng told the other leaders shortly after declaring martial law: "There was no way out. You give a step, they advance a step; you retreat two steps, they advance two steps. It had gotten to the point where there was nowhere else to retreat. If we were going to retreat any further, we might as well have handed China over to those people."[31] The leaders preferred military repression to seeing China become another Poland.

Chen Xitong, in the regime's most thorough indictment of the democrats to date, contends that the democratic movement wanted to achieve the violent overthrow of the government.[32] The regime needed to portray the spontaneous, uncoordinated acts of defensive violence by people throughout the city of Beijing on the night of June 3, when the troops moved in, as part of a coordinated plan in order to justify calling the democrats' activities a "counter-revolutionary rebellion." Chen quoted some unsigned leaflets as calling for the use of violence to overthrow the CCP, but he was unable to name the organizations or individuals responsible for them. Nor could he find direct quotes from any specific democratic activist calling for the overthrow of the party or the use of violence. Chen could only find personal attacks on Deng and Li Peng, criticisms of the Chinese socialist system, and appeals for thoroughgoing reform.

The only exception, one worth pausing over, is Chen's charge against literary theorist Liu Xiaobo, who was arrested after June 4 and is believed to be in danger of receiving a heavy sentence for his activities.[33] Liu was one of four intellectuals who began a 48–72 hour hunger strike on June 2. Chen accused Liu of membership in China Spring and quoted him as having stated in a published interview: "We must organize an armed force among the people to effect Zhao Ziyang's comeback." But an investigation by a Chinese-language news magazine in New York has established that these words were a mistranslation. The interview was conducted by telephone in Chinese, but the transcript was prepared in English in New York by the activist Chen Jun, for publication in the West. Chen provided a copy of the transcript to the *Independence Evening News* of Taiwan, which translated a statement by Liu, to the effect that all social forces must be mobilized, back into Chinese as "armed forces in society must be organized." The text was reprinted in Hong Kong and from there picked up by Chinese intelligence and quoted by Mayor Chen.[34] These facts are important not only because they may affect Liu Xiaobo's fate, but also because they confirm the nonviolent character of the democratic movement even after the declaration of martial law.

After the June 4 killings and the subsequent wave of arrests, many intellectuals broke completely with what they call the Deng-Li Peng-Yang Shangkun regime. Liu Binyan, who was often criticized by younger intellectuals after he was purged from the CCP because he continued to express hope in the communist party, has denounced the regime and predicts its fall within two years.[35] This attitude is widespread. But the loss of hope in the Deng regime has not brought with it a break in the moderate, remonstrative tradition of Chinese democracy. The opposition has stopped short of calls for either the use of violence or the overthrow of the CCP.

The official press has taken pains to present the post-June 4 democratic movement in exile as consisting of revolutionaries who seek to overthrow the Chinese government by armed action. This assertion is made to legitimate condemning the movement's foreign support as interference in China's internal affairs, and hence a violation of international law.[36] However, these charges can only be made plausible by selective quotation and quotation out of context. No major democratic organization in exile so far has called for either armed rebellion or terrorism, or, for that matter, for the overthrow of the CCP.

Yan Jiaqi, who has emerged as the main spokesman for the democratic exiles, has predicted that Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and Yang Shangkun will "reap the storm" that their violence has sown and will be publicly

[30] *Huaqiao ribao*, June 1, 1989.

[31] "Important Points in the Speeches of Comrades Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, at the May 22 Meeting," inner-party document, reprinted in *Huaqiao ribao*, June 14, 1989.

[32] Chen, "Report," pp. I–XX.

[33] See the denunciation of Liu in *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, June 26, 1989, reprinted from *Beijing ribao*, June 24, 1989.

[34] Ch'en Chih-hsiung, "Journalistic Ethics as Seen from the Huang Te-pei Incident," *Shih-pao chou-k'an*, (New York), July 15–21, 1989, p. 3; Chen Xitong, "Report," p. XVI.

[35] See "Liu Binyan Discusses Beijing While Visiting Hong Kong," *Huaqiao ribao*, June 19, 1989.

[36] See, e.g., "Renegade Elements Conduct Activities to Overthrow the Chinese Government With the Protection and Support of American, Taiwan, and Hong Kong Reactionary Forces," *Renmin ribao*, Overseas Edition, Aug. 2, 1989.

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tried for their crimes.[37] However, such statements merely describe the fragility of a coercive regime, and do not constitute a call for violence or a declaration of anti-socialism. The program of the Democratic Chinese Alliance (*Minzhu Zhongguo zhenxian*), which Yan established with Uerkesh Daolet (Wuerkaixi), Liu Binyan, Su Shaozhi, and Wan Runnan in Paris on July 20, makes "reason, peace, and nonviolence our standards for action" and "freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights" its goals.[38] The organization's strategy, according to Yan, envisages four stages. First will occur the inevitable fall of Li Peng, which will come about through his own weakness and unpopularity at home and abroad; second, the Alliance will press for reversal of the verdict on the democratic movement; third, its members will return home to participate in revising the constitution so as to establish an open, pluralistic political system similar to the ones that the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary are now moving to establish; and finally, it will work to establish a federal system in China within which the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet problems will be amenable to resolution. At the end of this process, the CCP will be competing peacefully in elections with the Kuomintang and the Democratic Alliance. Yan estimates that the entire process will take 10 years or longer.[39] He argues that democracy cannot be achieved by violent means and that the democracy movement itself must begin the democratization process, by relying on dialogue and the power of ideas rather than on force.

The Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States established itself in Chicago in late July 1989 on a platform of moderation. It is a loosely organized liaison group rather than a political movement or party. It intends to work for democratization chiefly through the dissemination of information to China. As citizens of the PRC, its members seek to maintain normal relations with China's officials and missions abroad.[40]

Even the organization that the Beijing authorities deem the most radical and dangerous, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy or China Spring, has not crossed the line separating reformism from revolution. At its Fourth National Congress, held in Los Angeles from June 23–26, 1989, China Spring debated a motion to include "overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party in its constitution." It also examined a proposal to abandon exclusive reliance on nonviolent tactics in favor of "revolutionary" methods, which included the formation of suicide squads to conduct "secret armed struggle on the mainland" and the use of terrorism abroad against PRC officials and their children in order to deter the authorities from arresting and executing leaders of the democratic movement. Both of these proposals were rejected.[41]

To say that the major dissident organizations in exile have eschewed anti-communism and the use of violence is not to say that these issues are not debated among exile democrats,[42] or that there is no armed resistance in China or assistance for it from abroad. Scattered shooting has been reported in Beijing, a train wreck occurred that might have been due to sabotage, some democratic movement leaders have been spirited out of the country, and others have somehow found ways to evade capture. Money is being collected by individual activists abroad for unspecified purposes and some individual Chinese do speak of the need to resort to violence. It is hard to gauge the prevalence and impact of such activities, which are by nature secretive, and obviously the advocacy and use of violence may increase. But so far, violence remains a minor thread in the movement as a whole, and it is not publicly advocated by any major democratic organization.

Regime Monopoly of Force

Besides intellectual reasons for nonviolence, practical concerns have dictated a nonviolent approach as well. The regime still controls overwhelming military and police force, and recent events have confirmed the importance of this factor. The events of June showed that the instruments of proletarian dictatorship—the least-mentioned but perhaps the most important of Deng's four cardinal principles—are still firmly in the hands of the senior leaders. It is hard to say whether their control is due to ordinary military discipline, the effectiveness of the political commissar system, or the reinforcement of the control system with personal networks. Whatever the reason, the army and police forces have stood firmly with the regime.

Their support explains why it would be unrealistic for the democratic movement to take to the hills as Mao did

[37]Yan's June 4, 1989, statement in Paris, *Shih-pao chou-k'an*, July 1–7, 1989, p. 14.

[38]"Proposal to Establish the 'Chinese Democratic Alliance'," *Shih-chieh jih-pao* (New York), July 21, 1989.

[39]Yan speech at Columbia University, New York, Aug. 1, 1989.

[40]*Shih-pao chou-k'an*, Aug. 5–11, 1989, pp. 8–10.

[41]*Zhongguo zhi chun* (Flushing, NY), July 15, 1989, p. 23.

[42]For example, New York-based dissident Ni Yuxian takes issue with Yan Jiaqi's stand of not opposing the communist party; see "The Democracy Movement and the Chinese Communist Party," *Shih-chieh jih-pao*, Aug. 21, 22, 23, 1989.

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in the 1930's. Conditions today are very different from those encountered by the Jiangxi Soviet when it faced Chiang Kai-shek's army. The total Nationalist forces were less than half the size of the PLA today, and much more poorly trained and armed. Chiang Kai-shek controlled only about one-fifth of the Nationalist Government' s military forces, and he controlled even those forces through factional allies rather than directly. Chiang had to allocate proportionally more military resources to national defense than the PLA does today and had correspondingly fewer resources to spare for internal security. Communications and transport were primitive and the Soviet Union was willing to help the insurgents. Despite all these advantages, the CCP barely survived Chiang's extermination campaigns of the early 1930's.[43]

The democrats say that if violence is to play a role in China's future, it will have to come from within the Chinese military and not from the democratic movement abroad or the democratic underground in China. In a debate over the use of violence at the recent Fourth Congress of the China Spring, Chairperson Hu Ping stated: "When the 'Gang of Four' was arrested in 1976, this certainly wasn't a peaceful change, but nobody complained about it. If somebody comes forward now to arrest the group of people who are holding power, there certainly won't be anyone to complain that they did not use peaceful methods. . . . However, our organization does not have the power to carry out a military coup."[44] According to Wan Runnan of the Chinese Democratic Alliance: "Our principle of nonviolence doesn't mean that no blood will flow. There is a division of roles. Our role is to carry out activities that are peaceful, rational, and nonviolent. But others will play other roles."[45]

With violence ruled out as an option, nonviolence and support for socialism offer the best possibility of building a broad anti-regime coalition and maximizing official and unofficial foreign support. As a China Spring leader stated during the Fourth Congress debate, "only the flag of peaceful methods can get wide popular acceptance. . . . If anybody here asks me for money for guns [to use against the communists], I would certainly claim to be giving you the guns to use for hunting birds."[46]

Social Composition of the Movement

The last factor that has argued for peaceful methods is the social composition of the democratic movement. The demonstrators in Beijing and other cities this spring were overwhelmingly urbanites (*shimin*)—students, peddlers, office workers, teachers, shop and factory workers. In exile, the class basis of the movement has become even narrower. It is now composed almost exclusively of students and intellectuals and a few ex-officials, with financial support from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and elsewhere (including Taiwan). The intellectuals are in no position to take up arms without the support of other classes, if only because their numbers are so small—less than half of 1 percent of the Chinese population is college-educated.[47]

It is difficult to imagine an insurrection in China that is not based in the countryside. So far as I know, the democratic movement did not enjoy much active support in the rural areas. The rural dwellers may have lacked information about the democratic movement; if they participated in it, they would not have enjoyed the same anonymity as did urban crowds; they were busy earning a living; and, perhaps most importantly, although the farmers were dissatisfied with the regime, they have not been as severely affected by inflation as urban dwellers and have greater possibilities for making do economically. As Wan Runnan has said, "When the economy worsens, the peasants will suffer. This is what is needed to change their political stance. For now, they still hope to muddle through; they still think they can make it."[48]

Of course, the social makeup of the countryside is becoming increasingly complex. Rural dwellers include not only farmers but also industrial workers, shop clerks, peddlers, fishermen, teachers, monks, and local officials. Members of some of these groups have evidently been willing to help the democratic activists go underground or escape. But this scattered assistance does not provide the critical mass necessary for a peasant uprising.

Conclusion

Although the democratic movement has maintained its tradition of moderation, a fundamental conflict over the nature of socialism in China reached a climax in

[43]Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution. 1937–1949*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1984, pp. 131–32; William Wei, *Counter-revolution in China: The Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet Period*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1985, Ch. 2.

[44]*Zhongguo zhi chun*, July 15, 1989, p. 32.

[45]Speech at Columbia University, Aug. 1, 1989.

[46]*Zhongguo zhi chun*, July 15, 1989, p. 33.

[47]*Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1984* (China Statistical Yearbook 1984), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1984, p. 492.

[48]Wan Runnan speaking at Columbia University, Aug. 1, 1989.

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1989. Mikhail Gorbachev was so popular with the Chinese demonstrators not because he was seen, as so many Americans see him, as leading a retreat from socialism, but because the Chinese saw him as symbolizing the hope that a communist regime can permit a free press, a dialogue with society, and an independent political opposition, and can thrive under the stimulus of such challenges. Deng and the surviving senior revolutionaries, by contrast, have remained orthodox Stalinists on the question of power. To Deng, "the key point is that [the demonstrators] wanted to overthrow our state and the party. Failing to understand this means failing to understand the nature of the matter. . . . Their goal was to establish a bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West."[49]

Deng has a point: if his four principles are the standard of true socialism, then the democrats did want to overthrow the socialist system. If open, competitive democracy and political freedom are the monopoly of the bourgeoisie, they did want to establish a bourgeois republic. If the exercise of free speech that is guaranteed by the Chinese constitution is illegal, then the students and intellectuals denounced by Chen Xitong did commit subversion. But the democrats continue to see their relation to the regime differently. In the words of the biographer of China's first remonstrator, Qu Yuan: "It was his fate to be faithful and yet doubted, to be loyal and yet suffer slander—can one bear this without anger?"[50]

[49]Deng's June 9 speech in *Beijing Review*, July 10–16, 1989, p. 18.

[50]Sima Qian in the *Historical Records*, quoted by Laurence A. Schneider, *A Madman of Ch'u: The Chinese Myth of Loyalty and Dissent*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1980, p. 21.

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The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989

Andrew G. Walder

Beijing's seven tumultuous weeks of popular protest marked a new stage in China's post-revolution political history. Student protest and elite power struggle, central to the events of this spring, are familiar features of the Chinese scene. But two new developments led from student protest to an unprecedented popular rebellion. First, the students received widespread and outspoken support from intellectuals in all fields, many of whom also organized protests of their own, while huge numbers of ordinary working people rallied to the demonstrations. Second, and perhaps more important, the party split internally over its response to the student movement, which prevented effective repression early on and which eventually led key elements of the capital's party apparatus and, most crucially, the mass media to support openly certain student demands. The combination of mass support and party fragmentation led rapidly to a massive, nonviolent rebellion that echoed in scores of cities throughout China, paralyzed the national leadership, and made the capital virtually ungovernable for several weeks.

Toward an Explanation

Beijing's popular rebellion presents us with two puzzles. Why did the 1989 student protests touch off the largest popular challenge to party rule in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC), when similar campaigns in the past—the most recent led by students at the end of 1986—found little popular response and were easily suppressed? And given the apparent lack of an organized foundation within factories and other workplaces, how could such a nonviolent movement lead so quickly to the paralysis and political crisis of May?

The explanation of any political upheaval must naturally begin with the dissatisfactions and motives that stimulate popular protest in the first place. But to this observer, the magnitude of this spring's rebellion cannot be explained simply by an increase in the magnitude of popular dissatisfactions. True, many have noted an increasing pessimism in the public mood after 1986 over official corruption, price inflation, and the stagnation of political and economic reform.[1] However, intense popular dissatisfaction is not a new phenomenon in China, while popular rebellion—at least the variety not instigated by a Great Leader—most decidedly is. We still need to explain how popular motives, whatever they may be, are translated into successful political action, and such an explanation cannot logically be based solely, or even primarily, on levels of dissatisfaction.

Similarly, while the size of a movement and the depth of popular support for it are important in explaining its impact, such impact depends just as much on pre-existing weaknesses in political institutions and upon disunity within ruling groups. Although this year's movement was crushed in early June, it shook the system to its foundations and provoked some of its leaders into a brutal and costly response. To this observer, the move-

[1]See, for example, Perry Link's evocative "The Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolt," *New York Review of Books*, June 29, 1989, pp. 38–41.

Andrew G. Walder is Professor of Sociology and an Associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University (Cambridge, MA). He is the author of Chang Ch'un Ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution *(1978) and* Communist Neo-Traditionalism. Work and Authority in Chinese Industry *(1986).* *The author would like to thank Jean Oi and Lawrence Sullivan for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.*

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ment could never have grown to the size it did, nor could it have shaken the halls of power to such an extent, had the party's organized means of political control not been weakened over the decade of reform and had there not been open divisions within the party apparatus and leadership itself.

My preliminary sketch of a solution to these puzzles will therefore not dwell on the accumulated dissatisfactions of China's long-aggrieved urban citizenry. Instead, I shall outline the long-term changes and short-run developments that helped turn student protests into a popular rebellion.[2] The argument has three parts: the first is about altered political attitudes; the second about changes in citizens' capacity to act on their attitudes; and the third about the broader political conditions for collective action provided by the stance of the party-state apparatus. In brief, we shall see, first, that for different reasons and in different ways, changes during the decade of reform coupled with developments in the last two years undermined both intellectual and worker support for the regime. In the case of students and intellectuals, the crucial changes were greater information about the outside world and recent political changes in Eastern Europe. In the case of workers, the crucial changes were the greater workplace contention over wage issues that accompanied the monetization of labor relations and the entrenchment of a consumer mentality in the 1980's and the stagnation and perhaps decline in real wages occasioned by the post-1986 inflation. Second, over the decade of reform, citizens were granted the opportunity to travel and communicate much more freely than 10 years ago, while systems of reward and punishment in workplaces shifted away from their past emphasis on political loyalty. The system of control was thereby weakened enough to allow mass participation in street demonstrations, although not enough to allow extensive organization of wage earners in their places of work. Third, the fracturing of party unity and eventually of state sovereignty in mid-May magnified the size and scope of the demonstrations. This factor made success appear within reach and the potential costs appear low just as a suddenly independent mass media actively mobilized the Beijing population to support the students, launching them into a briefly successful rebellion against martial law.

Changing Political Outlook

Only a decade ago, China's urbanites were still shell-shocked, demoralized by the ravages of the Cultural Revolution, and grateful for any change the party would make on behalf of their political or economic welfare. They were still largely unaware of the economic prosperity of their neighbors in East Asia, of life in Japan and in the West, and of the possibilities for change soon to be presented in the Soviet bloc. What has changed crucially in the Deng Xiaoping era is that the government has lost the ability to control the information that citizens use to evaluate their own circumstances, and thus to stem their propensity to conceive of their problems in political terms, to envisage alternatives, and to see the attainment of these alternatives as feasible. The opening to the outside world placed different ideals of governance into popular awareness, changed perceptions of the feasibility of democratic reform in China, and perhaps most importantly, provided models of strategy and tactics for public protest. Meanwhile, the 1980's consumer revolution, and increased inflation and official corruption helped spread these changing perceptions beyond the intelligentsia.

Students and intellectuals. From the outset of this year's protests, China's students and intellectuals exemplified the profound changes that a decade of openness had wrought in public perceptions. In the 1978–79 protests that are commonly referred to as the "Democracy Wall" movement, criticisms of the party were often quite scathing, but open and favorable references to foreign models of government were rare. Wei Jingsheng, the most famous protest figure and leading victim of that era, gained notoriety primarily by daring to draw unfavorable comparisons between China's backward system of government and the "modern" politics of the liberal democracies. The iconoclastic arguments that drew to him the attention of both the foreign media and domestic security forces, however, distinguished Wei from the political mainstream of the period.[3]

Despite the fact that Wei remains in prison to this day, the attitude that earned him this treatment would hardly have gained notice in the intellectual climate of the mid-1980's. The ideas of the rule of law, separation of powers, and even of pluralism had moved to the sphere of permitted public discourse, and carefully worded suggestions that China might have something to learn from Western models in this regard were commonplace by

[2]Each of the observations that I make below strike me as plausible, but sustained research, which is now just beginning on this subject, has a way of altering such perceptions. Documentary sources are still becoming available, human sources have still to be interviewed, and no doubt future changes in China's leadership will bring fresh information and sources.

[3]See Roger Garside, *Coming Alive: China After Mao*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1981, pp. 212–98; and James D. Seymour, Ed., *The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978–1979*, Stanfordville, NY, Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980.

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1986.[4] In private discussions in China and abroad, students and younger intellectuals in recent years often gave the impression that the guardians of party orthodoxy had completely lost the struggle for the hearts and minds of the younger generation. Ideas considered heretical only a decade ago have moved to the mainstream of opinion among the educated and the young.

This profound decade-long shift was fueled by the extraordinary openness of China in the 1980's. In the late 1970's, only a handful of students and visiting scholars had recently studied outside China, the foreign community was small and isolated, listening to broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was a punishable offense, and contacts with foreigners were tightly restricted. By the beginning of this year, many tens of thousands of students and scholars had already been to the United States alone, Beijing's long-term foreign community numbered in the thousands, and tens of thousands of others visited China for scholarly or business purposes every year and enjoyed relaxed and easy contacts with their Chinese colleagues. VOA and BBC broadcasts, no longer forbidden, had a large and open audience. Western publications, in both their original languages and in translation, were readily available, and were not subject to systematic control at China's borders. China's national television news regularly employed footage from Western news agencies.

These changes helped create a student body and an intelligentsia that were highly cosmopolitan in comparison with their late-1970's counterparts. This year's student movement bristled with foreign symbols and allusions. Students in both Beijing and Shanghai erected replicas of the Statue of Liberty in prominent public places.[5] Wallposters and placards paraphrased or quoted Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, and Patrick Henry, and they alluded to Mahatma Gandhi, Lech Wałęsa, Mikhail Gorbachev and *perestroyka,* the American civil rights movement, and Kent State.[6] The student protesters wore the white headbands they had seen in films and photos of Japanese and South Korean student radicals; they flashed the "V" sign they had seen in news footage from the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines.[7] Although the mentality and style of the protesters in many ways remained characteristically Chinese, the ardent adaptation of foreign symbols and ideas was striking.

These long-run changes were unmistakable. But as long-run changes, they do not account for the striking difference in the strength and stridency of the student movement in 1989, compared with that of December 1986; nor can they account for the different response of the intelligentsia and broader populace this year. The summer of 1986, in retrospect, was the high tide of political openness in China; the impact of openness on student and intellectual mentalities was fully worked out by then. What occurred after 1986 to make demands for democracy more strident and broadly popular?

Ironically, the crucial short-run cause of changed political perceptions was not influence from the West, but from the Soviet bloc. In the period after Hu Yaobang's ouster and the conservative backlash occasioned by the 1986 student movement, China's leaders reversed themselves on the political reforms promised in the summer of 1986 and began to draw back from further economic reform. However, in precisely this period political change accelerated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's *glasnost'* received the rapt attention of educated Chinese. The 19th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1988, extraordinary for its openly contentious debate, the stunning spectacle of the Soviet party's embarrassment in parliamentary elections early in 1989, and the subsequent parliamentary debates in mid-1989 have been the object of open envy among reform-minded Chinese. Equally crucial was the evident failure of martial law to solve Poland's political and economic crises, and the turn to a free press and partially contested parliamentary elections negotiated with Solidarity. Also important, but less dramatic, have been developments in Hungary, where a number of political organizations are now readying for promised parliamentary elections.[8]

These developments have rapidly altered the standards by which educated Chinese judge their government, while they have undercut the main conservative objection to political reform. In the crackdown on the

[4]This is one reason why several groups of intellectuals sent petitions to Deng Xiaoping earlier this year to ask that Wei and other political prisoners from the Democracy Wall period be released. It should be noted, however, that as an electrician, Wei crossed strict status boundaries guarded jealously in the Chinese political system. Intellectuals in the 1980's were licensed to debate topics freely within set boundaries, and could test those boundaries from time to time. But members of the working class could not engage in political discourse; those who did were immediately viewed as subversive, especially if they sought to air nonconformist ideas of their own.

[5]The Shanghai replica was placed in front of the party headquarters in mid-May, well before the more famous statue was erected in Tiananmen Square on May 29. See *The New York Times,* May 20, 1989.

[6]See *Time* (New York), May 29, 1989, p. 21; *The Washington Post,* May 25, 1989; and a series of reports by Mike Chinoy of Cable Network News aired in April and May. Many have questioned how completely the students understood these foreign traditions, or how clear their ideas about democracy were. However, they were very clear about what they opposed and obviously drew inspiration and tactics from foreign models.

[7]See *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), May 25, 1989; and *Time,* May 29, 1989, p. 21.

[8]See the interview with several Chinese studying in the Boston area in the *Boston Globe,* May 23, 1989.

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Democracy Wall movement, right up through the backlash against the 1986 student protests, party orthodoxy has labeled calls for democracy "bourgeois" and inappropriate for "Chinese conditions." The emergence of coveted forms of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe directly undermines the conservative argument. On the eve of Gorbachev's visit to China, the political scientist Yan Jiaqi, a leading Beijing proponent of political reform (and now a dissident in exile), observed: "China used to be afraid of influence from the West. Now we are afraid of influence from the Soviet Union. . . . If we want to keep out Western influence, we can say we're against 'bourgeois liberalization' or against 'total Westernization.' But we can't use that pretext against Soviet influence . . . there is no ideological concept to resist it."[9]

In effect, reform experiments in the Soviet bloc changed the terms of an implicit compact formed with China's intellectuals at the outset of Deng's reform program. Intellectuals in the post-Cultural Revolution period appear generally to have accepted Deng's argument against political reform in return for enhanced status and advisory influence, and as a price to be paid for the stability needed for economic reform and prosperity. Especially important in this acquiescence was the perception that no matter how far from the ideal, China's political situation in the early 1980's was infinitely better than in the recent Mao era and was the best that a citizen of such a party-state could hope for, at least in the immediate future.

The intellectuals' response to the student movement suggests that this political outlook had lost its viability by the late 1980's. No longer could Chinese intellectuals conclude that their political situation was the best they could hope for, nor could they be so readily convinced that democratic reforms or greater political openness were inappropriate for China or unrealistically ambitious goals. The impact of developments in world socialism was naturally greatest among students, for whom, by the mid-1980's, the political repression of the Cultural Revolution was a distant historical fact that was largely irrelevant to political judgments.

Awareness of change in the Soviet Union and admiration for Gorbachev were much in evidence before and during the Soviet leader's visit in mid-May. Students interviewed by Western reporters said that they listened regularly to Radio Moscow for news of Soviet reforms, and one student at Tiananmen Square said, "We need someone like a Gorbachev, a man with vision. Zhao [Ziyang] does not measure up to Gorbachev. He wants to modernize the country and has good ideas, but he does not know how to carry them out."[10] Large demonstrations in Beijing on May 15 and 16 displayed placards praising the Soviet leader and calling for more *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* for China; thousands of students at Beijing University petitioned for Gorbachev to speak on campus.[11] In short, backtracking on reform in China, coupled with dramatic political developments in Eastern Europe, undermined the foundation of the intellectuals' consent to the political restrictions of the Deng regime and emboldened the students to act.

Blue- and white-collar workers. These factors were apparently less important to the broader working population than the high rate of inflation and the widely perceived upsurge of official corruption at all levels. After 1986, inflation became a serious problem for urban residents. After decades of extraordinary price stability, the last two years saw the real rate of inflation (much higher than the official rate) climb to an estimated 30 percent. Difficult as it is to measure inflation, it is even harder to assess the prevalence of corruption. Public perception of official corruption, however, does appear to have become more acute in recent years (a development not unrelated, as I shall note momentarily, to the upsurge in inflation).

The inflation of the late 1980's and the increased salience of corruption took place against the backdrop of a decade-long trend of increasing contention over wage matters. Three factors explain the increased wage contention. First, it was an inevitable outgrowth of the monetization of labor relations. Growth in real wages between 1979 and 1984 far outstripped increases in labor productivity. While the share of national income generated by urban workers rose by 9.3 percent, their total compensation more than doubled. From the late 1950's through the late 1970's, bonuses were either nonexistent or small and the material incentives that were offered were consistently linked to political evaluations of employees.[12] By the mid-1980's, bonuses comprised almost one-fourth of the wage bill, and enterprises kept much larger percentages of their profits and distributed much larger percentages of these profits as incentive pay, as managers attempted to avoid labor conflict by "overspending" on bonuses and other benefits.[13] Quotas and contracts proliferated

[9] *The New York Times*, May 14, 1989.

[10] *The Washington Post*, May 21 and 24, 1989.

[11] Ibid., May 18, 1989; *The New York Times*, May 14, 1989.

[12] Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986, Chs. 2 and 4.

[13] See Andrew G. Walder, "Factory and Manager in an Era of Reform," *China Quarterly* (London), June 1989, pp. 242–64, esp. pp. 243–44 and 249–53; and "Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests," ibid., March 1987, pp. 22–41.

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on the shop floor, intensifying contention over standards of work and pay.[14]

Second, the shift to light industrial production greatly increased the availability of consumer goods and purchases of key consumer goods increased by several orders of magnitude. In the late 1970's, the Chinese urban consumer aspired to own a wristwatch, a foot-powered sewing machine, a name-brand bicycle, and a transistor radio. By the mid-1980's, such items were commonplace, and the consumer could realistically aspire to own a color television (perhaps even an imported or foreign co-produced one), a washing machine, refrigerator, or a tape recorder/stereo with AM/FM/shortwave reception. From 1978 to 1987, ownership of electric fans grew 12-fold; of television sets, 38-fold; of refrigerators, 131-fold, and the number of washing machines grew from around 1000 to 5.7 million.[15] During this same period, the housing stock doubled. Farmers' markets brought to cities fresh foodstuffs that had been tightly rationed or simply unavailable in the Mao era, but prices were much higher than in the reviled state stores. The consumer revolution in cities fed the workers' hunger for money, despite the sustained rise in living standards after the late 1970's.

Finally, increases in real wages, although rapid, had begun at a base more than 20 percent lower than the average real wage in the mid-1950's. Not until 1984 did the average real wage, according to official statistics, surpass the comparable figure for 1957.[16] Urbanites, in fact, used the prosperity of the 1980's to recover from the depression of living standards they had suffered during the Mao era. During this process of recovery, workers were aware that peasants in suburban areas, who were now free to engage in private commerce, enjoyed much larger increases in income and could build for themselves much larger and higher quality housing than anything available to workers in cities. In short, a number of factors explain why workers' satisfaction might not increase along with their standard of living.

Given this recovery through the sustained rise of real wages, where wage issues once again became a prominent feature of shop floor politics, and where a consumer mentality became firmly entrenched once again, the inflation of 1987–89 had a major impact on public perceptions. To an extent that we are as yet unable to gauge, real incomes began to fall for the first time in the post-Mao era. It is reasonable to suspect that such inflation would stimulate increased corruption among petty officials and clerks, whose wages are not high and who are also hit hard by price rises. Whether or not this hypothesis is true, corruption would certainly be much more sharply resented in an era of inflation: that of petty officials and clerks because it is visible and cuts further into worker incomes; that of higher officials—who are seen as responsible for inflationary policy—because their privileges protect them from the ravages of inflation. Whether corruption increased in fact or merely in public perception, inflation made corruption less tolerable.

Because Beijing's wage earners have been less articulate in their protests than the highly educated, changes in their outlooks are more obscure. But it appears that inflation had the effect of politicizing worker dissatisfaction in a way that made the student demands for democracy more appealing than a few years ago. As bad as it is for the Chinese consumer, the inflation of the last two years does not come close to the kind of hyperinflation that has sparked riots and looting in Argentina, Venezuela, and other countries in recent years. Nor were the price rises as large as the ones that have touched off riots and strikes in Poland (nor were the price rises, as in Poland, the result of announced government decisions). Although riots did break out after student protests in Changsha and Xi'an in early May, they did not occur in Beijing, and looting was entirely absent. Inflation and corruption appear to have fueled public protest primarily by enhancing the workers' sense of powerlessness and resentment at official privilege, thereby providing a long-missing link with student and intellectual demands for greater democracy.

As with the intellectuals, the implicit compact that the Deng regime had forged with the working class began to unravel after 1986. Workers now saw themselves as being made to sacrifice for a reform program of benefit only to the corrupt petty officials and clerks, and the privileged higher officials who set the policies in the first place. One worker from the Beijing Shoe Factory, while participating in the protests, told a reporter, "I cannot afford a decent life so naturally there is anger in me. . . . When I hear our leaders speak of 'reform,' I know that means the price of food is about to increase. . . . [Inflation and corruption make] rich men of party cadres and leave the masses behind. . . . The students have given all the people the courage to raise their voice."[17]

Although workers' motivations were different from

[14]Walder, "Wage Reform," loc. cit., and Susan L. Shirk, "Recent Chinese Labour Policies and the Transformation of Industrial Organisation in China," *China Quarterly*, December 1981, pp. 575–93.

[15]*Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988* (Statistical Yearbook of China 1988), Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988, p. 804.

[16]Ibid., p. 190.

[17]*Boston Globe*, May 24, 1989.

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those of the students, many apparently felt that the protests would provide an avenue of expression, and perhaps redress, of their grievances. From the outset, the students sought to show sympathy and build ties with the broader public. In the massive and pivotal march of April 27, in which workers cheered openly from the sides, helped clear away police lines in advance, and swelled the student procession to several times its original size, one student banner read "You work but you get nothing; your life is bitter."[18] A library clerk in the crowd that day told a reporter: "Inflation has given us a lot of difficulties because prices rise but salaries don't. Students voice that desire of ours to suppress the inflation. And then there's corruption. Bribery is evident everywhere, and the people are sick of it." An older worker (who was wearing a Mao button) told the same reporter: "They represent the people's thinking, the sense that we the people are in control. The leaders cover everything up. People don't know anything, and we are no longer the masters. That's why there is this uprising."[19] At another key mass demonstration, on May 4, an ironworker said, "I hope student demonstrators will make the government do something about inflation. But even if the students don't bring up the inflation problem, I'll still support them. They demand press freedom, which is something we need too. Now we have no freedom at all."[20] Workers evidently felt that students provided an opportunity to influence the leadership on matters of concern to them. The more sustained the student protests, the more encouraged and emboldened workers became.

The Weakening of Political Controls

No matter how emboldened Beijing's workers became during this period, they never demonstrated a capacity to organize and sustain a movement of their own. Blue- and white-collar workers either participated spontaneously in student-led actions or formed themselves into small bands who left their offices and factories to march under banners naming their place of work. At least one autonomous organization of industrial workers, the "Capital Independent Workers' Union," publicly announced its formation,[21] but we have little evidence to suggest that it was able to build a significant membership or to coordinate work actions in support of the student protests. Independent unions were more a result of the upheaval than a cause. In sharp contrast to Poland, where an organized labor movement, through superbly organized strikes and demonstrations, turned itself into a virtual opposition party, in China only the students and, to a lesser extent, the intellectuals, were able to form and sustain even loose-knit political associations.

But even this organizationally limited protest activity is significant in light of the heretofore remarkably effective institutions of grass roots political control inherited from the Mao era. China under Mao developed distinctive institutions of control centered in workplaces and neighborhoods. Even more so than in most Soviet bloc regimes, these controls made it very difficult for urban Chinese to change their jobs or place of residence, travel without workplace permission, obtain information other than from approved channels, or gather together outside official scrutiny.[22]

Over the past decade, the framework of these controls has been maintained, but their exercise has been relaxed. The intense workplace monitoring of behavior and thought characteristic of the past has subsided, and rewards have been distributed increasingly based on performance rather than loyalty. In addition, a small urban private sector (some 6 million nationally) and a much larger sector of peasant entrepreneurs from the city's suburban rings have been released from such controls. The strict control over travel and information and means of communication characteristic of the Mao era has also been loosened, as a consequence of both the policy of openness and of China's rapid development. For example, from 1978 to 1987, total passenger traffic grew 3.4 fold, and highway traffic 4.7 fold. The number of urban telephone lines increased 2.2 fold, long distance calls, 2.8 fold, and radio sets of all kinds, 3.4 fold.[23] These increases are due to the greater physical availability of travel and communication equipment, as well as to the fact that access to telephones, intercity travel, photocopy machines, and foreign radio broadcasts have in recent years all been subject to few or no political restrictions. These changes, of course, have been concentrated in the nation's capital: Beijing's 120,000 telex lines in 1987 were 78 percent of the nation's total, and the city's 194,000 telephones were almost three times the number of telephones in Tianjin,

[18] *The New York Times*, Apr. 28, 1989.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., May 5, 1989.
[21] *The Washington Post*, May 31, 1989, and *The New York Times*, May 31, 1989.

[22] See, for example, Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism*, passim, and Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984.
[23] *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988*, pp. 500–01, 523, 804. The radio figures probably understate the increase in shortwave sets, because an increasing proportion of radios sold after 1978 had this capacity.

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





Tiananmen currents, clockwise from top left: students draw inspiration from American revolutionary hero Patrick Henry; China Daily *workers draw on Lord Acton to condemn corruption within the party leadership of the People's Republic; motorcyclists participate in the demonstrations for democracy (other cyclists kept demonstrators posted on police and army movements); a contingent of the million Beijing office workers, laborers, and others who marched in support of the pro-democracy students on May 17, 1989; students and teachers man a makeshift communications center in Tiananmen Square.*

—The first two photos by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos, one by AFP, and two by Magnum.

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a nearby city of comparable size.[24] The rapid growth in these means of communication has clearly outpaced the capacity of the authorities to monitor them. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this fact is the ability of some hunted political activists to escape from Beijing, or from China altogether, in the weeks after the June 4 massacre.

The greater availability of these means of communication—many of which were in private hands—was much in evidence during the Beijing protests. A group of young motorcycle enthusiasts called the "Flying Tigers," employing a mode of transportation nonexistent 10 years ago, rode throughout the city after the declaration of martial law to spread news of advancing troops and to bolster citizen defenses. Participants in the student movement communicated with their colleagues in North America and Europe via long distance telephones, facsimile machines, and electronic mail on computer networks. They received news, advice, and encouragement from Chinese students abroad via these same media; and the information on these networks helped inform news programs broadcast back to China on shortwave channels.[25] As acknowledged by the resumption of jamming of foreign broadcasts on May 22, these news sources played an important role in spreading information about the protest's successes within China.[26] Also, even in the midst of the rebellion, international travel was still unrestricted: people easily obtained visas and arrived from overseas with contributions of funds and supplies for the student strikers. Students from outlying areas easily made it to Beijing, periodically replenishing the ranks of protesters in the square.[27] None of these advantages were available to the protesters of 1978–79.

Although these changes made massive street demonstrations possible, a number of barriers still hinder the political organization of the working population as a whole. Although workers joined in student protests to an unprecedented degree, they have not yet demonstrated the capacity to organize and lead a broader movement of their own.[28] As yet, China has no general labor market for workers in state-owned and large collective enterprises. In these sectors, which still employ more than 90 percent of urban Chinese, turnover remains very low, and most workers expect to stay at their workplace until they retire, as they did 10 years ago. State and large collective enterprises still distribute a wide array of benefits to employees, are the chief source of housing, and provide employment for their workers' children in an overcrowded urban labor market. The small urban private sector has provided an outlet primarily for otherwise unemployed youths or families with special skills or connections; it does not yet provide an attractive employment alternative for the secure and heavily subsidized state worker. Urban employees are therefore still very much attached to, and dependent upon, a single workplace. So far, this factor has constrained workers from organizing independently.

One reason why student demonstrations met with such enthusiastic support from the broader population is that they provided workers (and others) with a rare opportunity to protest that did not entail high and immediate costs. To organize behind factory gates, right under the nose of party officials, would be a gamble with potentially high costs.[29] However, simply not to show up for work or to leave early with a group of co-workers, perhaps taking a factory vehicle along, does not challenge factory authorities as directly as organizing for a work stoppage does. (Some managers might even condone outside participation by small groups of activist workers as a way of minimizing disruption of the factory.) But the events of this spring showed that it is not necessary to have an organized workers' movement to mobilize protests that put enormous pressures on the institutions of political power. One very important reason for this circumstance lies within the party and state apparatus.

The Fracturing of Party Unity

The evident disintegration of party unity after the first week of May is perhaps the most important cause of the size and tenacity of the protest movement, especially

[24]Ibid., p. 527.

[25]The number of phone calls between China and the United States were triple the normal number during May. *Boston Globe*, May 23, 1989.

[26]Ibid. The foreign radio broadcasts were especially important in spreading news about the protests to other parts of China, and were most important in Beijing before the second week of May, and after May 25, when local media reports were sketchy or biased.

[27]This travel was facilitated by sympathetic railway staff, who reportedly let students travel free, but such travel would not have been possible if the system of travel permits, which existed during the Mao era, had still been enforced by the Bureau of Public Security.

[28]Because it remains very difficult for managers to fire workers in China, managers are highly vulnerable to slowdowns and spontaneous walkouts. See Walder, "Factory and Manager," loc. cit., pp. 252–53. The Achilles heel of this system of political control is therefore within each isolated workplace. In the wake of the crackdown, the political system is more vulnerable to waves of isolated walkouts and slowdowns than to renewed student protest. Should a sustained stagnation or fall in urban living standards occur, such actions would be one possible source of pressure for political change.

[29]Workplace supervisors reportedly warned workers against participating in or even watching demonstrations; others tried to lock their workers into their compounds; some offered bonuses to those who would stay or threatened to fine those who left. One bystander at the May 4 demonstration told a reporter, "Workers won't dare march by themselves because the economic risk is too great." See *The New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

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its paradoxical growth after the May 19 declaration of martial law. The student demonstrators' invocation of the memory and progressive political legacy of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang drove wedges into an already divided party. Significant portions of the party-state apparatus openly supported the student campaign. Especially important was the defection of key organizations in the mass media that, on the eve of Gorbachev's visit, began to report openly and sympathetically on the growing demonstrations. This reportage helped to magnify public sympathy and involvement, and during a pivotal period, made it appear that the demonstrations might succeed in toppling the hard-line leadership.

It is apparent that the regime, beginning in the weeks leading up to martial law, was grappling with divided sovereignty in two respects. First, the Politburo Standing Committee itself found its powers usurped by Deng and members of the senior advisory group. This usurpation lasted a period of weeks, during which time there was no clear political center. Second, once these party elders, whose power rested not on formal position but on personal influence, forged an alliance with Premier Li Peng, President Yang Shangkun, and others, many of the personal followers of Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili (as well as Hu Yaobang's former followers, among whom were many intellectuals), who headed key central and provincial institutions, including, apparently, part of the armed forces, contested the rule of premier Li Peng and the Politburo majority manufactured by Deng. In essence, key governmental institutions—such as the Foreign Ministry, research institutes, key newspapers, and others—reportedly refused to take orders from the Li Peng government. The true magnitude and shape of this divided sovereignty is not clear to us at present and is in any case outside the scope of this essay, but a clearly divided party and state apparatus played a central role in feeding the popular rebellion. The population of Beijing was well aware of this division because of the mass media.

Beijing's mass media—local and national newspapers, the New China News Agency, local radio and television—also played a major role in mobilizing popular protest, initially through accurate and sympathetic reporting on the student demonstrations and the popular response, and later by openly challenging the party leaders who ordered martial law. As early as April 24, such newspapers as Shanghai's *World Economic Herald* and Beijing's *Science and Technology Daily* ventured sympathetic reports on the student protests, drawing the ire of officials.[30] However, the official media remained hostile or silent on the student movement and followed the line enunciated in the *People's Daily* editorial of April 26, which attacked the students for engaging in a "planned conspiracy" aimed at overthrowing the party, until May 4, when, speaking at the reception for members of the Asian Development Bank, Zhao Ziyang declared that "the just demands of the students must be met" and that "we should solve the problem in a democratic and legal way."[31]

During this time, the student demonstrations were massive and enjoyed clear popular support. In the demonstration of April 27, hundreds of thousands of students and their supporters marched through the streets for hours, repeatedly breaking through police barricades to fill Tiananmen Square. On May 4, hundreds of thousands of students and supporters again marched, and this time were joined by organized intellectuals and journalists under banners of their own, and by young workers who "easily outnumbered" the students.[32]

Despite the enormous size of the demonstrations, they did not yet constitute a popular rebellion. They would become one only after the protesters came to see themselves as having the clear sympathy of one wing of the party and government apparatus and as helping this faction in its fight against the conservatives. This process began after Zhao's May 4 speech, which was followed by a series of conciliatory statements about "patriotic" students that continued up to May 17. Beginning on May 5, the official media began to run brief but objective reports on student activities and demands; by May 9, the reports had become longer and more detailed, leading quickly to actively sympathetic media coverage for a period of about two weeks, ending on May 25.[33]

At two distinct points, the suddenly independent and assertive mass media played a pivotal role in the development of the popular rebellion. First, from around May 13 through May 19, the media's detailed and sympathetic reporting riveted the city's attention on the drama of the hunger strikers, building a huge groundswell of popular support, and openly seeking to pressure top leaders to reverse their intransigent stand against negotiations. This period was one in which, for the first time, protest marches swelled to 1 million or more (May 15, 17, and 18). White- and blue-collar workers, profes-

[30] *The New York Times*, Apr. 25, 1989. The editor of the former was sacked, and the issue in question impounded. In turn, these actions galvanized protests for a free press by leading intellectuals and journalists, beginning in earnest on April 27, and continuing through mid-May.

[31] *China Information* (Leiden), Summer 1989, p. 41.

[32] *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, May 5, 1989.

[33] *The Washington Post*, May 5 and 10, and *The New York Times*, May 10, 1989.

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sionals, and cadres began to march under banners naming their workplaces (including at least eight agencies of the central government), and a force of several hundred thousand began to occupy the square continuously.[34] During this period, the people of Beijing were told by their press and television that "hundreds of thousands" or "more than a million people" "from all walks of life" were going to the main square "to show their support for the students." They read detailed lists of student demands and heard reports that university presidents, teachers' organizations, leading social scientists, the staff of Beijing television, the head of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, leading journalists and intellectuals, and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions had appealed to the government to negotiate with the students in good faith. Finally, they heard that citizens and organizations throughout the capital were sending aid and medical supplies to the hunger strikers.[35]

Having so effectively mobilized public opinion for the cause of the students (and by extension for the cause of liberalization and reform), in mid-May, Beijing's mass media also laid the foundation for massive popular resistance to martial law beginning in the early morning hours of May 20. This second stage marked the start of an open popular rebellion against the Li Peng-Deng Xiaoping faction. Until troops moved into the compounds of broadcasting stations and newspapers on May 25,[36] the mass media openly encouraged resistance to martial law, making it appear that practically the entire country was united in opposition against it.

During this week, hundreds of thousands of students and ordinary citizens continued to demonstrate in the square, while massive numbers of other demonstrators rushed to countless barricades throughout the city to block troop movements. People could read and hear in the official media that the masses were opposed to martial law, and that military officers were pledged not to attack the demonstrators. Photographs in newspapers showed citizens and soldiers fraternizing at the barricades. As Li Peng made speeches naming "turmoil" as the pretext for the military show of force, local papers reported that rates of crime and traffic accidents had gone down in the past month.[37] *Science and Technology Daily* published an appeal, signed by 24 members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, calling for an emergency session to repeal martial law.[38] *People's Daily* printed on its front page an article quoting Hungarian Prime Minister Miklós Nemeth saying that his country had learned from sad experience that solutions to its problems did not come from military force, along with an article about the resignation of the Italian government.[39] New China News Agency reports claimed that more than 1 million people marched in the streets to oppose martial law on May 23, when foreign observers put the number at 100,000, and the agency's interviews with citizens on the street directly refuted the rationale for martial law.[40]

The evident division in the national leadership and the open defection of the mass media fueled an exhilarating sense of popular power. From the outset, the student protesters, in characteristic Chinese style, saw themselves not as dissidents but as loyal remonstrators. Their sense of insult at the April 26 editorial is evidence of this mentality; and a retraction of the accusation that they were "counterrevolutionary" became a key student demand. They saw themselves as patriots carrying out their duty as educated citizens to press the government even at personal risk. However, when it became apparent that their activities had sympathizers in the government, they began to feel a sense of direct participation in national politics; as the splits in the leadership widened, they and ever broader circles of the population came to feel that they were participating directly in a momentous historical drama. The disintegration of the party apparatus made victory seem possible and lowered the perceived costs of continued participation. Without this disintegration, it is hard to imagine a population united in rebellion against a party leadership that had already publicly committed itself to the use of military force.

Conclusions

From this perspective, the military assault upon Beijing should not be interpreted simply as a tough response to stubborn student protesters. The stakes were much higher by mid-May; by the time martial law was declared, the students were no longer the hard-liners' main problem. The entire population of Beijing was seemingly united in effective resistance against the

[34] *The New York Times*, May 16, 18, and 19, 1989, and *The Washington Post*, May 17, 1989.

[35] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), May 17, 18, and 19, 1989. Provincial radio stations reported on protest activities in at least 23 other cities on May 17 and 18 alone.

[36] *The Washington Post*, May 25, 1989.

[37] Ibid., May 24 and 25, 1989. Some publications dissented by placing the word "turmoil" in quotation marks.

[38] *Asian Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 1989.

[39] *The Washington Post*, May 23, and *The New York Times*, May 24, 1989.

[40] *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1989.

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hard-liners' refusal to negotiate with students, and broad sectors of party and government were in open defiance. Outside the capital, demonstrations had occurred in more than 80 cities.[41] The crackdown was, instead, an act calculated to terrorize the entire population of Beijing, and the recalcitrant party-state apparatus, back into submission.

It is tempting, but misleading, to characterize Beijing's popular rebellion as a movement by "society" against the "state." This characterization is much more appropriate for the decade-long struggle of Solidarity in Poland; the Beijing events are much more like the 1956 rebellion in Hungary. In Hungary, as in China, growing restiveness among students and intellectuals exacerbated existing divisions within the regime, and drew broad segments of the population into participation. China's ordinary citizens did not organize to force themselves onto the political stage; they used an opportunity created initially by students, and then opened wider first by the rebellion of intellectuals and later by the defection of key parts of the government apparatus and the media. The events of this spring show, instead, how explosive is the mixture of popular protest and party disunity. The splits in the party were opened wide by the protests; but they were already deep. And while the protests showed extraordinary strength before the party's unity began to crumble, they would not likely have grown to such an extent had the party maintained internal discipline, as in 1986–87.

The June massacre has temporarily staved off the defeat of conservative political figures, but at enormous human and political cost. Moreover, it has given future popular movements a powerful symbol and rallying point, because ordinary citizens, perhaps even more than the students, bore the brunt of the massacre. And it has, if anything, further deepened existing divisions within the party apparatus, while giving future politicians a powerful issue to use against those implicated in it. The unprecedented involvement of ordinary workers in this year's street actions suggests that any future economic stagnation will once again make this group available for political mobilization. In a situation of heightened political repression, through slowdowns and isolated walkouts, workers will have more effective means of political leverage than students and intellectuals. But whoever leads future protests, and whatever form they may take, it now appears certain that the volatile mixture of popular protest and elite strife will continue to mark the path of political change in China into the next century.

[41] Ibid., Aug. 20, 1989.

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The People's Liberation Army and the Power Struggle of 1989

June Teufel Dreyer

On May 19, 1989, Li Peng, Premier of the State Council, signed the following order:

In view of the fact that serious turmoils have taken place in Beijing and that social stability, people's normal life and social order have been disrupted, and in order to firmly stop the unrest, to safeguard social tranquility in Beijing, to safeguard the life and property of the citizens, to protect public property, and to ensure the normal function of the central departments and the Beijing Municipal Government, the State Council decided, in accordance with the stipulations of Clause 16 under Article 89 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, to execute martial law in part of Beijing as from 10:00 [am] on May 20, 1989, and that the order be implemented by the People's Government of Beijing, which is to take concrete measures according to practical needs.[1]

The declaration of martial law formally brought the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into the domestic political standoff that had all but paralyzed China's capital for the previous month. The PLA, however, did not immediately respond to the civilian leadership's orders to carry out the martial law decree, thus raising questions about the military's political role and its relationship to China's civilian leaders.

Since the late 1970's, the PLA has been, under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping, undergoing multifaceted processes of modernization and professionalization. The latter was designed to secure the PLA's political loyalty and to ensure that it execute whatever directions given to it by the properly constituted political authorities. As the de facto supreme leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and also as the chairman of the party Central Committee's Central Military Commission, Deng was in an ideal position to supervise the professionalization process.

Moreover, the PLA had undergone extensive personnel changes in the decade since Deng returned to power. All of the country's military region commanders and commissars had been changed at least once, as had the heads of the PLA's three general departments and the members of the Central Military Commission. Those who seemed to differ with Deng were dismissed or allowed to retire; presumably they were replaced by persons loyal to him. On grounds of both professionalism and personal loyalty, the PLA should have responded immediately to orders from the civilian leadership.

The unfolding of the political crisis from the declaration of martial law to the assault on the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3–4, 1989, strongly suggests that the PLA was thrust into the role of power broker to resolve a stalemate between the political reformers, who were willing to accommodate the demonstrators' demands, and the conservatives, who rejected these demands. That stalemate was broken when what seemed to be the dominant faction of the military moved to support the conservatives.

But the reasons for the stalemate were also related to the military's divergent understandings of the role and purpose of professionalism. Hence, this article will explore how different understandings of that concept shaped the military's relationship to the martial law declaration. In addition, the article will examine the effects of the Tiananmen massacre on the public's perception

[1]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China*, (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), May 22, 1989, p. 26.

June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Politics at the University of Miami, (Coral Gables, FL). She has written widely on contemporary China, particularly on Chinese military affairs. Her latest book is Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy *(1989).*

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of the PLA and the regime's use of a variety of public relations efforts to repair the damage. Finally, because this clear reliance on the military to restore "order" in Beijing portended a possible change in the balance of power between the military and civilian leadership, this article will also analyze the implications of the June events for political-military relations within the regime.

The PLA and Martial Law

Foreign observers had fully expected the PLA to obey its orders. By contrast, the leadership of the PRC had no expectation that compliance would be automatic. On the same day that martial law was declared, Deng left Beijing in order to convene an emergency meeting of the heads of China's seven military regions. The session was reportedly stormy, with the commanders of the Beijing, Lanzhou, and Guangzhou military regions refusing to endorse the decree.[2] Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian, the two surviving marshals of the 10 who had led China's War of Liberation—men who are literally legends in their own lifetimes—were reported to have telephoned the Martial Law Command to advise against the use of force.[3] And a petition drafted by seven high-ranking military leaders and signed by more than 100 others stated:

The People's Army belongs to the people. It should not stand against the people or even kill ordinary people. It should under no circumstances fire at the people and create any bloody incidents. To prevent further deterioration of the situation, the army should not enter the city.[4]

These reports might have been dismissed as mere rumor, albeit from hitherto reliable sources, were it not for the initial failure of the troops to react. To be sure, some of this inaction seemed dictated by prudence. Thousands of citizens blocked the progress of military convoys. They erected barricades out of buses, construction materials, and whatever else was handy. They also let the air out of the tires of military vehicles and lectured the soldiers on their duties to the people.

For the PLA to attempt an advance under such circumstances would have entailed inflicting major casualties on the people who formed this human wall, at the risk of significant PLA casualties as well. But curiously, many officers chose to explain their inaction as ideologically rather than pragmatically motivated, saying that the army and the people were one, and that for family members to draw swords on one another could only give joy to the country's enemies and grief to its friends.

Despite the dominance of this theme, undertones of frustration were evident as well. For example, a colonel interviewed on May 23 by Beijing's Central Television network, stated:

. . . our way was blocked by too many people for us to move. This has put us in a difficult position. Our superiors have ordered us to move back, but we failed to do so.[5]

Although relations between civilians and the troops sent to enforce martial law were basically cordial, the weather was hot and the days were long. Both soldiers and civilians found themselves in a difficult situation not of their own choosing. Tempers frayed, and incidents occurred. As noted by the same colonel,

. . . the masses of the people don't understand us. Yesterday morning many people abused us, but we ignored such misunderstanding in a bid to avoid clashes. . . . I think our soldiers have behaved well, despite hunger, thirst, heat, and lack of sleep. But they feel they have been greatly humiliated.[6]

Most of the troops were unable to move, but some soldiers managed to fight through the barricades, injuring about 40 people and making it possible for a convoy of some 72 tanks and 300 trucks to enter the city. Other troops, apparently utilizing underground tunnels and the subway, managed to ensconce themselves in the Great Hall of the People.[7]

According to Uerkesh Daolet (Wuerkaixi), maneuvering for position was taking place in the streets and on the outskirts of Beijing, long discussions and fierce disputes were taking place within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the military.[8] The terms of discussion and the techniques of persuasion used by the party are unknown. However, by May 25, six of the PRC's seven military regions—that is, all except the Beijing command—had declared their allegiance to the martial law decree. Because it was precisely troops

[2]Ibid., p. 4.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid., p. 16.
[5]Ibid., May 23, 1989, p. 40.
[6]Ibid.
[7]See, for example, the articles by David Chen and Marlowe Hood in *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), May 23, 1989.
[8]"Deng Will Allow the Killing of Thousands More," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 20, 1989, p. 124. Wuerkaixi is the Chinese transliteration of the student's name, by which he has become well known in the West. Uerkesh Daolet is his Uygur name, by which he prefers to be known.

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from the Beijing command who would be expected to bear the brunt of martial law enforcement in the capital, the omission of the Beijing Military Region from the list of the loyal is important. Not surprisingly, troops from outlying areas soon began arriving in the environs of the capital, some from as far away as Inner Mongolia in the north and Sichuan in the southwest.

The number of troops—estimated at 150,000 by May 25, and still growing—seemed far in excess of what would be needed to deal with unarmed civilians. Their equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons, seemed similarly inappropriate. In view of these incongruities and the widespread evidence of dissent at the highest levels, residents began to speculate that the troops were present to support various political factions struggling for power.[9]

Political Infighting and the Military

Differences within the leadership over reform had been noticeable for some time, with the reformers maintaining in general that the solution to China's problems lay in the implementation of more reforms and the conservatives believing that the reforms had gone too far too quickly and wanting to reassert state control in certain areas. Not surprisingly, the reformers tended to sympathize with the demonstrators and the conservatives did not. A rough split characterized the five-person Standing Committee of the Politburo, with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili representing the reformers, and Premier Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin the conservatives.

Deng, the architect of the reforms, had seemed to distance himself from their political ramifications in recent months. Moreover, during the past two years, he had associated himself with the notion of "neo-authoritarianism."[10] This concept represented a remarkable change for a man persecuted during the Cultural Revolution for having said "it does not matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice," and who had supported Democracy Wall in 1978–79. As if in recognition of this change, some demonstrators carried anti-Deng banners that read "it does not matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat if it is a bad cat." The harshness of this criticism may have influenced Deng to turn definitively away from the reformers, who were carrying out programs he had himself designed, and toward the conservatives. In turn, Deng's shift meant abandoning Zhao Ziyang, who was his protégé.

The split in the Standing Committee of the Politburo was reflected in the military. Deng's modernization program led to a number of positive results for the military as certain weapons were upgraded and efforts were made to improve training. However, military modernization ranked fourth in the country's Four Modernizations program, and it received budget allocations consonant with this ranking. Moreover, certain measures taken in order to further modernization had undesirable side-effects. For example, re-institution of the rank system and provisions requiring those who wished to become officers to attend certain academies are reasonable steps toward military modernization. However, these measures also led to an increase in status differentiations within the military. Many people found this outcome distasteful and not in keeping with the PLA's egalitarian traditions.

The inflation and widening gaps in income distribution that accompanied Deng's moves toward a market economy hurt the military badly, as well as, of course, all other sectors of society that lived on fixed incomes. The military also experienced an alarming increase in corruption. Just as in civilian society, some PLA members were willing to accept the reforms and try to ameliorate the problems they had caused, while others wished to rescind portions of the reforms.

Among those siding with the reformers was Qin Jiwei, who, before being named Minister of Defense, had been head of the Beijing Military Region for the preceding decade. Qin's long-time deputy succeeded him as Commander of the Beijing Military Region. This factor may explain the reluctance of the 38th Army—which is under the command of the Beijing Military Region—to move against the demonstrators.[11]

The conservative faction of the military centered around Yang Shangkun, who served under Deng as

[9]See, for example, *Hong Kong Standard*, May 25, 1989.

[10]As defined by the official media, this term meant "enlightened or elite autocracy to develop the economy and assure smooth progress in modernization," with "enlightened" in turn defined as "having good sense and being reasonable." See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1989, pp. 30–31.

[11]Loyalty networks, however, can sometimes be poor predictors of actual behavior. The ups and downs in Qin Jiwei's military career coincide with those in Deng's career, and the two men were believed to be very close. Qin's allegiance to Deng's position could have been taken for granted, but in this case it would have been a wrong assumption. For a brief summary of Qin's relationship with Deng, see ibid., May 30, 1989, pp. 35–36.

Similar considerations apply to Yang Dezhi. When Deng withdrew from the position of head of the PLA's General Staff Department in 1980, Yang was named to succeed him. The two had had a long association, and Deng's choice of Yang Dezhi as a successor was construed as further proof of Deng's confidence in the loyalty of his subordinate. In 1989, however, Yang Dezhi was one of the seven military leaders who drafted a letter to the Martial Law Command objecting to sending the PLA into Beijing. See ibid., May 22, 1989, p. 15.

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The PLA and China's people: top, units of the 27th Army on the Avenue of Eternal Peace, June 5, 1989, guarding the approaches to Tiananmen Square; left, on May 20, an elderly citizen pleads with martial law troops not to shed the blood of fellow citizens; above, an injured tank driver is escorted to medical help; below, a citizen shot by the PLA during the crackdown is rushed to the hospital.

—First photo by Magnum, others by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

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permanent vice-chairman and secretary general of the Central Military Commission. As de facto leader of China, Deng was preoccupied with the many non-military aspects of administering the PRC, and Yang in fact assumed responsibility for the functioning of the military. In this capacity, Yang was able to build a loyalty network of his own. He was so effective that some Chinese described the upper echelons of the military as "the Yang family village." A younger brother, Yang Baibing, served as head of the PLA's General Political Department. The head of the General Staff Department, Chi Haotian, is reputed to be Yang's brother-in-law. Yet another Yang, believed to be a nephew, is in charge of the 27th Army, one of the units that moved into Beijing to counter the influence of the 38th.[12]

Factional infighting took place against the background of continued incidents between civilians and the military. Some incidents can be documented; others turned out to be exaggerations or quite false. What is more important is that they were credible to their audiences. Significant numbers of the PLA who had been sent to enforce martial law believed that they were being harassed by Beijing citizens, and significant numbers of Beijing citizens believed that they were being harassed by the PLA.

Meanwhile, sympathy demonstrations began to occur in several of China's other large cities, occasionally—most notably in the case of Chengdu—becoming quite violent. In Hong Kong, a massive rally was held in support of the demonstrators, and sources there began to contribute large sums of money to their cause.

Politburo Standing Committee member and security expert Qiao Shi defended the army's inaction by saying that the authorities were trying to solve the problem without bloodshed, but that "it would not be good to let things drag on," and "an appropriate time will be found to clear things up."[13] Given Qiao's standing in the highest levels of the leadership and his experience in matters of public security, it is reasonable to assume his statement indicates that the leadership was carefully monitoring the demonstrations and would make every effort to avoid violence. It is therefore puzzling that the order to go forward came, without warning, in the early morning of June 4th, just when it seemed that the demonstrations had lost their momentum. The violence seems unnecessary unless one assumes that its real aim was resolving a high-level power struggle.

The Aftermath of the Massacre

The 27th Army, considered loyal to Yang Shangkun and the conservative side, ultimately executed the order to clear Tiananmen Square. Subsequently, fighting was reported among military units as well, with units of the 27th and 63rd armies said to be skirmishing with those of the 38th, 15th, 16th, and 17th armies.[14] Speculations that a civil war was beginning ceased a few days later, as no more reports of fighting were received.

The victorious conservative faction then set about repairing the damage, tangible and intangible, that the confrontation had caused. The 27th Army was withdrawn from Beijing in the early hours of June 7th,[15] being replaced by young peasants from other units who had not taken part in the fighting. Civilians had occasionally retaliated against soldiers with great cruelty, including disembowelment and burning alive; withdrawing the army responsible for the Tiananmen massacre was undoubtedly intended to forestall the emergence of a vicious circle of violence-retaliation-violence.

Public relations efforts. PLA members were ordered to do good deeds for the people, consonant with CCP propaganda that "the army and the people are one." Within days after the massacre, soldiers were photographed clearing garbage from urban areas, giving free haircuts to local people, and helping the elderly and infirm to cross the streets. The people were described as responding with gratitude, bringing water and soft drinks to the troops, and praising them for their brave deeds in putting down the demonstrations. Deng told a meeting of the commanders of martial law troops that this rebellion was bound to happen sooner or later; handling it was a "severe political test" for the PLA, which had indeed "passed muster."[16]

Ceremonies were held to honor the memory of those soldiers who died at the hands of "counterrevolutionaries," with 10 of them receiving the posthumous title "Guardian of the Republic."[17] Eulogies depicted the young men as patriotic young people who had died in defense of their country.[18] It was stated that more than 6,000 martial law troops had been injured, and dozens killed, whereas no civilian had been run over by any PLA vehicles, and no one died in Tiananmen Square.[19] Survivors interviewed by the official press tended to stress that they had been set upon by "hooligans" or "ruffians," rather than by demonstrators or ordinary citi-

[12] *The New York Times*, June 2, 1989.
[13] *FBIS-CHI*, May 30, 1989, p. 34.
[14] Ibid., June 6, 1989, pp. 15–16; p. 24; pp. 27–28.
[15] Ibid., June 7, 1989, p. 28.
[16] "Deng Talks on Quelling Rebellion in Beijing," *Beijing Review*, July 10–16, 1989, p. 14.
[17] *FBIS-CHI*, July 11, 1989, pp. 41–42.
[18] See, for example, ibid., June 29, 1989, p. 32.
[19] Ibid., July 3, 1989, p. 17.

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zens, but that they had been aided by patriotic people.[20] The theme that the demonstration had been a counterrevolutionary rebellion that was put down through the joint efforts of the people and the PLA was repeated again and again. And Beijing celebrated the 66th anniversary of the founding of the CCP with a songfest by martial law units called "The People's Army Is Loyal to the Party." Shown on Beijing Television, the entertainment featured several numbers on the topic of the close ties between the people and their army.[21]

Popular contempt for the PLA. Preliminary indications are that measures to convince the population that the PLA is their friend and savior rather than their enemy and oppressor have failed. When the authorities ask citizens to make public statements of their views, they invariably profess love for the military and praise the military's accomplishments in putting down the rebellion. Privately, attitudes seem overwhelmingly negative. A mother refuses to let her son wear his favorite green pants because they are the same color as PLA uniforms; a man threatens to break a small boy's legs if he so much as expresses an interest in joining the military. A Western reporter notes that the people whom the official press photographs bringing soft drinks to the troops and praising them look like soldiers out of uniform. Suspicion is the order of the day: in July, an apparently genuine civilian appeared with a pail of water to quench the troops' thirst. The soldiers had the water tested and were informed that it contained poison.[22]

Hebei Radio reported that while troops from the province were posted to Beijing, "an extremely small number of bad elements . . . took the lead in storming military organs," beating and abusing those who remained and their family members.[23] In other areas, reports surfaced that "dare to die" squads of snipers had been formed. Using weapons stolen from PLA sources during the turmoil, they vowed to take revenge on military personnel.[24] Soldiers' relatives received death threats, and the father of a man shot in the back by soldiers as he was bicycling to work reacted to reports of the snipers by saying "I hope they keep it up. I don't mind if they shoot more of them."[25] It is noteworthy that all these statements concern the PLA as a whole: none of the speakers distinguished between pro-reform or pro-conservative factions of the PLA.

Future Political-Military Relations

Much speculation has arisen about the military's political role as a power broker between the reformers and the conservatives. The massacre on Tiananmen Square ensued when the military threw its support to the conservative faction led by Deng and Li Peng. Some sources opine that Yang Shangkun agreed to move against the demonstrators only after exacting Deng's pledge to allow the military a greater political role.[26] Others noted that a military once called out of the barracks does not easily return to them.[27] Both points of view posit an increased PLA influence at the highest levels, the first based on an explicit bargaining process, and the second on the military's anticipated reluctance to withdraw from its role in the decision-making process.

So far, no evidence supports the hypothesis of greater military influence in the elite. New members appointed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo after the massacre lack substantial ties to the military. As predicted, the Committee's two pro-reform members, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili, lost their positions. They were replaced by former Shanghai party chief Jiang Zemin, Party Organization Department chief Song Ping, and former mayor of Tianjin Li Ruihan.

The lack of a military representative on the Standing Committee is not, of course, proof that the military's position has not been enhanced. After all, Deng, although the de facto leader of China, is himself not a member of the Standing Committee. But thus far no rewards have gone to the military for its role in putting down the demonstrations, either. Pay scales remain low in comparison to those of civilian institutions, and poor living conditions continue to hamper the PLA's recruitment and retention efforts. Indeed, redressing these problems for the 3.1 million-member PLA would have a markedly detrimental effect on the conservatives' anti-inflation program.

The military's role in putting down the demonstrations also raises the issue of sanctions against those military officials who resisted the orders of the civilian leadership. One might have expected that Deng and Yang Shangkun would have moved against those military officials who were unwilling to implement the declaration of martial law. Inasmuch as political reformers lost power and were purged, it would seem reasonable that military reformers would be purged as well. So far, sanctions have not been instituted against recalcitrant mili-

[20]"Beijingers Rescue People's Liberation Army Men," *Beijing Review*, July 10–16, 1989, pp. 6–7.
[21]*FBIS-CHI*, July 3, 1989, p. 13.
[22]*The New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1989.
[23]*FBIS-CHI*, July 18, 1989, pp. 1–2.
[24]Ibid., July 19, 1989, p. 18.
[25]*The New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1989.
[26]*South China Morning Post*, June 5, 1989.
[27]*Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 6, 1989, p. 12.

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tary leaders. Qin Jiwei's name appeared prominently on a list of "leading personages of the Central Military Commission" attending a ceremony honoring a young PLA man who was killed in the performance of his martial law duties.[28] He retains his membership on the CCP Politburo. And a book by Yang Dezhi entitled *Military Work of the Contemporary Chinese Army* came off the press in late June. The official military newspaper described its publication as "worth a celebration."[29] The Chinese media have reported one case of a *former* lower-level PLA officer currently under investigation. However, he is accused of putting up reactionary posters and vilifying the martial law troops rather than of failure to obey orders.[30]

Why have no personnel changes in the military paralleled those in the Standing Committee of the Politburo? In the absence of hard information, one can do no more than speculate. It is possible that PLA commanders who initially opposed the imposition of martial law were able to exact a promise of no retaliation against the military in return for their pledge to go along with the decree. It is also conceivable that the leadership, recognizing that the officer corps is already suffering from the after-effects of a highly disruptive demobilization campaign,[31] believes that it could not afford another internal upheaval. Yet another explanation might be the latent strength of the pro-reform element in the military. The conservative faction may prefer to make peace with the reformers rather than provoke them by attempting a purge. Another possibility is that cross-cutting allegiances on other issues make it inadvisable for conservatives to attempt to remove military reformers from office. Although the two groups may have disagreed on the matter of the demonstrators, agreement on other factors, such as attitudes toward military corruption, procurement of foreign technology, and the like, may dictate a policy of "seeking common ground while reserving differences."

Yet another series of questions raised by the PLA's actions after the declaration of martial law centers around the issue of military professionalism. When measured by Western standards of professionalism, the reluctance of the PLA, or at least of a part of the PLA, to enforce a properly constituted directive from the civilian authorities would be considered highly unprofessional. The letter sent by leading military figures to the Martial Law Command would be tantamount to gross insubordination and therefore grounds for immediate dismissal. Yet clearly it was neither seen as such nor treated as such by the authorities, regardless of factional affiliation. According to the Chinese Communist concept of the military, the PLA exists to serve the party and its programs. Mao Zedong's statement that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun suggests a highly politicized military, and none of the changes made by his successors—including Deng Xiaoping—has altered this tenet. The concept of a politically neutral military is distasteful, calling forth images of warlordism and what has been termed "the purely military point of view." Indeed, the PLA *is* politicized. When consensus has characterized the highest levels of the CCP on political matters, the PLA has had a good record of compliance. But, when civilian leaders have disagreed over political questions, these splits have characterized the military as well.

Relations between civilian leaders and the military in the spring and summer of 1989 were further complicated by three other factors. First, under martial law, the PLA was asked to perform internal security duties that it had ostensibly given up in 1984, when the People's Armed Force Police was founded.[32] Second, since the founding of the PLA, its members have been indoctrinated with the view that the military exists for the people and to serve the people. They were taught that "the army is the fish and the people are the water; the fish cannot swim without the water." Understandably, the military hesitated to attack the people. A third factor was the apparent shift of Deng, its commander-in-chief, from the camp of the reformers to that of the conservatives. In essence, Deng was asking the military to act against those who supported the same policies of political democratization that he himself had previously championed.

The interaction of these factors created a good deal of confusion over the PLA's proper course of action. In this context, it was professionally valid for one side to believe—with the reformers—that it should not move against the people. However, it was equally professionally valid for the other side to believe—with the conservatives—that those who voiced their demands for greater political and economic benefits in such a way as to disrupt political and economic activities in the capital had removed themselves from the category of "the people" and placed themselves squarely in the camp of the counterrevolutionaries. Those who sided

[28] *FBIS-CHI*, July 14, 1989, pp. 36–37.
[29] Ibid., pp. 37–38.
[30] Ibid., June 23, 1989, p. 21.
[31] See J. Dreyer, Ed., *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy*, New York, Paragon House, 1989, Ch. 10, for a discussion of the campaign and the problems it caused.

[32] The People's Armed Force Police was not used to put down the demonstrators because it did not have sufficient numbers to handle this task.

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with the conservatives believed that the army of the CCP had an obligation to defend the party against counterrevolutionaries, and was therefore duty-bound to move against the demonstrators.[33]

Prospects for the Military

The image problem from which the military has suffered in recent years was appreciably worsened by its role in putting down the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. Repairing the military's image will be an arduous task. China faces no imminent external threat that would allow the PLA to be cast in the role of protector of the people. The absence of a salient threat will compound the difficulties of dispelling its present image as suppressor of the people. In addition, assuming the continued absence of external threat, common sense dictates that the bulk of the country's scarce resources be allocated to non-military sectors. The PLA's pay scales are apt to remain lower than those in the civilian sector, which will be an ongoing disincentive for the country's best and brightest young people to enlist.

The government can be expected to employ education and persuasion in an attempt to ameliorate this situation. A campaign to publicize "the new great contributions . . . made by the People's Liberation Army . . . and establish a good social practice of respecting and cherishing the army"[34] has already begun. Soldiers are being told to re-dedicate themselves to the CCP, the state, and the people in the manner of 1960's military role model Lei Feng.[35] Unfortunately, these techniques have been tried before, with little result. At least in the short term, the PLA faces difficult circumstances.

[33]The question also arises as to whether changes at the top of the CCP caused by the demonstrations constitute a military coup d' etat. This question raises definitional difficulties similar to those involved in defining "professionalism." The martial law decree that brought the military into the political equation was issued in accordance with the PRC's constitution. Although much has been made of Yang Shangkun's presence during the promulgation of the decree, he is in fact the President of China, a member of the CCP Politburo, and in a very influential position with regard to the military. Where, as in China, formal title does not necessarily coincide with actual power, and a number of key individuals hold high positions in the party, the government, and the military simultaneously, a military coup is definitionally impossible.

[34]*FBIS-CHI*, July 21, 1989, pp. 47–48.

[35]A soldier, who, some argue, is a mythical figure. Lei reputedly kept a diary that revealed his complete dedication to Maoism. Lei was last resurrected after the purge of Hu Yaobang. Calls to emulate Lei can be expected to be met with derision.

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Diplomacy Amid Protest: The Sino-Soviet Summit

Steven M. Goldstein

Sino-Soviet summits have rarely been routine occasions. Mao Zedong's two trips to Moscow (in 1949–50, and 1957) marked, respectively, the founding of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the beginnings of serious differences on matters of global policy. Nikita Khrushchev's three trips to China (in 1954, 1958, and 1959) degenerated from efforts to strengthen the alliance into heated exchanges over Soviet-American relations that became the basis for the bitter rift of the 1960's and 1970's. In all cases, then, Sino-Soviet summits have proven to be milestones presaging dramatic new developments in bilateral relations. The latest summit promised to be no exception. Many saw in Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China and the expected "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations a watershed event comparable to the apparent demise of the post-war order in Europe.

The results of the Soviet leader's four-day visit did not, however, live up to such expectations. The sixth Sino-Soviet summit did not solve any important issues or set any new directions for future relations; the meetings merely declared closure to nearly three decades of conflict. As Gorbachev left China, it appeared that this summit would not be remembered as one of dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs, but rather as the culmination of a long process of change that had been occurring in Sino-Soviet relations throughout the 1980's. Simply put, the road to the summit seemed more important than the summit itself.

However, appearances were deceiving—history will not judge this summit to be routine. A narrow focus on the meetings between Soviet and Chinese leaders yields only a partial insight into their results or significance. The "pro-democracy movement," as well as its brutal repression by Chinese authorities, not only overshadowed the summit but also brought into sharp relief elements of the Sino-Soviet relationship that were not readily apparent from the diplomatic record. Like a catalyst, Chinese domestic turmoil combined with the routine diplomacy of the summit to produce a reaction that provides critical insight into the manner in which this summit might shape not only the future of Sino-Soviet relations but also the international environment of which they are a part.

The story of the sixth Sino-Soviet summit is thus one of contrasts and interactions. On the one hand, inside the meeting rooms, leaders engaged in largely predictable diplomacy concerned more with setting the seal on past developments than with solving old problems or establishing parameters for a new relationship. On the other hand, outside and after the summit, as demonstrations grew in size and scope, there was little precedent for or predictability to events. Chinese and Soviet leaders alike were responding to rapidly changing developments in Beijing that soon shaped not only the venue, but also the results of their meetings.

The analysis that follows is built around this theme of linkage between summit diplomacy and China's domestic turmoil. It first traces the diplomatic roots and results of the summit in the Sino-Soviet relations of the 1980's and considers the substance and impact of the

Steven M. Goldstein is Professor and Chair of the Department of Government at Smith College (Northampton, MA). *This article has benefited from readings by Harry Harding, Steven Levine, Michel Oksenberg, Jonathan Pollack, and Alan Romberg. Research assistance was provided by Donna Milrod. Smith College furnished funding and Sophia Sluzar of* Problems of Communism *provided the accreditation that made possible my trip to Beijing for the summit and subsequent events. All of this assistance is gratefully acknowledged.*

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slow and cumulative route to the summit. Next, there is an assessment of the manner in which these very modulated diplomatic trends interacted with—and were shaped by—the fact of China's growing domestic upheaval. A final section moves beyond the retrospective nature of the diplomacy as well as the immediacy of the student demonstrations and government repression. It considers the results and lessons of their interaction and speculates on the clues which that interaction provides to the future course of Sino-Soviet relations and to the nature of international politics in East Asia.

Laying the Foundations: 1982–85

Initial signs of change in Sino-Soviet relations became apparent in the period before Leonid Brezhnev's death in the fall of 1982. As tensions developed in Sino-American relations at the end of the Carter administration and in the early Reagan presidency, Moscow sought to use the pattern of triangular politics to stunt the growth of a de facto security entente involving the United States, Japan, and China by fishing in the troubled waters of Washington's relations with Beijing.[1] Responding to early indications of China's "independent foreign policy" and its willingness to discuss outstanding issues, Brezhnev, in a March 1982 speech delivered in Tashkent, made important conciliatory gestures toward China. The Soviet leader acknowledged that China was socialist, rejected the idea of two Chinas (an obvious reference to Sino-American tensions over Taiwan), and offered to hold bilateral talks on the border issue. Even Brezhnev's death provided an opportunity to improve relations as Foreign Minister Huang Hua, while attending the funeral, met not only with General Secretary Yuriy Andropov but also with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. It was the highest level of contact since the meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and Premier Aleksey Kosygin in 1969.[2]

Brezhnev's immediate successors seemed willing to continue to explore the possibilities inherent in the new Chinese posture and in Sino-American tensions. But they were not willing to redirect the general thrust of Soviet policy in Asia in order to accommodate the Chinese. There was little let-up in the massive growth of military power surrounding China that had begun under Brezhnev. The political encirclement also continued. The courtship of North Korea proceeded with Kim Il-Song's first visit to Moscow in 17 years.[3] But most important, although Andropov's posture seemed more flexible than Konstantin Chernenko's, neither Soviet leader was willing to endanger seriously relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) for the sake of improving relations with China.[4] Vietnam's strategic location and its uses as a military base made it an integral part of the Soviet military position in Asia. Here was the central thread of continuity between the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev eras: relations with China would be improved as long as a wedge could be driven into Sino-American relations *and* broader Soviet strategic goals in Asia were not endangered.

The Chinese also saw the time as opportune for exploring détente with the Soviet Union. As one Chinese commentator noted, there was no reason why China should not "make active use of . . . [Soviet-American] contradictions."[5] These contradictions not only lessened the Soviet threat to China, but were a positive stimulus to improving Sino-Soviet relations both as leverage on the Reagan administration and as a way of distancing China from any involvement in a possible Soviet-American conflict. Improving relations with Moscow would thus add credibility to the new independent foreign policy line even as it helped assure a tranquil international environment for China's development.

However, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues remained wary of Moscow because they viewed Soviet policy toward China as a tactical shift within a general and continuing commitment to the Brezhnev policy in Asia. Despite the independent foreign policy line that condemned all forms of hegemony, including presumably US hegemony, China's differences with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan as well as Southeast and Northeast Asia were in areas of real importance to China's security.[6] Therefore, barring a fundamental reorientation in Soviet policy, China's leaders were determined to keep their distance from the Soviet Union—and tilt toward the United States. The early declaration of the need for Moscow to address the "three obstacles"—

[1]For a strong argument along these lines, see Chi Su, "China and the Soviet Union," *Current History* (Philadelphia, PA), September 1984, pp. 245–46.

[2]Robert C. Horn, "Soviet Leadership Changes and Sino-Soviet Relations," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1987, pp. 687–89; and "Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations Viewed," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 8–9.

[3]Osamu Miyoshi, "Soviet Strategy in Asia: A Japanese View," *Comparative Strategy* (New York), Vol. 6, No. 1 (1987), p. 20.

[4]Robert Horn, "Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations: What Price Rapprochement?" *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), July 1987, pp. 729–47; and Leszek Buszynski, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia," ibid., May 1986, pp. 591–609.

[5]Cited in Yan Mei, "The Maturing of Soviet-Chinese Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Beverly Hills, CA), No. 481, September 1985, p. 77.

[6]Chi Su, "China and the Soviet Union," loc. cit., p. 246.

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the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, support of Vietnam in Cambodia, and troops on the Sino-Soviet border—before China would consider "normalization" of relations made this clear.

Nonetheless, the years from Brezhnev's death until the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 saw significant development in Sino-Soviet relations. In the first place, a series of official visits raised contacts to levels that had not been seen since the 1960's. Aside from what one author has called the "funeral diplomacy" surrounding the deaths of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, there was a meeting of Chinese and Soviet Foreign Ministers at the United Nations, as well as the December 1984 visit to Beijing of Soviet Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov, the former head of the Soviet assistance program in China.[7] This last meeting not only provided an occasion to review the halcyon days of Sino-Soviet relations and for Arkhipov to have "exciting meetings and frank conversations with his old friends"; it also produced a number of concrete agreements related to "economic and technical cooperation," including a pledge to set up a joint committee for economic, trade, scientific, and technological cooperation.[8]

This final development indicated that undergirding the sub-summitry of this period was a more substantial process—the institutionalization of the relationship. The most prominent example of this institutionalization was the five rounds of semi-annual meetings between deputy foreign ministers that were held beginning in the fall of 1982. Characterized by the Chinese foreign ministry as "consultations . . . on the question of Sino-Soviet relations," these meetings provided a regularized channel for Chinese and Soviet officials to discuss a broad range of bilateral and global issues touching on everything from security to cultural and trade relations.[9] There were also other manifestations of the process of institutionalization. A broad program of citizen exchanges was reactivated, and economic relations between the two countries became more regularized. In 1983, trade along the northern border was resumed for the first time since 1969. Yearly trade agreements negotiated at the national level provided the framework under which national trade between the two countries, which had been only US$263 million in 1981, grew to almost $2 billion in 1985.[10] Finally, during these years there were suggestions that each side was reconsidering the intellectual bases of their two-decades-long confrontation. During the early 1980's, Chinese treatment of the Soviet Union became progressively more positive, and signs that Brezhnev's successors were pursuing reform policies met with favorable comment.[11] Similarly, on the Soviet side there were suggestions of ferment among Moscow's China-watchers, some of whom sought to break the pattern of mutual hostility.[12]

The years before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power thus represent both a crucial—as well as a paradoxical—period in the development of Sino-Soviet relations. Relations between the two countries had moved beyond the realm of simple conflict management. They were becoming routinized and institutionalized. Still, the shadows of past conflicts and mind-sets hung over the relationship. Despite initiatives by the Soviets and the declaration of an "independent foreign policy" by the Chinese, neither side was willing to stray very far from core aspects of its previous policy. Soviet military and political encirclement of China continued. Beijing, still mistrustful of Soviet motives, maintained its special relationship with the United States. In short, both sides clung to old strategies despite signs that new formulas were emerging. This was in large part because neither side was convinced that a fundamental change had occurred in the nature of the other's foreign policy. Each was probably right.

Prelude to the Summit: 1985–89

The emphasis on the centrality of domestic reform for foreign policy—and vice versa—has become the hallmark of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" on international affairs. As George Breslauer has noted, there is an urgent need "to create actively an international environment conducive to the realization of leading domestic priorities."[13] And although the most dramatic manifestations of "new thinking" have concerned strategic weapons and the European region, its imprint has also been apparent in Moscow's relations with Asia.

The Brezhnev policy in Asia epitomized the "old thinking." Seeking to isolate China and disrupt Ameri-

[7]Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's: From Confrontation to Conciliation," in Samuel S. Kim, Ed., *China and the World*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, p. 113.

[8]*FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 28, 1984, p. C/1, and Dec. 31, 1984, p. C/1.

[9]Ibid., Oct. 4, 1982, p. C/1.

[10]Valerie Niquet-Cabestan, "The Recent Evolution of Economic Relations Between China and the USSR, (1982–1987)," *Revue d'études comparatives est-ouest* (Paris), Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, pp. 88 and 89.

[11]Gilbert Rozman, *The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1987.

[12]See Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's China-Watchers in the Post-Mao Era: The Response to a Changing China," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1983, pp. 215–41; and Chi Su, "Soviet China-Watchers' Influence on Soviet China Policy," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (Washington, DC), December 1983, pp. 25–49.

[13]George Breslauer, "Linking Gorbachev's Domestic and Foreign Policies," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Summer 1989, p. 267.

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can influence in Asia, Moscow sought to build its own alliance structure in the area even as it projected land and naval military power. The early stirring of Soviet interest in détente with China was, of course, an implicit recognition that this policy was not working. By the time Gorbachev came to power in the spring of 1985, its failures—particularly when measured against the new leader's priorities—were obvious.[14] Not only had the policy not succeeded in disrupting the American alliance structure in Asia and encircling China, it had left the Soviet Union in the unenviable position of being tied to a few unpopular allies in Asia and expending enormous amounts of money to maintain these allies, in addition to sustaining an ineffective Soviet military presence in the region. Perhaps more important, the old thinking had isolated the Soviet Union from an economically fast-growing region of the world from which the underdeveloped eastern parts of the USSR could clearly benefit.[15] The "new thinking" in regard to Asia that developed during the Gorbachev era thus revolved around the relaxation of tensions in the area, some reduction in the Soviet military presence, and increased economic links with the region.

As this Asian policy unfolded between 1986 and 1989, China's place in it became apparent.[16] A relaxation of Sino-Soviet tensions would permit a significant drawing-down of Soviet forces in Asia with a resulting easing of the economic burden of the 15–20 percent of defense spending committed to deployments directed against China. The growth of Sino-Soviet ties would also enhance exchanges between somewhat complementary economies (Soviet technology and raw materials for Chinese light industrial goods), while conserving scarce Western currencies. But most important, an easing of the Sino-Soviet conflict would establish Soviet bona fides as a force for peace in Asia and facilitate better relations with Chinese friends in Southeast and East Asia—in particular, Japan. For Gorbachev, the road to Asia very clearly lay through Beijing.

The day after his election as General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, Gorbachev made clear his intention to address the issue of Sino-Soviet relations. Speaking to a Central Committee meeting he announced: "We would like a serious improvement of relations with the Chinese People's Republic and believe that, given reciprocity, this is quite possible."[17] In the months that followed, the Chinese seemed to react positively to the apparent new tone in Soviet statements: Hu Yaobang sent party greetings on the occasion of Gorbachev's election; Deng Xiaoping suggested that if the Soviets could not deal with all three obstacles, they could begin with one—the problem of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia; Deng also noted that China would accept a Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay if Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia; and, finally, Vice Premiers Yao Yilin and Li Peng visited Moscow—the latter meeting with Gorbachev.[18] However, overall, the Chinese response during Gorbachev's first year was relatively restrained, with at least one internal report suggesting that "in substance he (Gorbachev) has shown no sign of change."[19]

The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1986 played a crucial role in reshaping Chinese perceptions of the new Soviet leader and his new foreign policy. Soon after the meeting, Chinese commentaries, noting the dramatic nature of the reform pronouncements made by Gorbachev, cautiously suggested that reforms of a different nature than those of the earlier Brezhnev regime were in the offing.[20] More important, there was the suggestion that Soviet foreign policy was being shaped by the imperatives of domestic reform. For example, writing in the influential journal *Shijie zhishi* in July, Shu Xiangdi concluded that Soviet policy toward the United States was "confronted by an acute contradiction between economic rejuvenation and the arms race." Unable to achieve both goals, Gorbachev's foreign policy toward the United States was becoming more conciliatory so as to realize his "accelerated development strategy."[21]

[14]The remainder of this paragraph is based on Rajan Menon, "New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-June 1989, pp. 1–29; Pi Ying-hsien, "Gorbachev's New Political Thinking and Soviet Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Issues & Studies* (Mucha, Republic of China), May 1989, pp. 102–22; Gerald Segal, "The Soviet Union in Asia in 1988," *Asian Survey*, January 1989, pp. 101–11; Elizabeth Wishnick, "Soviet Asian Collective Security From Brezhnev to Gorbachev," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Fall 1988, pp. 3–28; Harry Gelman, "Gorbachev's Policies in East Asia After Two Years," ibid., Spring 1988, pp. 47–54; and Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 68, No. 1 (1988/1989), pp. 120–38.

[15]On this, see Mikhail G. Nossov, "The USSR and the Security of the Asia-Pacific Region: From Vladivostok to Krasnoyarsk," *Asian Survey*, March 1989, pp. 252–67; and Gail Lapidus, "The USSR and Asia in 1986," ibid., January 1987, pp. 2–3.

[16]This paragraph draws on Robert G. Sutter, "Sino-Soviet Relations: Recent Developments and Implications for the United States," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Spring 1987, pp. 68–69; Menon, loc. cit.; and Pi, loc. cit.

[17]Horn, "Soviet Leadership Changes and Sino-Soviet Relations," pp. 689–90.

[18]Ibid., p. 696; and Gregory D. Knight, "China's Soviet Policy in the Gorbachev Era," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Spring 1986, p. 107; and *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 9–10.

[19]Cited in Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's," p. 113.

[20]See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 31, 1986, pp. C/1–4, and Aug. 8, 1986, pp. A/3–5. This paragraph draws on talks with Lyman Miller, who has shared with the author interpretations and citations relating to Chinese views of the Soviet reform effort.

[21]*FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 8, 1986, p. A/5.

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This assessment was a fundamental departure from earlier ones, which saw the reform drive as secondary to the priorities of projecting Soviet military power abroad.

Of course, from the Chinese perspective, the most important issue was Soviet policy in Asia, and here a new Soviet initiative was not long in coming. In a July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev spoke of an all-Asian approach to regional security based on the model of the Helsinki Agreement; announced greater Soviet economic participation in the region; suggested that troop withdrawals in Mongolia and Afghanistan would be forthcoming; declared Soviet willingness to accept the Thalweg (middle channel) principle of border demarcation on the Sino-Soviet border; and proposed a number of joint projects between China and the Soviet Union.[22]

Although later, at the May 1989 summit, Deng would tell Gorbachev that this speech changed his perception of Soviet policy—he claimed to see "new content in the speech"—the initial Chinese response was still lukewarm. The approach to Asian regional security smacked too much of Brezhnev's anti-American Asian collective security system. This suggested that Gorbachev's "new thinking" in Asia was being constrained by the need to confront the United States, which was not ready to give the Soviet leader the peaceful environment he "urgently" needed for domestic reform.[23] In the Chinese view, such antagonistic superpower relations minimized the beneficial effects to China of a reformist Soviet Union by encouraging Russian expansion in the Pacific to counter American influence, and thus reducing improved relations with China to a mere strategic ploy in the still tense Soviet-American relationship.[24]

With change in Soviet Asian policy only a possibility, Chinese policy toward Moscow continued its previous course.[25] There was a further institutionalization of the economic relationship via agreements to exchange engineering and technical personnel, to promote economic and technological cooperation, to broaden consular relations, to rebuild 17 plants constructed in the 1950's, and to initiate cooperation between state planning commissions. High-level exchanges were maintained, as the biannual consultations were continued and boundary talks inaugurated. Finally, the economic relationship continued to grow—with border trade in Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang benefiting from the relaxation in tension. By the end of 1986 total trade had reached $2.6 billion—more than seven times what it had been in 1982.

As long as the deadlock on the three obstacles remained, however, the Chinese side refused to declare the relationship officially "normalized." Although the Soviets suggested for the first time in the fall of 1986 that they were prepared to discuss any subject (even Cambodia) with the Chinese, little movement occurred on those issues that might suggest a fundamental change in Soviet policy. From Beijing's perspective, although the early Gorbachev years saw a continuation of the easing in tensions that had begun under his predecessors, there was as yet little evidence that "new thinking" was *actually at work* in Sino-Soviet relations.

Matters changed radically in the second half of 1987. Running counter to Chinese expectations, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty that changed China's "strategic horizons" by similarly limiting Soviet missiles in Asia.[26] However, of greater importance was the environment within which Beijing saw the treaty unfolding. Although, in the Chinese view, Soviet motives remained unchanged,[27] American policy was seen as undergoing substantial change. Under the pressures of Irangate, a rising budget deficit, international balance of payment problems and, finally, the October 1987 collapse of the stock market, Ronald Reagan could no longer pursue his policy of forcing the arms race. Like Gorbachev, he was being compelled by domestic needs to ease international tensions. The basis for mutual agreement was thus created by domestic problems on both sides.[28]

The implications of these developments for China's strategic position were, of course, potentially more significant than the removal of Soviet missiles from Asia. Reagan's sudden reversal of fortunes and the changed policy toward the Soviet Union that followed from it, profoundly changed Beijing's view of the foreign policy impact of the Gorbachev reform. The leadership in Beijing seemed to accept the proposition that Soviet foreign policy was indeed being driven by a domestic reform policy that required "an international environment of détente and relaxation."[29] Now, Chinese articles noted with approval, there was a broad reassessment of Soviet aggressive policies of the past—Finland, the

[22]See Lapidus, loc. cit., p. 3; and Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's," p. 114.
[23]*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 27, 1987, p. A/5.
[24]Ibid., Dec. 31, 1986, p. C/1.
[25]This paragraph is based on Niquet-Cabestan, loc. cit., pp. 86–88; and *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1989, pp. 9–11.
[26]James Hsiung, "Sino-Soviet Detente and Chinese Foreign Policy," *Current History*, September 1988, p. 246.
[27]See *FBIS-CHI*, May 26, 1987, p. A/2.
[28]Ibid., Oct. 16, 1987, pp. 1–2; and Nov. 25, 1987, pp. 1–2.
[29]Ibid., June 10, 1988, p. 2.

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placing of SS-20's in Europe, and Afghanistan—with an eye toward moderating Moscow's international ambitions in the future.[30]

But more fundamentally, the theoretical bases of Soviet foreign policy were seen as changing. As 1988 unfolded, the Chinese press depicted a corpus of "new thinking" on international affairs evolving in the Soviet Union that revolved around the concept of global interdependence rather than conflict; the recognition that "war cannot become a means of achieving any political, economic, ideological or other purpose"; a desire to gain "protracted peaceful coexistence"; and a willingness to tolerate "diversity" in socialist countries as well as a recognition that "the international Communist movement should be built on the basis of self-determination and independence." A former director of the Xinhua news bureau in Moscow depicted these changes as "serious," warning that China "should not consider . . . [them] as mere propaganda or political games."[31]

Indeed, not only did Chinese assessments of the nature of Soviet foreign policy change after the fall of 1987, there was also a major revision of Beijing's view of the nature of global politics. By early 1989, Chinese statements began to argue that "peace and development have replaced war and revolution as the main themes in the contemporary world."[32] The military daily *Jiefangjun bao* seemed to be echoing late 19th-century Spencerian logic when it suggested that "economic factors" had "directed" peace. It concluded:

In the wake of constant development and changes in the current world's economic situation, people will see more clearly that on more occasions the economy will serve as a powerful lever in solving international conflicts.[33]

In short, the Soviet reform movement and the resultant foreign policy adjustments by Moscow had become, by early 1989, nothing less than the basis for an entirely new Chinese image of the postwar world. Superpower struggles for "hegemony" seemed to have diminished. Trends toward "peace and development" presented China with an opportunity to achieve its reformist goals in an atmosphere of developing economic interdependence.[34] China's view of the world and the conclusions that were drawn from it regarding the opportunities it presented for a peaceful reform environment had, after three years, grown strikingly to resemble Gorbachev's "new thinking"—a fact that was certainly not lost on Soviet commentators.[35]

This Chinese assessment of the nature of Soviet foreign policy—and of the world—was not unrelated to the course of Sino-Soviet relations in the period immediately preceding the summit. In a somewhat dialectical manner, it was shaped by the development of such relations even as it provided the intellectual context within which those relations developed. It is clear that 1988–89 was a period when Soviet rhetoric regarding issues of special importance to Beijing in Asia not only became more specific, but also seemed to be translated into real policy initiatives. In September 1988, Gorbachev gave a second major speech on Asia in Krasnoyarsk. Continuing his earlier themes, the Soviet leader put forth a seven-point proposal for "strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific region." Trying to put a more conciliatory face on Soviet policy, he spoke of US participation in the discussion of regional issues, reiterated his desire for a Sino-Soviet summit, and spoke of better relations with Japan. However, the major emphasis in this talk was on the economic aspects of Soviet policy in Asia. Gorbachev proposed greater foreign economic participation in the development of the Soviet Far East through investment zones, even as he pledged greater Soviet investment in the region. This economic orientation of Soviet Asian policy was complemented by increased efforts to gain membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.[36]

The Chinese response to the speech was cautious and reflected a residual distrust of Soviet motives.[37] Still, in spite of Chinese suspicions regarding Gorbachev's ambitions in Asia and continued doubts regarding the extent of change in actual policy, the Soviet Union initiated movement on concrete issues central to the relationship that could not be ignored in Beijing. In April 1988, an agreement was signed in Geneva that stipulated that Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, scheduled to begin in May, would be completed in February 1989. Soviet actions on a second obstacle—Soviet troops on the Chinese border—seemed equally promising, with Gorbachev announcing to the United Nations in December of 1988 that most Soviet

[30]Ibid., July 27, 1988, pp. 5–6.
[31]Ibid., June 14, 1988, pp. 8–14, and Feb. 2, 1989, p. 5.
[32]Ibid., Jan. 10, 1989, p. 2.
[33]Ibid., Sept. 30, 1988, p. 4.
[34]Ibid., Sept. 20, 1988, p. 4. It should also be noted that Deng Xiaoping was associated with this assessment. See ibid., Apr. 7, 1989, pp. 1–3.
[35]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Apr. 24, 1989, p. 20.
[36]"A Siberian Serenade," *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Sept. 30, 1988, pp. 18–23; *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 21, 1988, pp. 7–8; and Nossov, loc. cit., pp. 262–66.
[37]*FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 22, 1988, p. 1; Oct. 17, 1988, pp. 2–3; and Nov. 21, 1988, pp. 8–9.
[38]Ibid., Feb. 6, 1989, p. 8.

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troops in Mongolia would be withdrawn within two years within the context of an overall reduction of the Soviet military presence in Asia. In February 1989 during his trip to Beijing, Eduard Shevardnadze announced that the goal was to remove three-quarters of these troops while those remaining would play a "more defensive role."[38] However, as Chinese spokesmen emphasized through the summer and fall, the third and most difficult obstacle—Vietnamese troops in Cambodia—remained.

On the Soviet side, the old predicament persisted. Although Soviet support of Hanoi was clearly hampering its efforts to project a more benign image in Asia, Moscow was understandably reluctant to abandon a major military asset in the region. Yet, in contrast to earlier periods, there was evidence throughout 1988 of greater Soviet readiness to be conciliatory on the Cambodian issue. A March 1988 Sino-Vietnamese naval incident was met by "studied neutrality in Soviet statements" and there was increasing evidence that Moscow was pressuring Vietnam on Cambodia.[39] But even more striking was the willingness on the part of the Soviets to discuss this "third country" issue with the Chinese. At the end of August 1988, the Soviets agreed to the first of three "working meetings" on Cambodia to be held at the deputy foreign minister level; at Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev pledged continued efforts to gain agreement on the issue.[40]

Although it represented a concession, the Soviet willingness to *discuss* Cambodia did not meet earlier Chinese demands that Gorbachev "bring about a pull-out of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia" before a summit would be considered. Nevertheless, the Chinese position seemed to soften somewhat in response to Soviet gestures. Beijing, in the fall of 1988, appeared willing to accept a Soviet "effort to urge a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia" as sufficient to merit serious movement toward a summit.[41] In September 1988, it was announced that the first exchange of visits between foreign ministers in more than three decades would take place. The meeting convened in Moscow in December and, despite continued differences over Cambodia, the possibility of holding a summit "in the first half of 1989" was accepted. When Shevardnadze visited Beijing in January 1989, disagreement on Cambodia continued, but the dates for Gorbachev's visit in mid-May were set. Although the issue was by no means settled, both sides spoke of progress toward an understanding.[42] But the fact remains that the Chinese leaders did clearly make a concession in the interest of facilitating a summit when they agreed to receive Gorbachev in the absence of any concrete agreement on Cambodia.[43] In April 1989, Hanoi announced that it would be out of Cambodia by the end of September 1989,[44] justifying China's faith in Soviet motives.

The reasons for the Chinese compromise relate both to domestic politics in Beijing as well as to the changed view of Soviet foreign policy and global strategy discussed above. Thus, a part of the explanation for the compromise can be found in Deng Xiaoping's desire to settle the Sino-Soviet dispute before his death or retirement. Moreover, Gorbachev's policy toward Asia did in fact become more conciliatory during 1987–88. Given the changed Chinese view of the world during this period as well as the gestures made by Gorbachev, Deng and his colleagues may have been cautiously willing to give Soviet policy the benefit of the doubt. Equally, this new view of the world might have given impetus to the Chinese desire to "normalize" relations with the Soviet Union lest China be left out of the impending shift in global politics. With Chinese commentaries arguing that the present Soviet-American détente was like none before it and might last through the end of the century, it made little sense to allow tensions with Moscow to force China out of the mainstream of the "'post-cold war' period."[45] In any event, the announcement of the summit as well as the exchange visits of foreign ministers that preceded it were dramatic evidence of the change in the tone and substance of Sino-Soviet relations that resulted from Gorbachev's initiatives as well as from changed Chinese perceptions of his policy and its global context. Soviet "new thinking" had clearly begun to shape Sino-Soviet relations.

Change was also evident in the evolution of other areas of the relationship. In June 1988, a Sino-Soviet agreement providing for economic relations between sub-national units was signed. The impact was immediate, with 1988 trade between Heilongjiang and the Soviet Union increasing to nearly five times what it had been in 1987 which, in turn, was equal to the total trade since 1983.[46] As a whole, border trade was said to have grown almost 4,000 percent between 1983 and 1988.[47] More important, such local economic relations expanded beyond trade into joint ventures, technology trans-

[39]Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," The Asia Society *Media Briefing*, May 1989, p. 12.

[40]*FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 17, 1989, p. 13.

[41]This was Deng's position in November 1987. See ibid., p. 12.

[42]See, for example, ibid., Feb. 6, 1989, pp. 10–11.

[43]Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," loc. cit., p. 13.

[44]*FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 10, 1989, pp. 4–8.

[45]Ibid., Nov. 23, 1988, pp. 4–6; and Dec. 23, 1988, p. 1. On the Chinese concern about being left out of global changes, see *The New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1988.

[46]*FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 14, 1989, p. 3; and May 17, 1989, pp. 35–36.

[47]Ibid., May 11, 1989, p. 10.

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fers, labor contracting, etc.[48] The expansion of the economic relationship was not limited to certain regions; it was reflected as well in national trade figures and economic ties. For example, during 1988 the Soviet Union became China's fifth largest trading partner: approximately $1 billion dollars in Sino-Soviet "cooperative projects" were negotiated; joint projects from the 1950's appear to have been revived; thousands of Chinese were working in the Soviet Union, with $100 million in labor contracts signed in the last half of 1988 alone; and an agreement was reached providing for Soviet loans to China.[49] Indeed, picking up on Gorbachev's call at Krasnoyarsk for international economic cooperation in the Far East, Deng Xiaoping spoke of the possibility of building a "new economic order" in Northeast Asia that included the Soviet Union.[50]

The range and depth of Sino-Soviet relations had thus changed dramatically and unmistakably in the year and a half before Gorbachev's arrival in Beijing. It is also true that the intellectual underpinnings of the relationship changed. Beijing came to acknowledge that significant departures from past policy were truly occurring in Soviet policy—Chinese and Soviet statements came to reflect a considerable conceptual consensus regarding domestic and international affairs. Both countries were engaged in reform of similar socialist systems and freely drew in their discussions of that process on each other's experiences. Moreover, considerable common ground existed regarding such central questions of global politics as the avoidability of war and the importance of economics—issues that earlier had been the basis for bitter ideological conflict.[51]

However, while it is apparent that a narrowing had occurred in the conceptual gulf separating the Soviet Union and China, the relationship between this movement toward a common Weltanschauung and the deepening and broadening of the relationship described above is not so apparent. Since the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, there has been extensive Chinese commentary on the nature of the Soviet reforms. Implicitly and explicitly such commentaries have drawn parallels with developments in China by using the Gorbachev reforms as justification for the inevitability of reform in socialist systems and by selecting certain aspects of his reform to illustrate common strategies or problems. However, at the same time, there has been considerable care taken by the Chinese to emphasize the differences between reform in the two countries and, most important, to dismiss any role that the common reform effort might play in giving a special quality to Sino-Soviet relations. Thus, in a series of remarkable articles published toward the end of 1988, it was argued that reforms in socialist countries were really a part of the universal reform efforts in both capitalist and socialist countries.[52] The conclusion intended by these Chinese statements was clear—there was, in fact, no special relationship created by Sino-Soviet reform efforts. And lest the point be missed, it was asserted: "We do not decide on our relations with other countries based on similarities or differences in social systems or ideology," and "facts of history prove that the foreign policy of any country is first decided by the country's own interests and not by ideology."[53]

The Chinese effort to downplay ideological kinship with the Soviet Union on the eve of the summit reflected a number of factors entering into Beijing's calculations. First, of course, it revealed the burden of history on the minds of the Chinese leaders. In the past, a shared ideology with the Soviet Union connoted hierarchy, with Moscow in the role of teacher. The possible re-emergence of this hierarchy was unacceptable to China's leaders, particularly at a time when they saw themselves in the vanguard of reform of socialist systems. Second, the effort to distance China from the Soviet Union, even as fundamental disagreements in the relationship were nearing solution, indicated Beijing's continued distrust of Soviet motives in Asia, despite much similar rhetoric on international affairs. Finally, the distancing was certainly intended to send a reassuring message to the West: despite the improvement in almost all facets of the Sino-Soviet relationship, the strategic and economic importance of the American connection would remain.

Still, in assessing the significance of these Chinese disclaimers regarding a common bond forged by reforms, we should distinguish the intentions of the Chinese leadership from the reality of Sino-Soviet relations where, as Gerald Segal has written, "the two ideologies are now facing more similar challenges and adopting

[48]Ibid., Nov. 29, 1988, p. 13.

[49]Ibid., May 17, 1989, pp. 35–36, and Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5; *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 14, 1989, pp. 23–24.

[50]*FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1989, pp. 2–3.

[51]On specific issues, a survey conducted in Taiwan found Chinese and Soviet positions to be identical on 13 of 28 issues, similar on 8 others, with disagreement on 7 issues. Cited in Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980's," p. 121. Note should also be made of an important Jan. 3, 1989, *Jiefangjun bao* (Beijing) article, which listed several "major changes" in "Marxist theory on war and peace." See *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 11, 1989, pp. 19–25. This article made many points similar to those of Gorbachev's new thinking.

[52]*FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 15, 1988, pp. 3–9; and Oct. 21, 1988, pp. 2–4. Once more, I am indebted to Lyman Miller for the interpretation of Chinese views of the Soviet reform presented above.

[53]Ibid., Aug. 15, 1988, p. 1, and Oct. 12, 1988, p. 10.

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more similar solutions than at any time since the 'honeymoon' in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950's."[54] The importance of these similarities became clear when, during and after the summit, domestic developments within China interacted with the objective reality of shared domestic and foreign policy concerns to decisively shape the nature of Sino-Soviet relations in the "new era" created by that summit.

The Summit: Motivations and Agenda

Even before Mikhail Gorbachev set foot in China, there had been substantial evolution in Sino-Soviet relations away from the confrontation of the 1960's, or even the tension-reduction of the post-Brezhnev interregnum. Verbal and military clashes were replaced by a growing economic exchange and political consultation. More significantly, there was a rapidly growing institutionalization of the relationship in a wide range of fields and at all levels of the bureaucracy—from local governments to scientific academies to newly-formed committees on technical and economic cooperation to foreign ministerial meetings. The claim that a summit would "normalize" relations was, thus, somewhat misleading. To be sure, a summit and the inauguration of party-to-party relations would represent a significant step forward in Sino-Soviet relations. However, it is also true that, as Jonathan Pollack has noted, in most other respects relations had "been normal for some time."[55] The summit would place a stamp of approval on past developments even as it permitted both nations to engage in what appeared to be the largely symbolic exercise of declaring the relationship "normal."

But symbolic does not mean insignificant. Indeed, for leaders on both sides, the symbolism of normalization seemed more important than any concrete results that might have come from the summit. From Mikhail Gorbachev's perspective, the symbolism of a trip to China seemed integrally related to his domestic reform program. The official settlement of the decades' long dispute would be an important part of his continuing campaign to present his administration as a break with the sterile policies of the past and to "bolster his personal image within Soviet politics as an effective problem solver in international affairs."[56] Additionally, given the high profile of China's reform movement, a visit there would provide him with a forum to promote the idea of reform in the Communist world to support his efforts at home—a forum his preceding trip to Havana (where Castro had said it would be "madness" to apply *perestroyka* in Cuba) did not afford him.[57] Indeed, given the high international visibility of the Chinese reform, Gorbachev probably hoped that—by associating himself with it—he could harness some of the momentum of that movement for his policies at home.

Regarding the Soviet leader's foreign policy goals, the symbolism of Sino-Soviet normalization was also important. During 1987 and 1988, it became clear that Gorbachev was beginning to apply his "new thinking" to Asia. Although not totally abandoned,[58] the Brezhnevian anti-Chinese and anti-American policy orientation in the area was being adjusted to project an image of a Soviet Union seeking multilateral strategic cooperation and tension-reduction in the interest of developing economic ties in the area. As one Soviet commentator noted, the Soviet Union suffered from a poor image in Asia due to past heavy emphasis on military power.[59] Attempting to change this image, Gorbachev combined broad statements (such as those made at Krasnoyarsk) with cautious overtures to South Korea and Japan as well as significant policy departures, for example, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan or pressure on Vietnam to leave Cambodia. By achieving "normalized" relations with a primary opponent in the region, Gorbachev would both increase Soviet leverage vis-à-vis the United States and enhance the credibility of his "new thinking" in Asia. He would also make it easier for some of Beijing's friends in Asia to deal with him because they no longer would have to fear the consequences of dealing with an "enemy" of China.

In Beijing, symbolism was also important. In contrast to their younger Soviet colleagues, many of China's leaders had been active participants in the Sino-Soviet exchanges of the 1960's. Most prominently, of course, Deng Xiaoping had been involved in bitter conflicts with Nikita Khrushchev during the 1960's and had, in fact, led the last major Chinese delegation to Moscow in 1963. Others in the Chinese elite, such as Yang Shangkun and Peng Zhen, had also played important roles. As one scholar noted, in presiding over the settlement

[54]Gerald Segal, "Sino-Soviet Relations: The New Agenda," *World Today* (London), June 1988, p. 96.

[55]Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," p. 12. This entire section relies heavily on Dr. Pollack's fine paper.

[56]Breslauer, loc. cit., p. 273.

[57]Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Apr. 14, 1989, p. 41.

[58]Soviet statements on Taiwan and Tibet made before the summit were clearly intended to contrast Moscow's support for Chinese positions with the position of Washington. Moreover, Gorbachev undoubtedly sought to use the occasion to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was not prepared to cede East Asia to the United States.

[59]Konstatin Pleshkanov, "Citadel or Harbour," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 20, 1989, pp. 11–12.

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of that dispute, "Deng undoubtedly feels vindicated that he has outlasted all his old Soviet antagonists."[60]

But more generally, the summit was to be the capstone for a year in which China had had several diplomatic triumphs, including visits by the prime ministers of India and Japan and the president of the United States, as well as the convening of the Asian Development Bank's meeting in Beijing. A successful summit on the heels of these other foreign policy achievements would create a situation almost unprecedented in the last century of China's history—the nation would face no significant foreign threat. An accomplishment of such historic significance would enhance the standing of Deng and his colleagues at home by helping to restore national morale and leadership determination undermined by inflation, unemployment, corruption, and agricultural problems, during the past difficult year.

The symbolism of normalization also served Chinese foreign policy objectives. China's leadership sought normalization to assure that China would be an active participant in the rapidly changing diplomatic game where restructuring of relations with the Soviet Union was a clear prerequisite for participation. There was also the hope that "normalization" would increase Chinese leverage vis-à-vis third states—in particular the United States and Soviet allies in Asia such as Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, North Korea.

There were also more concrete issues on what was a carefully crafted agenda. First among these was the civil war in Cambodia. Of course, strictly speaking, this issue should not have been on the agenda at all—since China had earlier sought the removal of this "obstacle" as a precondition for a summit. However, as noted earlier, Soviet willingness to discuss the issue in the fall of 1988 was ultimately deemed a sufficient show of good faith. During the months that followed, Soviet flexibility culminated in the joint communiqué defining considerable common ground that was issued after Shevardnadze's visit in early 1989, as well as in the Vietnamese pledge of April to withdraw all troops by September 30, 1989, which was undoubtedly a result of Soviet pressure. Differences remained, however, particularly on the central questions of foreign aid to Cambodian factions and the timing and composition of any coalition government that might emerge. Moscow sought Chinese pressure on the Khmer Rouge to accept a lesser role, just as Beijing sought Soviet pressure on Hanoi to stand by its pledge to withdraw and cease aid to Vietnam's Cambodian allies.

In the period immediately preceding the summit, the Cambodia issue became more complicated as the parties directly involved began taking greater initiative. In the early months of 1989, SRV representatives held two rounds of inconclusive talks in Beijing. Moreover, on the eve of the Gorbachev arrival, there was evidence that the Cambodians themselves were moving to settle key questions. Prince Norodom Sihanouk met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Although differences over the place of the Khmer Rouge in any future government remained, there were signs of some movement that might be clarified at a meeting of all the parties involved scheduled for late July 1989.[61]

A second item on the agenda was the discussion of differences over the Sino-Soviet border. Once again full agreement eluded Sino-Soviet negotiators. One Hong Kong source suggested that agreement had been reached on most of the border, the only major sticking point being the Heixiazi (Tarabarov/Bol'shoy Ussuriysk) island at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. According to the Thalweg principle announced in 1986 by Gorbachev, this island would belong to China. However, its strategic location overlooking Khabarovsk led to Soviet reluctance to cede it.[62] On the Soviet side, in a pre-summit interview, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Rogachev noted that "roughly 95 percent of all the disputed issues" on the eastern border had been settled, but that "a great deal of work remains to be done" on the western border. He made it clear that no final settlement would be announced at the summit.[63]

Third, there was the issue of economic relations. With the total trade volume at $3 billion—roughly equal to China's trade with South Korea or Taiwan—neither side was a major economic partner of the other. Moreover, both China and the Soviet Union were looking West for the technology needed to modernize their respective economies. Still, economics had been an area of strength in the bilateral relationship, and both sides seemed anxious to nurture it. Chinese discussions emphasized the possibilities of expanding economic cooperation in the several areas identified during the past few years. Moreover, there were localities within China for which trade with the Soviet Union was becoming vital. For example, at trade seminars, meetings, and in the press, there seemed to be a veritable Soviet trade constituency developing within China centered on the province of Heilongjiang.

Similarly, on the Soviet side, there was enthusiasm for everything—from Chinese consumer goods to labor to technical and managerial advice. Local officials

[60]Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," pp. 9–11.

[61]*The New York Times*, May 4 and 7, 1989.

[62]Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," p. 14; and *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 21, 1989, p. 9.

[63]*FBIS-SOV*, May 15, 1989, p. 26. This assessment was shared by the Chinese. See *FBIS-CHI*, May 16, 1989, p. 33.

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pressed their Chinese counterparts for expanded contacts. Clearly many localities in the Soviet Far East, like those in China, saw cross-border trade as a way to promote their own economy and autonomy. Given this atmosphere, pre-summit articles suggested that talks at the highest levels could lead to further development of this trade by reaching agreements in such areas as joint development of transportation and expanded provision for trade credit even while increasing cooperation between national trade and planning bodies. Indeed, one Soviet commentary suggested that the State Planning Committee had drawn up a plan for cooperation until the year 2000.[64]

A fourth issue, also related to the border regions, was that of the reduction of Soviet troops.[65] Once again, there had been considerable progress on this issue in the pre-summit period with the Soviet side actually announcing target figures for troop reductions, and, even as Gorbachev arrived in Beijing, withdrawing some military forces from Mongolia.[66] The summit meeting, it was expected, would see Chinese pressure for greater specificity in terms of timing and troop levels. From previous indications, it appeared that the Soviet side would probably comply even as it tried to place the issue of border forces into a broader context by pressing for institutionalized contacts with the Chinese military and for discussions regarding the larger issue of the military balance in Asia.[67]

The issue of the Asian military balance, of course, moves beyond purely bilateral questions and into a fifth, all-encompassing, item on the agenda related to the discussion of regional and global issues. Here, there were some clear asymmetries in Chinese and Soviet objectives at the summit. For Gorbachev, a discussion of these issues was the first step in a larger effort to expand Soviet influence in Asia by pursuing some sort of regional dialogue based on the model instituted in Europe. By initiating such a multilateral dialogue on regional political and military questions, Moscow sought to promote its own objectives even as it fostered pressures—similar to those in Europe—for a reduction of the American military presence.[68] The absence of such themes in the pre-summit Chinese discussions, as well as rumors that the Chinese were resisting the issuance of a final communiqué, suggest that while Beijing might have been willing to discuss specific questions related to Korea, Japan, and the ASEAN region, it was unlikely, given continued suspicion of Soviet motives, to be drawn into discussions relating to Gorbachev's conception of a regional forum. While China sought to use the summit to improve bilateral relations and solve bilateral questions, it was reluctant to facilitate the success of Soviet "new thinking" in Asia.

The Summit: Predictable Outcomes

The sixth Sino-Soviet summit lasted from May 15 to May 18, 1989. In these four days Mikhail Gorbachev visited a Sino-Japanese joint venture, laid a wreath at a monument to the Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin, and visited two Chinese cities—Beijing and Shanghai—as well as the Great Wall. In the course of his stay he met with his two Chinese counterparts (President Yang Shangkun and Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang), the Premier of China, Li Peng, and, of course, Deng Xiaoping. Gorbachev made a major foreign policy speech, held an international press conference, and gave an interview to Chinese television. Finally, there were talks between vice premiers on economic issues and foreign ministers on questions of foreign policy. A final communiqué was issued. But despite these outward manifestations of movement, in its broad outlines, this was almost a generic summit. The putative agenda outlined in pre-summit articles in the Soviet and Chinese press was an excellent indicator both of what was discussed and of the outcome—or non-outcome—of those discussions.[69]

Thus, the two sides announced that relations—both on a party-to-party and a state-to-state level—had entered a "new era," having been normalized on the basis of mutual respect and equality. There was a shared desire to put what the Soviet spokesman called the "unsatisfactory" past behind them—a sense encapsulated by a slogan attributed to Deng Xiaoping, "end the past and open up the future."[70] However, it proved not so simple to dismiss the past. In briefings, the Soviet spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, bristled at the suggestion that Gorbachev might have "apologized" for the past. In his meetings with Deng, the Soviet leader acknowledged that although "Chairman Deng's views [on past problems] are not groundless, the Soviet side still has some differing views."[71]

The question of Cambodia was the most difficult one.

[64]Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," pp. 11–17; *FBIS-SOV*, May 10, 1989, pp. 24–26, *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 24, 1989, p. 11; Feb. 1, 1989, pp. 11–12; Feb. 9, 1989, p. 5; Apr. 28, 1989, p. 3; and May 17, 1989, pp. 35–37.

[65]This paragraph and the next draw on Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," pp. 13–16.

[66]*FBIS-SOV*, May 16, 1989, pp. 30–31.

[67]See, for example, ibid., May 15, 1989, pp. 36–38.

[68]One example of this is the discussions of nuclear-free zones in Asia. See, for example, ibid., Apr. 24, 1989, pp. 20–21, and May 4, 1989, pp. 14–15.

[69]Much of the following is based on my notes on the summit as well as the press briefings that accompanied it. Where possible I have tried to provide references to more accessible sources.

[70]*China Daily News* (Beijing), May 16, 1989, p. 1.

[71]*FBIS-CHI*, May 16, 1989, p. 19.

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The Cambodia issue was thoroughly aired both in Gorbachev's meetings as well as in those of his foreign minister. In the end, there seemed to have been very little movement. There was continued agreement on broad principles such as the need to end the civil war, the withdrawal of foreign support, and the international supervision of general elections. However, the central issue—the composition of a new Cambodian government—remained unresolved, with each side restating its previous position.[72] This lack of movement can be attributed both to the dynamics of Sino-Soviet bargaining over this issue as well as to recent meetings between the opposing factions in Cambodia. As noted above, in the weeks before the summit there was evidence that Prince Sihanouk and the pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh were edging towards some kind of accommodation that might include the Khmer Rouge. Given this fluid situation, neither side was inclined to commit itself or its allies to a firm position until matters were clarified. The Soviet side believed that it had done all that it could to bring about an end to the civil war there by pressuring Vietnam to withdraw by the end of September, and suggested that the focus had shifted to Sino-Vietnamese talks and to Cambodian efforts to find a formula for agreement.[73]

A more positive note was struck on the issue of economic relations. But the actual accomplishments were equally thin. In his public statements, Gorbachev spoke effusively about the need to expand the relationship beyond the "limits" of trade and "to begin extensive cooperation in many fields of work" that included such ambitious-sounding projects as a joint liquid coal pipeline and a "new Silk Road from China to Europe," as well as more modest cooperation at the regional or enterprise level. However, as the Soviet leader also noted, "time was needed" for both sides to prepare for such expansion—a sentiment echoed when vice premiers Tian Jiyun and Yuriy Maslyukov met.[74] For the foreseeable future, it appeared that Sino-Soviet trade would be characterized by further growth according to the pre-summit pattern rather than by the emergence of a qualitatively new model. Continuity with the past was also apparent when the leaders turned to the issue of the border. As noted above, there was little expectation that any concrete movement would take place at the summit—and this was the case. It was agreed to raise the talks to the foreign ministerial level in an attempt to "speed up discussions" to reach a "fair and reasonable settlement" of the border.

Thanks to Soviet initiatives, the military situation on the border appears to have been addressed in a more substantive manner. Throughout the summit, Soviet rhetoric on this issue was strong. Gennadiy Gerasimov told the press of the need for "radical military détente" and a border protected "only by friendship," while Gorbachev spoke of the need to transform the border into one "of peace and good neighborliness."[75] This rhetoric was substantiated somewhat by the December 1988 pledge to withdraw troops from Mongolia and the actual movement on the day the summit began. But the muted Chinese reaction suggested continuing wariness of Moscow's motives. Gorbachev, in his conversations with Li Peng, noted that the Soviet Union kept in touch with the military of Western countries and proposed that a similar mechanism be established with China. No apparent action was taken on this, the second, Soviet request for such a mechanism, although a Soviet source suggested that "a working mechanism" for military consultation on the border area had been established. Chinese sources remained silent on the existence of such a mechanism.[76] The final communiqué blandly noted agreement "to cut down the military forces" on the border and noted that the Chinese welcomed the Soviet intent to withdraw troops on the border while hoping that the remainder would be withdrawn in a "specified short period of time."[77]

The sudden initiatives or dramatic breakthroughs that often characterize summits were thus not present in Beijing. Because the meetings were driven by the momentum of the past two years, their diplomatic results were unremarkable and easily overshadowed by the concurrent drama of the pro-democracy demonstrations. What was often forgotten, of course, was that the diplomatic output of these meetings was a poor indicator of the overall strength of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Precisely because the process of normalization had proceeded in the slow and incremental fashion described above, the relationship had a degree of breadth and substance that would have been unattainable in a few days' deliberations among top leaders. By achieving official closure to a conflict nearly three decades old, the summit unobtrusively buttressed these more positive aspects.

The resolution of questions of mutual concern was

[72]The most detailed statement of these differences is in the final communiqué. Ibid., May 18, 1989, p. 23.

[73]Ibid., p. 17.

[74]See ibid., May 17, 1989, pp. 27–28, and May 18, 1989, pp. 13 and 26.

[75]Author's notes from Soviet press briefing of May 16, 1989; and *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 13.

[76]Author's notes from May 16, 1989, Soviet press briefing; and *FBIS-SOV*, May 19, 1989, p. 27. This was not the first time during Shevardnadze's February visit that the Soviets mentioned the existence of such a mechanism, but the Chinese were silent. On the eve of the summit, Moscow Radio reiterated such a proposal. See Pollack, "The Sino-Soviet Summit," p. 14; and *FBIS-SOV*, May 5, 1989, pp. 18–19.

[77]*FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 23.

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only one objective of the summit. Both the Chinese and Soviet sides had their own agenda, which each pursued outside of the bilateral context. Thus, in Gorbachev's speeches as well as in accompanying press briefings and commentaries, there was a clear effort made to link the changes in Sino-Soviet relations to broader issues of the Asia-Pacific region—where, as Gorbachev asserted, "the destiny of our civilization will largely be decided."[78] More specifically, Soviet statements suggested three areas where the forum of the Sino-Soviet summit was being used to promote foreign policy objectives in Asia. First, there was a clear attempt made to use the Soviet gestures on the Chinese border to initiate a region-wide dialogue, similar to that in Europe, on issues of arms control and force reduction. This connection was made implicitly in Gorbachev's major foreign policy speech in which, within the context of the border issue, he announced very specific air, land, and sea reductions in the area, and explicitly in a *Pravda* editorial, which spoke of the need to begin movement toward "negotiating structures" similar to those that exist in Europe."[79]

Secondly, and similarly, the Soviet leader sought to break economic cooperation out of its bilateral context into a multilateral one as he restated his desire to link Sino-Soviet developments with the "all-Asian process of economic integration taking place."[80] A Moscow broadcast to China spoke of the desire to "invite all countries in the Asia-Pacific region" to take part in joint projects.[81]

Finally, there was Japan. Since the end of World War II, Soviet-Japanese relations had gone from confrontation to confrontation. Japan's role as the linchpin of the American military position in Asia, as well as the refusal of either Japan or the Soviet Union to compromise on the issue of the Northern Territories, which had been seized by the Soviets during the last days of the war, had made any reconciliation almost impossible. If Gorbachev's new Asian policy were to succeed, Soviet-Japanese relations had to be improved. Japanese abstention would render meaningless any multilateral "Asian Forum," and development of the Soviet Far East would be impossible without Japanese participation.

In the months before the Sino-Soviet summit, Moscow approached Japan in a manner similar to that which had brought success with China. Although standing firm on the validity of the claim to the Northern Territories, Moscow departed from past practice and expressed a willingness to discuss the Japanese counterclaim.[82] During the first week in May, Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno visited Moscow. Although his talks with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze settled no basic questions, the incremental improvement of the recent past continued: a sub-ministerial working group on the peace treaty met, further meetings of foreign ministers were arranged, negotiations regarding a Gorbachev visit to Tokyo continued, and discussions in other areas, such as an environmental treaty, proceeded.[83]

Soviet statements left little doubt that the summit was an integral part of the campaign to end the decades of confrontation in Soviet-Japanese relations. On the eve of the meetings with Foreign Minister Uno, Yevgeniy Primakov, a Gorbachev adviser, noted that a settlement of the Sino-Soviet rift would "contribute to Soviet-Japanese relations."[84] In his speech in Beijing, Gorbachev raised the same theme when he stressed to his Chinese audience the Soviet desire to have "full-blooded ties" with Japan even as he acknowledged that both sides still had "a fair bit of work" to do to realize that end.[85] The bid was in. Gorbachev had used the occasion of his trip to Beijing to announce his next foreign policy goal in Asia.

The second broad area where the Soviet leader sought to use the symbolism of the summit meetings to promote his own policies was that of domestic reform or *perestroyka*. He said:

At the moment, in a number of socialist countries processes are underway that are close to our restructuring in their content and sometimes in their form as well. . . . Restructuring in the USSR, reforms in China, and the transformations in many other socialist countries are dissipating once and for all the erroneous conceptions of socialism as something uniform and unchanging. They show its ability for progressive development and self-improvement.[86]

Statements such as this served several purposes. They were a way of complimenting Gorbachev's Chi-

[78]*FBIS-SOV*, May 18, 1989, p. 28.
[79]*FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 13; and *FBIS-SOV*, May 23, 1989, p. 27.
[80]*FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 13.
[81]*FBIS-SOV*, May 18, 1989, p. 41.
[82]For a discussion of the background to this controversy see Kenichi Ito, "Japan and the Soviet Union—Entangled in the Deadlock of the Northern Territories," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1978, pp. 35–44; and Yevgeniy Prokhorov and Leonid Shevchuk, "Japan's Territorial Claims to Moscow," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1989, pp. 42–47.
[83]*The Economist* (London), Apr. 1, 1989, p. 30. For Soviet reportage of the May visit of Foreign Minister Uno, see *FBIS-SOV*, May 4, 1989, pp. 17–21; May 5, 1989, pp. 20–21; and May 8, 1989, pp. 18–23.
[84]*FBIS-CHI*, May 15, 1989, p. 7.
[85]Ibid., May 18, 1989, p. 17.
[86]Ibid., May 18, 1989, p. 15.

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nese hosts and using their common socialist heritage to give greater substance to the new relationship—Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev had spoken of "an affinity between the two countries."[87] But, most importantly, with the Chinese reforms as a backdrop and a rostrum, the Soviet leader sought to extol the importance of reform and use the Chinese accomplishments to bolster his own reform program at home. Gorbachev's message was clear: the reforms of both countries were proof not only of the necessity of socialism's reform, but of the promise that such reform held for social improvement and national progress. When Gorbachev told the Chinese that the reforms in their countries demonstrate socialism's "ability for progressive development," he was more concerned with the progressive development of his *perestroyka*. Facing a difficult first meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies when he returned, Gorbachev was using the summit to speak to those at home skeptical of the imperative of reform.

Chinese students on a hunger strike demanding political reforms lie near the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square on May 14, the eve of the Sino-Soviet summit. Their presence forced relocation of official welcoming ceremonies for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Of course, such a dual strategy was based on two assumptions. The first was that the Chinese leaders would be receptive to a linking of the Soviet reforms to their own. The second was that the Chinese reform movement would be such that it could be used to promote Gorbachev's vision for change in the Soviet Union. Even as Gorbachev arrived in China pro-democracy demonstrations began to call both of these assumptions into question.

Domestic Politics and Diplomacy

What later came to be known as China's pro-democracy movement began with the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989.[88] In the month before the Gorbachev visit, the protests ebbed and flowed in tune with government action and historical coincidence. Thus, the numbers of demonstrators grew on the occasions of Hu's April 22 funeral, a harsh April 26 *People's Daily* editorial depicting student actions as anti-party, and the confluence of the Beijing meeting of the Asia Development Bank with the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the May 4th (1919) Movement.

A similar escalation occurred in protester's demands. At the time of Hu's funeral, student demands revolved around such general issues as dialogue with the government, greater openness of the press, as well as an end to government corruption and nepotism. On the eve of the May 4th anniversary, the demands had grown to include government recognition of the new student organizations and a "dialogue" with high party and state officials to be broadcast live to the nation. Finally, on the weekend before Gorbachev's arrival, about a thousand students went on a hunger strike. In response, the authorities ordered that the square be cleared by 8:30 am, Monday, May 15, the first day of the Soviet leader's visit.

This ultimatum, coupled with the visibility that would be provided by the thousands of media representatives

[87] *FBIS-SOV*, May 4, 1989, p. 13.

[88] On the growth of the democracy movement, see the essays in this issue by Lowell Dittmer, Andrew J. Nathan, and Andrew G. Walder. In preparing the discussion that follows, I have drawn from Fred C. Shapiro, "Letter from Beijing," *The New Yorker* (New York), June 5, 1989, pp. 73–82; "Special Report: The Shattered Dream, China, 1989," *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989; and my own notes from my visit to Beijing, May 15–21, 1989.

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Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, reviews an honor guard with Yang Shangkun, President of the People's Republic of China, at the Beijing airport upon the Soviet leader's May 15, 1989, arrival for the Sino-Soviet summit.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

descending on Beijing for the summit, only strengthened the students' resolve. Despite Zhao Ziyang's plea that demonstrators "protect our national reputation" and "not do anything that would damage the summit meeting," Tiananmen Square was packed on May 15 and hunger-strikers were sprinkled throught the crowd. The mood was almost festive, with banners flying from commandeered flagpoles, and impromptu discussions taking place throughout the square. The impact of the summit had been clear earlier when a student delegation appeared at the Soviet embassy to invite the Soviet leader to speak to them. In the square, many signs praised Gorbachev's political reforms, often using them as a standard against which China's slower progress was judged. With a banner proclaiming "Democracy Our Common Ideal (*lixiang*)" dominating the square from the martyrs monument, others announced "An Honor Salute to the Democratic Envoy," "You're [Gorbachev] 58, I'm [Deng] 85," or "The Soviet Union Has Gorbachev. Whom Does China Have?"[89] The demonstrations continued and grew in size during the Soviet leader's stay. By May 17, Gorbachev's last day in Beijing, nearly 1 million people were demonstrating. During the next day's stop in Shanghai, smaller crowds greeted him as the massive demonstrations continued unabated in the capital.

Because it probes individual motives and reactions, much of the assessment of the impact of these demonstrations on the summit must remain speculative. However, assessing their influence on the physical planning for the meetings requires no such speculation. Major events had to be postponed or relocated. For example, the welcoming ceremony could not be held in Tiananmen Square; Gorbachev was unable to lay a wreath at the monument for China's revolutionary martyrs; his press conference as well as a meeting with Li Peng was moved from the Great Hall of the People (which borders on the square); an opera performance at the Hall was canceled and the Soviet leader did not visit the Forbidden City. Moreover, those few engagements (Gorbachev's speech as well as the meetings with Yang Shangkun and Deng) that were held at the Great Hall not only required back-door arrivals, but took place as thousands of demonstrators, standing on the steps of the building, shouted slogans supporting the hunger-strikers lying on the pavement in sight of the conferees. To all—media and participants alike—the demonstrations, and the political issues that they raised, were a continual presence.

And so we return to the symbolic uses of the summit. For Mikhail Gorbachev, the demonstrations complicated his attempt to use the summit to promote reform at home. He had to balance two sets of priorities. On the one hand, there were the sensitivities of his very embarrassed Chinese hosts for whom the demonstrations were a humiliation. To exploit their difficulties by speaking positively of the demonstrators would hardly start the "new era" of Sino-Soviet relations off on the right foot. Indeed, given the vehemence with which both sides were affirming the right of every socialist state to find its own reform path, any comment by Gorbachev could easily evoke images of past Soviet interference.

On the other hand, if he made strong anti-demonstration comments in support of his hosts, he would lose the opportunity to drum up the political support both for himself as well as for *perestroyka* that depicting these demonstrations in a positive light would afford. Suddenly, after decades of conflict and years when the reforms in China seemed to be surpassing those in the Soviet Union, Beijing's protesters were holding up Gorbachev's political reform program as the model to be

[89] *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), May 16, 1989; *The Washington Post*, May 16, 1989; and *Los Angeles Times*, May 15, 1989.

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emulated in China. As one astonished Soviet official is reported to have said of Gorbachev's reception:

. . . it was a welcome beyond our imagination. Who would have thought that after all that passed between us, the leader of the Soviet Union would be welcomed as a hero in China?[90]

Could the Soviet leader afford to ignore or refuse such praise? Also, such disturbances in a land where reform seemed to have been making headway could provide Gorbachev with ammunition against those at home who either sought to slow reform or pointed to the destabilizing effects of such reform. Gorbachev could use Beijing's problems to highlight the importance of continuing political reform in order to avert such problems in the Soviet Union and the fact that some disturbances were an inevitable part of the reform process.

In both the reportage back from the summit to the Soviet Union and in Gorbachev's statements in China, the fine line between these two priorities was carefully trod.[91] Soviet coverage of the student demonstrations in their initial phases, in the weeks before the Soviet leader's arrival, seemed to be very general and cautious, while staying very close to the official Chinese line that emphasized the dangers of disorder and "dissension."[92] Immediately before and during Gorbachev's visit there was a clear shift in emphasis. Although apparently the coverage was not extensive—particularly in regard to "visuals" from Tiananmen—the Soviet media did intimate the extent of the demonstrations, the changes that they required in the summit's schedule, the nature of the protesters' demands and their tactics—especially the use of hunger strikes. Finally, the pro-Gorbachev slogans of the demonstrators were noted and shown to the Soviet audience.[93]

Of course, once the demonstrations held up Gorbachev as a leader to be emulated, they could not be portrayed in the same negative light as they had been before. Now, they were depicted as the result of the dislocations attendant to reform as well as the result of the fact that the Chinese reform policy, unlike the Soviet, had not emphasized political reform.[94] Although there was a suggestion that the students might be overzealous, it was noted that the thrust of their demands was "in line with the [Chinese] government's intentions."[95] Indeed, one Moscow television broadcast was even more sympathetic and associated the protests with events in the Soviet Union by presenting them as the result of errors in a shared reform process:

Just as the color of our two flags is common so are the main directions and the basic processes of restructuring in both our countries. . . . Democratization, yes, glasnost, yes—only in China it is called transparency, and reforms to the economy, altering its mechanisms. And the mistakes, as well as the crossroads, and putting the cart before the horse in the course of these processes, are also similar, if you like.[96]

This reportage was consistent with—and reflective of—Mikhail Gorbachev's statements in China. Although always careful to abjure any intention of interfering in a domestic Chinese matter, the visiting Soviet leader made quite clear his views on the sources and nature of the demonstrations as well as the best way to resolve the issues raised by them. In his press conference, he clearly associated the demonstrations with "the painfulness of the process of renewal," which confirms "the fact that the processes taking place in the socialist countries are profound. . . .[and] not a cosmetic refurbishment."[97] As for the demonstrators themselves, Gorbachev walked a fine line between alienating his hosts by expressing sympathy for them and passing up an opportunity to exploit the political potential inherent in the movement's pro-*glasnost'* sympathies. In general, he struck the theme of overzealous or impatient youth, although his emphases varied with the nature of his audience. In his live interview on Chinese television, the Soviet leader went out of his way at the close of the broadcast to strike a very positive note, supportive of the students:

You know, I liked very much the way young people are receiving the restructuring and reforms and the way they want rapid changes with all their heart. Perhaps they would like more than can even be done at once. But one thing is that they are committed to the renewal of socialism and to the friendship between our two countries.[98]

[90] *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989.

[91] This article is obviously not the occasion for a detailed discussion of Soviet media coverage of these events. What follows are my preliminary impressions based on the reading of a very small sampling of Soviet commentary translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

[92] See for example, *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 24, 1989, p. 16; Apr. 28, 1989, pp. 14–15; May 1, 1989, pp. 1–2; and May 3, 1989, p. 11.

[93] Ibid., May 15, 1989, p. 28.

[94] This was the conclusion of a Chinese analyst cited in *Pravda*. See *FBIS-SOV*, May 15, 1989, p. 32.

[95] Ibid., May 17, 1989, p. 21.

[96] Ibid., May 15, 1989, p. 28.

[97] Ibid., May 18, 1989, p. 30.

[98] Ibid., p. 25.

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In his private talks with the Chinese leaders, the general thrust of Gorbachev's statements stayed the same, but there was clearly a change in tone to one more supportive of the Chinese leadership and critical of the students. In his talks with Zhao, Gorbachev noted that in the Soviet Union there were also "hotheads" who sought "to renovate socialism overnight." Asserting that such things only happen in "fairy tales," and not in real life, he emphasized the importance of party leadership in any reform process, asking "who is more interested in renovation than those leaders of the party?"[99]

Finally, despite the Soviet emphasis on the necessity of respecting the right of each socialist state to choose its own reform path, Gorbachev's statements and those in the Soviet media left little question as to how the mass demonstrations should be solved. In his final press conference Gorbachev expressed the "wish that through political dialogue the solutions will be found." When asked how he would handle such an occurrence in the Soviet Union, he was less guarded in his espousal of dialogue and peaceful resolution:

I think that, in the Soviet Union, too, if problems of this or a similar kind should occur, we would look at them specifically and seek political methods of solving them in order to tackle the problems that had arisen within the framework of the political process on the basis of democracy and glasnost, so as to preserve the main values to which we have sworn allegiance.[100]

The Soviet leader was clearly speaking to his audience at home. In the wake of the brutal suppression of a peaceful demonstration for reform in Tbilisi, Georgia, it is probable that Gorbachev was taking advantage of China's difficulties to rebuild the somewhat damaged image of *glasnost'*, even as he responded to those among his colleagues who might have had doubts about the disruptive consequences of the upcoming meeting of the newly elected Congress of People's Deputies.[101]

In short, Gorbachev undoubtedly came to Beijing intent on using the reform issue both to promote his program at home and to enhance Sino-Soviet relations. When he arrived he found himself forced to improvise in response to the huge protest demonstration. His responses were those of a skilled politician. Putting the demonstrations in a positive light and associating them with genuine reform would serve to answer those who saw recent disturbances in the Soviet Union as a negative phenomenon. Moreover, Gorbachev's own standing as a reformer benefited from: the impression that China's problems stemmed from its failure to emulate the Soviet path of emphasizing political reform; the youthful support for his program of *glasnost';* and his ability to use China's difficulties to reaffirm the importance of moderation and political methods in dealing with the problems attendant to reform.

On the other hand, the Soviet leader was careful to pursue these themes in a way that would not alienate the Chinese leadership. He lectured the press on the need to "have a respectful attitude to the Chinese people"; presented the demonstrations as evidence of positive change; empathized publicly with the Chinese leadership in their time of trial; and stressed the need for all problems to be resolved within the framework of Communist Party leadership. Assuming the posture of a sympathetic, fellow-socialist reformer, Gorbachev sought to turn the dilemma of China's leaders into an element of Sino-Soviet cohesion.

The manipulation of the issue of student demonstrations was indeed an impressive display of Mikhail Gorbachev's political skills. However, because the success of his strategy depended on events over which the Soviet leader had little control, it was a politically vulnerable one. His domestic and international goals would be reached only if the demonstrations did not become completely unmanageable and the Chinese leadership continued a dialogue with the social forces that Gorbachev had depicted as playing a positive role. Should these elements change, his arguments for a tolerant approach to reform instability at home would be seriously undermined and he would find his program associated with leaders whose approach was fundamentally at odds with his own. And as Gorbachev was leaving China, this was precisely what was happening.

The reason for this was clear: Gorbachev's symbolic gains were, in the minds of many Chinese leaders, being achieved at their expense. As noted earlier, the Chinese leadership looked to the summit as an occasion to reaffirm China's recently-earned status as a worthy and responsible member of the international community. Moreover, it was hoped that it would provide a leadership beset by domestic difficulties with an opportunity to bask in the satisfaction of declaring closure to the Sino-Soviet conflict. A successful summit could provide an opportunity to project to the nation as well as the world the image of a decisive Chinese leadership in charge of a still vital reform movement. The actual out-

[99]Author's notes from Soviet press briefing, May 16, 1989. Parts of this exchange were translated in *FBIS-SOV*, May 18, 1989, p. 19.

[100]*FBIS-SOV*, May 18, 1989, p. 30.

[101]The Congress was clearly on Gorbachev's mind during his trip to China. He mentioned it in his public speech stressing the importance of "glasnost and pluralism of opinions." *FBIS-CHI*, May 18, 1989, p. 15.

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come of the summit could not have been further from these expectations.

As an exercise in symbolic politics, the summit was an absolute disaster for China's leaders. With a fascinated world watching live via satellite feeds, the Chinese leadership seemed barely able to meet the schedule of the meetings, much less cope with the student demonstrations. The hope that the summit would deflect attention from the problems of China's reform was dashed as the demonstrators saw to it that the deficiencies of the reform, as well as the demonstrators' contempt for many of China's leaders (and their admiration for the Soviet reform and its leader), were known to the entire world. What was to have been the finale of a year of foreign policy victories and a triumph for Deng Xiaoping became a national as well as a personal humiliation. Finally, the summit did little to project either leadership resolution or unity. Throughout the meetings and immediately afterwards, there were signs of leadership indecision and disunity. Chinese media comments regarding the deleterious effect of these demonstrations on "the state's prestige" were thus merely stating the obvious.[102]

What is not so obvious is precisely how this situation affected Chinese behavior or credibility at the summit. Clearly the leaders' attention was divided between the diplomacy of the summit and the events in the square, but it is not clear how much of a distraction the upheaval created. For the most part, the leadership tried to proceed as if the protests were having little impact on the meetings. Before a skeptical, sometimes jeering, international press, the official Chinese spokesman suggested that the demonstrations had not prevented the summit from proceeding "smoothly," and refused to comment on what he maintained was a domestic affair.[103] Observers in Beijing noted that Deng Xiaoping seemed to make a special effort to take the initiative in the televised portions of his meeting with Gorbachev. Indeed, to judge by public statements and press briefings, the Chinese leaders attempted to put the best possible face on the affair by joining with Gorbachev in seeing the demonstrations as an expected phenomenon to be handled in a moderate fashion. Even Li Peng, who would soon be seen as the quintessential "hard-liner," emphasized that "socialist countries should also enjoy freedom, democracy, and human rights."[104]

Despite this, as the talks were proceeding, speculation about splits within the Chinese leadership was rife, even though any concrete evidence for such splits was lacking and those indications that did exist were often ambiguous. For example, it was apparent that Zhao's meeting with Gorbachev went extremely well—Gerasimov noted it was as if there had never been a Sino-Soviet split—with both leaders emphasizing the same themes regarding the necessity of continued reform. Such themes were not as apparent in discussions with other leaders. Was Zhao reflecting his greater commitment to reform? Or was the difference in emphasis a result of the fact that the meeting between Zhao and Gorbachev was one between party leaders?

Of course, the most puzzling and ambiguous hint of Chinese leadership differences came when Zhao, declaring that "normalization" had really occurred when the Soviet leader met earlier with Deng, for no apparent reason turned to the television cameras and told Gorbachev a fact that had "never been published for the outside world." Despite Deng's resignation from official party posts in the fall of 1987, "our whole party knows that we cannot do without him, without his wisdom and experience. We formally adopted a decision . . . that on the most important questions, we still need him as the helmsman."[105] Later, Zhao would be condemned for having revealed a state secret in an attempt to place the blame for China's difficulties on Deng Xiaoping's shoulders. But his intent remains unclear. Despite later charges, he may have been seeking to curry favor with China's paramount leader during a time of leadership conflict or seeking to make perfectly clear to the millions of Chinese viewers that the leadership was united behind Deng. Whatever Zhao's motives, his comments increased speculation about divisions in the Chinese leadership.

We can only conjecture on how this colossal failure of the Chinese leaders to achieve their symbolic goals actually affected the course of the summit. There were rumors that Gorbachev was particularly impressed with the meeting of minds between Zhao and himself—a Soviet source said "these two were on the same wave length within minutes and by the end of the evening it was as if they had known one another for years."[106] This favorable impression might explain why Gorbachev allowed his response to the demonstrations to be so heavily dependent on the assumption of Chinese moderation. But we have no sense of how the disarray within the Chinese leadership actually affected his bargaining posture or might have shaped Soviet policy. Similarly,

[102] *FBIS-SOV*, May 16, 1989, p. 25.
[103] Author's notes from the May 15, 1989, Chinese press briefing.
[104] *FBIS-CHI*, May 16, 1989, p. 27.
[105] Ibid., p. 28.
[106] *Los Angeles Times*, June 25, 1989.

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Soviet and Chinese party chiefs Mikhail Gorbachev and Zhao Ziyang confer on May 16, 1989, during the first Sino-Soviet summit meeting in 30 years.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

although we can certainly assume that the Chinese leadership was distracted, divided, humiliated, and angered by the demonstrations, there is no evidence of the impact of these factors on the summit's outcome.

However, the events leading up to the summit and the course of the summit itself are not the whole story. The frustration and division of the Chinese leadership—barely hidden during the summit itself—would soon erupt into purges and the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement as a humiliated Deng Xiaoping viciously turned on his colleagues and the people of China after Gorbachev left. Although these events occurred after the summit, they were an integral part of it. Now the vulnerabilities of Gorbachev's approach to China's domestic turmoil and of the terms of normalization were apparent.

Post-Tiananmen Sino-Soviet Relations

Late in the evening of May 19, the day after Mikhail Gorbachev's departure from China, Prime Minister Li Peng, in a televised address, imposed martial law on parts of Beijing. Zhao Ziyang, who had last been seen paying a tearful, early morning visit to the students in Tiananmen, was conspicuously absent. In the more than two weeks that followed this declaration of martial law, China seemed to be drifting uncertainly. At the apex of power, it gradually became apparent that Zhao and his policy of moderation toward the protesters had lost to those ready to take a more coercive approach. As the leadership became more inflexible, the students became more unyielding and provocative. Refusing to heed their leaders' calls that they vacate the square, they constructed a 30-foot "goddess of freedom and democracy." Finally, after a number of abortive attempts to clear the square, on the evening of June 3–4, the People's Liberation Army with massive armored support swept into the center of Beijing. The protests were brutally and murderously ended.

This, of course, was not the outcome that the Soviet side had wanted—or had even expected. On May 18, as Gorbachev left China, Moscow television told its viewers: "We are not going to make any predictions but the fact that things are moving in the direction of a political solution is excellent."[107] Given the chaotic state of the Beijing streets on that day, this statement was wish-

[107] *FBIS-SOV*, May 19, 1989, p. 29.

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ful thinking. But it was also understandable in light of Gorbachev's stake in such a solution. In the uncertain weeks that followed the summit meeting and the aftermath of the military action against the demonstrators, Soviet media and leadership statements had to grapple with the problem of responding to events in China both in light of the importance of what Gorbachev had at stake politically and the importance of preserving the diplomatic gains of the summit.

Although a widely-reported TASS dispatch that Chinese "authorities have practically lost control over the situation" was not typical of all Soviet reporting, commentaries on events in China in the aftermath of the Soviet leader's departure, but before the clearing of the square, captured much of the ferment of these days. While there were only the slightest suggestions of leadership differences, there was reportage of troops being turned back, of the ebb and flow of student demonstrations, and of the extensive evidence of the disruption of normal life in Beijing.[108] Yet along with this depiction of chaos, the themes staked out during the summit remained. Politburo member and Gorbachev ally Aleksandr Yakovlev spoke of the "enthusiasm" of the Chinese people, while Vitaliy Kobysh, a commentator for *Izvestiya,* spoke effusively of how *perestroyka* had "opened up the hearts of the Chinese," making the Soviet Union "not just interesting but . . . close."[109] The Soviet media described the demonstrations as a positive movement suffering from youthful enthusiasm, but being "heard by the whole of Chinese society."[110] Finally, the continued Soviet emphasis on the similarity of problems facing both societies and the prominence of statements on the importance of a peaceful solution, bespoke a continued Soviet commitment to a solution of China's problems through "democratic" and "legal" methods.[111]

The final, murderous denouement in Beijing could not have been farther from the peaceful resolution that Gorbachev had hoped for nor could it have come at a worse time for him. Gorbachev's attempt to link Chinese and Soviet reforms to reap domestic and foreign policy gains seemed to backfire just as policies on both fronts entered crucial phases. Domestically, during the end of May, the newly instituted Congress of People's Deputies with its many dissident voices went into session and immediately addressed the use of force in Georgia the month before as well as the violence in Uzbekistan that had broken out during the first week in June. With the Soviet Union taking a major step toward political dialogue, the pressures on Gorbachev to demonstrate to skeptics his commitment to peaceful change by distancing himself from Chinese methods was undoubtedly strong. Lest there be any doubt that such pressures existed, on June 5, Boris Yel'tsin made them explicit by likening the Beijing events to those in Georgia.[112] On the foreign policy front, Gorbachev arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany on June 12 to renew a major effort to promote himself abroad as one committed to new thinking in international relations and to peaceful reform in socialist countries. The Soviet advance team had been questioned on the China issue and a position on it would be necessary.[113]

Soviet public commentary on the events of June 3–4 captured much of the chaos and bloodshed of the moment, and used such words as "tragic" to characterize the incident.[114] However, it also made clear that those concerned with Soviet reform should draw two lessons from these happenings.[115] The first was that "all sorts of excesses" can occur during the reform process. The second, the result of drawing explicit parallels with events in Georgia, was that both events were tragedies, which only emphasized the importance of the "skill of peacefully solving internal conflicts." The resolution on China adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies pursued this theme, stressing the importance of seeking "adequate political solutions determined by the aims of consolidating society" and expressing the hope "that wisdom, common sense and a balanced approach will prevail."[116] The events in Tiananmen thus took on a meaning in the Soviet domestic reform dialogue quite different from that which had prevailed during the Sino-Soviet summit. They became a way of cautioning those at home who might try to go too quickly with reform even though the Congress of People's Deputies resolution pledged a continuing commitment to *glasnost'* and peaceful reform.[117] Moscow was also sensitive to the importance of not appearing out of step with the international outcry that greeted the military action. For example, Gerasimov depicted the Soviet leaders as "extremely dismayed," and the head of Novosti

[108]This discussion is based on my reading of *FBIS-SOV* for this period.
[109]*FBIS-SOV*, May 22, 1989, p. 18, and June 1, 1989, p. 17.
[110]Ibid., May 19, 1989, p. 29.
[111]See, for example, ibid., May 19, 1989, p. 29; and May 24, 1989, pp. 18–19. The quotations are from the Soviet reporting about Wan Li.

[112]*FBIS-SOV*, June 5, 1989, p. 11.
[113]They characterized it as "regrettable." Ibid., June 6, 1989, p. 13.
[114]Ibid., June 6, 1989, pp. 9–13.
[115]See ibid., p. 13, and June 16, 1989, p. 9.
[116]Ibid., June 8, 1989, p. 9.
[117]Some seemed unconvinced regarding this latter point. For example, an Estonian radio broadcast, which criticized the Soviet Congress's statement as "quite weak" and intended "not to upset the Chinese leadership," argued that it demonstrated that "to the Soviet Union, the state regime is . . . more important than human rights." Ibid., June 13, 1989, p. 9.

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Press Agency spoke of "joining Moscow's voice" to other countries' condemnation of the use of force.[118]

Yet, this was not quite true. Moscow's voice was not identical to those in the West. It had qualities that gave clear evidence of an attempt to modulate criticism in such a way as not to sacrifice the goodwill of the summit. Thus, in broadcasts beamed to China, Soviet commentators continued the theme of a common reform effort and noted, sympathetically, that in both countries "sometimes things may go too far" and that Moscow had learned from the "painful experience" of Georgia the "negative consequences of using force."[119] This mild rebuke was, however, balanced by Soviet reliance on Chinese communiqués as sources and the acknowledgment that "at some moment the character of the action [in Tiananmen] changed."[120] Moreover, in an attempt to distance Moscow from China's critics in the West, despite the extensive commentary cited above, the Soviet press ostentatiously abjured any intent to influence internal events in China and strongly criticized those who sought to pressure Beijing or impose sanctions.[121] Finally, in contrast with the West, the Soviets did attempt to maintain the impression of "business as usual," as symbolized by events such as the Chinese foreign minister's visit to Moscow and the arrival of a Kazakh trade delegation in China.[122]

In sum, although foreign and domestic pressures conditioned a somewhat critical Soviet approach to post-summit developments in China, there was also room to demonstrate goodwill and to preserve the momentum of the summit. Indeed, it appeared at first glance as though the Soviet Union was, in the spirit of the earlier triangular politics, once again positioning itself to be the beneficiary of China's worsening relations with the outside world. And, from the initial indications of global reaction to the military suppression of the pro-democracy movement by Chinese authorities, there seemed, on the surface at least, to be great potential for Soviet gain.

The decision to use force against the pro-democracy movement only intensified the failures of the summit for China's leaders and further complicated China's relationship to the international environment. A country that for more than a decade had struggled to be accepted as a responsible and stable regional and international actor was, once again, viewed with distrust. Although the actual scope and impact of official sanctions was unclear, China found itself condemned by Japan and the Western industrialized nations. As important multilateral aspects of foreign economic relations (Asian Development Bank loans, GATT membership, etc.) became endangered, Beijing was faced with the difficult task of reassuring an edgy international business community. With the economic reform at a critical point, China confronted the specter of eroding international financial and technological support.

Similarly, the nation's diplomatic position suffered from the international perception of political uncertainty. In Southeast Asia, latent distrust of China was rekindled just as the settlement in Cambodia reached a crucial juncture. The rapid change in China's domestic climate prompted calls to reassess the Sino-British agreement regarding Hong Kong, and endangered important ground recently gained in promoting economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. Finally, of course, the events in Beijing rekindled the human rights issue in Sino-American relations. As the authorities expelled American journalists amid charges that Washington was interfering in China's domestic affairs, anti-American polemics reached a pitch not heard for more than a decade.

In this international climate, the somewhat moderate—even supportive—stance taken by the Soviet Union might have seemed to some in Beijing to represent a major accomplishment of the summit. Chinese reporting of Soviet statements and actions was, of course, intended to convey an impression of support.[123] But there were more concrete indications that Beijing was looking to the Soviet Union. Toward the end of May, as Western nations displayed some chariness in the face of growing instability, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that Yao Yilin told a "high level meeting of the State Council" that a decision had been made "to immediately increase economic and trade cooperation with the Soviet Union by a big margin as a countermeasure to the possible reduction of loans offered by the United States, Japan, and other Western countries."[124]

Supportive Soviet statements and this report of Chinese leadership thinking are, of course, reminiscent not of a "new era" in Sino-Soviet relations, but rather of an earlier triangular pattern. Was all of the talk of a changed international environment and a new relationship, which preceded and accompanied the summit, simply rhetoric covering the further refinement and development of a very familiar triangular pattern of international relations in the Far East? Perhaps. But the simi-

[118]RFE-RL, *Report on The USSR*, June 16, 1989, p. 36; and *FBIS-SOV*, June 16, 1989, p. 9.

[119]*FBIS-SOV*, June 14, 1989, p. 11.

[120]Ibid.

[121]See, for example, *ibid., June 7, 1989*, p. 10; and June 8, 1989, pp. 7–8.

[122]Ibid., June 13, 1989, p. 9; and June 16, 1989, p. 9.

[123]See, for example, *FBIS-CHI*, June 12, 1989, p. 7.

[124]Ibid., May 31, 1989, p. 2.

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larity was superficial. These events, which seem to fit so easily into such a framework, actually demonstrate a quite different point: that the international environment and the "new thinking" that was the basis for the summit actually serve to inhibit such triangular politics.

Thus, one senses the presence of Gorbachev's new thinking in post-summit Soviet policy toward China. Of course, the opportunity to reap some of the benefits of Sino-American tensions could not be ignored. But Soviet statements suggest that policy toward China in this period was still being shaped by those goals that brought the Soviet leader to Beijing: the imperative of domestic reform and the need to improve the Soviet Union's political image and economic position in Asia. According to this calculus, Soviet interests might be better served by maintaining some distance from China, rather than rushing to play triangular politics.

Gorbachev had gone to Beijing seeking to associate the Soviet Union with China's dynamic reform and to enlist China's reform movement, along with those in Poland and Hungary, as part of an international constituency that could be used to promote reform in the Soviet Union.[125] Events in Beijing moved China out of such a grouping, making it a less attractive partner. A retrogressive movement in China did not serve the Soviet leader's interests as much as a reforming one. Of course, a China on the road of reform also had been expected to serve Soviet interests in more concrete ways. The post-normalization relationship was to have had a strong economic and arms control component. For the near future, there seems to be little likelihood of Chinese initiatives in these areas, thus further diminishing the probable gains to Moscow from a tilt toward the Chinese side.

Broader Soviet diplomatic objectives also argued against the logic of earlier triangular politics. At the summit, it was clear that policy toward China was part of a more extensive reassessment of policy toward Asia. With China rocked once more by domestic turmoil, marginalized in international affairs, and viewed with distrust in Asia, it made little sense to associate closely with it. China suddenly had become a weak bridge to Asia. Gorbachev's Asian offensive thus needed to proceed in other ways. Accordingly, there was little let-up in the thrust of Moscow's policy toward Asia that had accompanied the summit. Soviet statements highlighted the impact of the summit on "peace, security, and cooperation" in all of Asia, and the Soviet Union continued efforts to promote ties with South Korea and Japan.[126] Whether this Asian policy will be successful is uncertain. Soviet policy in Asia still has to confront the formidable obstacles posed by territorial disputes, distrust, and Moscow's weak economic position—Gorbachev has a long way to go before he establishes the kind of credibility in Asia that he has in Europe. Moreover, it may well be that Gorbachev will slow his efforts in Asia to focus on more likely and dramatic gains in Europe. But, at this writing, the indications are that he remains committed to his Asian effort, an effort that would benefit from an image of Soviet moderation and stability as well as greater distance from China.

Of course, the development of Sino-Soviet relations in the previous triangular pattern is not dependent only on Soviet behavior; forces must also be operative on the Chinese side. But here, too, there are suggestions that such politics might be blunted by recent global and domestic developments. Despite the bravado that characterized the rhetoric of the days immediately following the crushing of the pro-democracy movement, there seems to be a growing recognition in Beijing that the nation cannot easily close the door to the West. The demonstrators have been cleared from Tiananmen Square, but the economic and social problems that brought them there remain. If China is to find its way out of the current crisis in the post-Mao reform, it will need support from the outside.

Clearly the still-limited structure and content of Sino-Soviet economic relations are not up to this task. Particular provinces in China such as Heilongjiang might be expected to press for expanded ties with the Soviet Union. However, such relationships could in no way substitute for the capital and technology that is needed from the West. Moreover, although the initial international outrage at the events in Tiananmen Square raised doubts about continued support from the West, it is possible that over time such outrage might abate. There is, thus, little incentive for China to rush into expanded Soviet economic ties that could not substitute for Western support and that might serve to engender even more distrust of China.

Finally, in mirror-image fashion, it is very possible that the issue of reform politics conditioned a preference for a more distant relationship in Beijing just as it had done in Moscow. The attraction of Western democracy for the Tiananmen demonstrators was obvious. But the Chinese leaders surely have also noted their idealization of Gorbachev and his policies. And as one Chinese dissident has noted, whereas there were "pretexts" for attacking Western bourgeois thought, there is "no ideo-

[125]Zvi Gitelman has suggested the existence of such a constituency. See his "The Transfer of Reforms among Communist States," unpublished ms.

[126]*FBIS-SOV*, June 5, 1989, pp. 17–18; June 7, 1989, p. 10; June 8, 1989, p. 10; and June 12, 1989, pp. 13–14.

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logical concept to resist" Marxist, Soviet influence.[127] For this reason, many Chinese leaders view reformist ideologies from socialist countries as more dangerous than Western democratic notions. At a time of political crackdown, such concerns would join with residual distrust of Soviet strategic motives and the need for Western support to modulate a shift within the triangle by China.

In short, the events of the summit and after it suggest caution in making any predictions about the future of Sino-Soviet relations. To be sure, after the suppression of the pro-democracy movement and the expression of Western outrage, there were certainly suggestions that the triangular politics of the past were at work. But there were also suggestions that the old formulas had lost some of their logic and potency for both China and the Soviet Union. However, the present shape of Sino-Soviet relations by no means exhausts the possible permutations suggested by the summit and the events that followed. The scenario described above assumes domestic political configurations in China and the Soviet Union that are by no means certain to continue in the future. Should they change, given the logic of the argument presented above, the nature of the relations between the two countries would also change.

For example, the recent miners' strike and continued nationality unrest in the USSR are reminders that the continuation of a reformist Soviet Union is by no means assured. Should Mikhail Gorbachev's policies change or should he be overthrown by more conservative elements, then the chemistry of Sino-Soviet relations would certainly change. A less reformist Soviet leadership would not operate under the same constraints as Gorbachev in seeking to exploit Chinese contradictions with the West and might, in fact, find kindred spirits in Beijing. It would also be a leadership less enamored of contact with the capitalist world and more willing to explore expanded relations with the more conservative post-Tiananmen leadership. A bond of common opposition to reformist socialism could, thus, prove a substantial foundation for a reconsideration of the nature of relations between the Soviet Union and China.

Conversely, of course, the leadership in China might change after Deng's death and return to the reformist path championed by Zhao Ziyang. Assuming that reform continues to dominate Soviet politics, one could imagine a renewal of the kind of rapport that seemed to exist between Zhao and Gorbachev at the summit. Although the inhibitions to an intimate Sino-Soviet relationship identified above would persist, there is also reason to expect that shared political agendas and challenges could present a very different, and quite unprecedented, basis for the relationship between the two countries. Of course, should such a change in China be accompanied by reversal in the Soviet Union, the situation would be different again, resembling a mirror image of that prevailing today: Beijing, anxious to maintain its reformist image and distrustful of Soviet motives, would keep its distance.

These scenarios, of course, do not exhaust all the possible outcomes within each country or their effect on Sino-Soviet relations. For example, both in China and the Soviet Union there are reformers as well as anti-reformers whose views go beyond the parameters suggested earlier. It is also clear that different permutations in the implicit matrix developed above will shape the various issue areas in the Sino-Soviet relationship differently. In its present form, then, this discussion can only be of heuristic value. But it does suggest that dramatic developments in Chinese domestic politics played a paradoxical role with respect to the sixth Sino-Soviet summit. By taking world attention away from somewhat lackluster meetings, these politics tended to mask the potential for development that exists in Sino-Soviet relations.

A central purpose of this essay has been to draw away that mask by presenting the meetings as the final stage in an impressive reconstitution of Sino-Soviet relations that had been going on for nearly a decade. The hectic nature of the summit, the distraction of many of its participants, and its meager diplomatic output should not obscure the fact that the basic scaffolding for a broadly-based and full bilateral Sino-Soviet relationship that resulted from this incremental process remains intact. This being the case, the issue becomes the identification of those factors that might energize the relationship and shape its future direction. In this respect, China's domestic turmoil has played a very different role, illuminating rather than masking, potential. The discussion of actual and possible permutations of post-summit Sino-Soviet relations suggests that although the actions of third states will continue to play an unquestioned part in shaping the future direction of these relations, the salience of domestic politics and ideology must not be overlooked. These internal and ideological sources of change in the relationship constitute a clear thread of consistency running back to the 1940's. Their persistence suggests that, as was the case in the past, Sino-Soviet relations will continue to frustrate the efforts of external actors either to affect or to predict their future course.

[127]The dissident was Yan Jiaqi, quoted in *The New York Times*, May 14, 1989.

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Note

Problems of CPSU Historiography

George M. Enteen

PARTY historians, those historians who specialize in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), make up almost half the historians in the Soviet Union. This note examines whether party historians have, in the light of *glasnost'*, modified any of their assumptions about the nature of the historical process and the character of historical knowledge. Its tentative conclusion is that some party historians have questioned fundamental propositions about party history, but they have by no means carried the day. Party historians have been less bold than historians in other fields and much less bold than writers of *belles-lettres*. Their questioning has, however, breached the unity of outlook prized by party leaders. Some have also cast doubt on the desirability of such unity.

Two kinds of evidence are pertinent to this investigation. The first consists of discourses about party historiography itself, the reflections of historians about the nature of their undertaking and their prescriptions for its restructuring. The second consists of actual examples of investigations into party history. I have selected for analysis two recent articles that seek to assess the impact of Stalin.[1] This second source of evidence is the more problematic. Many historians inside and outside the Soviet Union question whether party historiography is genuine scholarship, because they maintain that the preconceptions of party historians and the constraints under which they work not only inhibit, but block investigation. This generalization requires modification. Works of authentic scholarship in party history can be found in increasing number. They exist side by side with works in a more traditional vein.

George M. Enteen teaches Russian history at the Pennsylvania State University (College Park, PA). He has written a number of works about Soviet historiography, including The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians *(1978) and with Tatiana Gorn and Cheryl Kern,* Soviet Historians and the Study of Russian Imperialism *(1979). An article of his about Pokrovskiy was recently published in* Voprosy Istorii *(May 1989). He is studying the work of E. M. Yaroslavskiy.*

Party Historiography and *Glasnost'*

Party historiography embraces a range of issues that concern the methods, sources, and content of research and writing on the CPSU. The purpose of party historiography has long been ideological and political: it was a body of work designed to legitimate the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society, to praise the party's achievements, and to denigrate the party's enemies. However, as recent reflections on party historiography show, some party historians wish to bring party history as such more in line with a conception of historical research that seeks to understand the past, not to sanctify the present.

The role of party historiography. In most societies and in most fields, research sets the pace for public understanding. For example, historical research more than anything else determines understanding of the past. The historians' hypotheses and findings enter into popular works, including textbooks. One mark of a good textbook is that it succeeds in incorporating up-to-date results of research.

In the Soviet Union, especially where party history is concerned, this situation is reversed. In this field, textbooks set the pace, in particular, textbooks on party

[1]Natalya V. Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), November 1987, pp. 93–107; I. L. Man'kovskaya and Yu. P. Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality and Party-Historical Science," ibid., May 1988, pp. 57–70.

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history. This practice appeared in some measure even in the 1920's, but it reached its zenith from 1938 to the death of Stalin in 1953. In 1938, the *Short Course of the History of the Soviet Communist Party (b)* (hereafter—the *Short Course*) appeared, and the CPSU proclaimed that work to be the official version of party history. This textbook was the point of orientation for research historians; it posed the essential questions and set the boundaries of the permissible.

The traditional role of the textbook on party history has been called into question by P. Rodionov, a member of the academic council of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. In a genuinely enlightened article in the June 14, 1988, edition of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* Rodionov examined Mikhail Gorbachev's call for the formation of a CPSU Central Committee commission to work with a commission of historians in preparing a new textbook on party history. Rodionov drew a parallel between Gorbachev's proposal and the circumstances surrounding the *Short Course,* which was edited by Boris Ponomarev. He argued that Ponomarev's position in the Central Committee and his eventual candidate membership in the Politburo stifled all criticism of the *Short Course*. Rodionov feared the possibility that the new book might acquire a "semiofficial" character, making it a "sacred annal," and thereby hinder the development of creative thought. Instead, Rodionov proposed the creation of some sort of competitive arrangement to produce a new textbook, as well as new popular works and children's literature about party history.[2]

The epistemological standing of CPSU documents. It has long been the practice of party historians to treat party documents as a source of absolute truth and therefore binding on everyone, historians and non-historians alike. Every decision contained in party resolutions was presumed correct. The documents could become a point of departure for discourse but were not themselves deemed a proper object of investigation.

This situation, too, has begun to change. Nikolay N. Maslov, who holds a chair in party history at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, is at present the foremost authority in the field of party historiography. He also seems to be the main force behind a push to desanctify party documents. In an article discussing the desirable properties of a textbook on party history, Maslov called for the study of the "causes of the appearance of one or another party document, which must be analyzed not in itself, but in close connection with historical conditions."[3] The fullest assertion of this same idea was made in a seminar on party historiography by A. A. Chernobayev, who is a member of Maslov's department (*kafedra*).[4] Chernobayev rejected the prevailing view that only the documents of lower party organs, but not those of the Moscow center, require the establishment of their authenticity and reliability, and that documents of the lower organs ought to conform to those of the higher bodies. Indeed, the prevailing view illustrates one of the chief "dogmas" of party historiography: "Absolute truth is contained in party documents, truth in the final instance." Chernobayev argued that under the impact of this dogma, historians construe party documents as normative assertions and provide commentary instead of analysis. Chernobayev also maintained that if historians intend to fill the "blank spots" of party history, they must have access to all documents. Only then can they examine the concrete conditions of the creation of a document. Without access to archives, historians see only the final product, not the stages of its development. They are ignorant of the range and complexity of sources and thus can deal with them only as propagandists.

In his own report to the seminar, Maslov further developed this thesis. He urged "liberation from the deeply rooted dogma that all party documents, in their capacity as historical sources, are trustworthy (*dostovernyye*) in the highest degree, and therefore do not require analysis and need not be subjected to scholarly criticism."[5] Maslov proceeded to distinguish two aspects or functions of party documents: they are at once a directive and a source. As a directive, the documents have normative force, but not for all time. The normative import should prevail for a period of time between party congresses or for the duration of an economic plan. Then the documents become merely sources, evidence about the past. Maslov further stipulated that even when it serves as a directive, a document must also be examined as a source.[6] But Maslov did not confront the dilemma that the two functions of the document might lead a historian in opposite directions. How should the historian proceed when the source still functions as a directive but if, in his or her view, it was engendered by considerations of power and was dys-

[2]Early in 1989 a textbook on the history of the USSR appeared for secondary-school students. As of September 1989, a textbook on party history had yet to appear. See Vera Tolz, "New History Textbook for Secondary Schools," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Sept. 1, 1989, pp. 5–7.

[3]"What the New Textbook on Party History Should Look Like," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, July 1987, p. 54.

[4]"The Documents of the CPSU as Historical Sources," ibid., February 1988, p. 152.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 153.

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functional with respect to its avowed goal? The mood of the seminar was reformist, with the participants intent upon filling the "blank spots." But the proposals of Maslov and Chernobayev found little resonance and can hardly be said to have won endorsement.

Partiynost'. Party-mindedness, a well-known principle of Leninism, when applied to historical writing asserts, first of all, that all scholarship justifies a particular class interest. It asserts, second, that Marxism is distinctive in its explicit acknowledgment of this fact and in its overt willingness to place historical writing in the service of the proletariat and its conscious vanguard, the communist party. *Partiynost'* is said to encompass the concept of objectivity: the open adherence to party-mindedness is the royal road to objectivity, because the defense of proletarian interests, the building of socialism, represents what is best for all mankind and thus constitutes the highest possible objectivity.[7]

Mark A. Varshavchik, a prolific specialist on the methods and problematics of party history, has provided a new emphasis in recent discussions of *partiynost'* by attempting to bring the concept of objectivity into clearer focus. He argues that party-mindedness by no means ensures objectivity. The "dialectical unity" between *partiynost'* and objectivity has been misunderstood, Varshavchik contends:

The pretense of objectivity in the face of minimizing or ignoring partiynost'*. . . is the purest form of bourgeois objectivism. But* partiynost' *without objectivity (or if the latter is relegated to a subordinate position) can turn into political babble, subjectivism of the sort that Lenin had in mind in speaking of the harm of "logomachy pretending to be communist conscientiousness."*[8]

Without objectivity, *partiynost'* is mere partisanship; without *partiynost'*, objectivity is mere pretense of detachment that conceals service to the bourgeoisie. Varshavchik indicates that the twin concepts have been out of balance in Soviet usage and their interaction incorrect, to the detriment of objectivity. The result was that party historians described "not how things *had been,*" but conducted research and writing "*as required.*" His use of the term objectivity is sometimes unclear and perhaps not entirely consistent. It is to him a cognitive, not an ethical concept. That is to say, understanding objectivity requires epistemological analysis rather than normative evaluation. Nevertheless, Varshavchik treats objectivity as an ethical concept, urging both fair-mindedness and an obligation to resist arbitrary authority.[9]

Periodization. Anyone who has devised a syllabus for a history course and earmarked assignments into separate categories has performed an exercise in periodization.[10] It is implicit in any construction of events that goes beyond mere chronology and assumes narrative form. To know that the past differs from the present is the beginning of historical consciousness; to perceive that one historical age differs from another constitutes a further refinement and represents an achievement that has not been attained in all cultures. Such consciousness grows out of the discovery that human experience deposits traces more durable than "the pattern of last year's wind on the surface of a lake. . . ."[11] The historian seeking to depict the past construes reality "under the modality of a 'pastness' [that is] both distinct from and continuous with 'the present'."[12]

Bertram Wolfe has written that "one of the peculiarities of Soviet historiography is its obsession with 'periodization'."[13] Soviet historians turn to it particularly in periods of change, but periodization is virtually a habit, for it flows out of Marx's materialist conception of history, which views all of history as a sequence of modes of production through which mankind passes from primitive communism to a classless society of abundance. Lenin also cherished the practice of periodization, because it provided various schemata of the history of the revolutionary movement and of the party.

Periodization provides the framework of meaning for party historiography, an infrastructure of control, and a scaffolding for the regime's mythology. As a mode of constituting the field of historical discourse, periodization assigns explicit meaning to long stretches of time and implicit meaning to the specific events that take place within them. Functioning as a master narrative, periodization determines the structure of the specific

[7] *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya* (The Soviet Historical Encyclopedia), Vol. 9, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1966, cols. 396–98.

[8] Mark A. Varshavchik, "The Primary Orientator—The Laws of History," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, October 1987, p. 79.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Robert O. Crummey, "Periodizing 'Feudal' Russian History," *Russia and Eastern European History: Selected Papers from the Second World Congress on Soviet and East European Studies*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984, p. 17.

[11] Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of History*, New York, Basic Books, 1981, p. 17.

[12] Hayden White, *The Content of Form: Narrative Form and Historical Representation*, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, pp. 88–89.

[13] Bertram Wolfe, *Revolution and Reality: Essays on the Origin and Fate of the Soviet System*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1981, p. 117.

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narratives that contain accounts of wars, party congresses, etc. It prejudges whether a specific act is progressive or regressive with respect to history's goal of communism. The master narrative defines what is a historical fact, what and who is incidental and accidental, what is foreground, and what is background.

Periodization has served as an important bulwark of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism by relegating whole classes of facts to the background or by making them nonfacts with respect to ultimate goals. This ideological objective is achieved by characterizing a period in terms of such abstractions as forces of production and production relations, which are deemed objective factors. The allegedly real effects of history are measured by changes in social structures and forms of property, which, in turn, indicate the mode of exploitation and whether, indeed, exploitation exists at all. Periodization—the story of the operation of history's "objective" forces—is the basis for the mythology that Soviet history is the story of the building of a society without exploitation. In this regard, as a methodological principle and in combination with *partiynost'*, periodization is the functional equivalent for historians of the doctrine of socialist realism for writers of *belles-lettres*. By contrast, subjective factors—history that works itself out on the backs of people—account for the differences between history as taught in Soviet books and history that one learns from one's father.[14]

In this light, periodization reflects the regression from historical consciousness to a more primitive way of thinking about history. It opened the way to a revival of mythical consciousness in the form of word magic.[15] Periodization reduced each period and each separate socioeconomic formation to an essence. Each event and person derived its historical meaning from that essence, and systematic confusion between the essence and empirical referent prevailed. Reasoning began and ended with the assigning of a dominant attribute to each period, which was taken to denote its essence and the essence of the society being investigated in that period. Any society deemed socialist had to be seen as nonexploitative and peaceful, no matter what its specific arrangements and policies. Capitalist societies had to be seen as decaying and warlike, no matter what their policies in a given situation. It is not the observable behavior of societies that form the basis of judgment about their historical role and worth, but their inner essence, defined in terms of property relations.

Since the 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1986, party historians have revived the discussion of periodization. Much of it merely echoed earlier discussions, but a few innovative points have emerged, notably from articles by Aleksandr I. Zevelev and L. M. Spirin. Zevelev has questioned some of the specific assertions regarding the conventional periodization of party history and some of the criteria used for the division of history into periods. Spirin has challenged one of the theoretical postulates of periodization. Both raise questions about the objectivity of schemata of periodization.

According to Zevelev, the "doctrine of socioeconomic formations provides the possibility of studying history as a law-governed process, which is composed of alternating periods that result from the action of objective causes and conditions."[16] Essential for the discernment of periods is the reliance on such objective factors as the distinction between base and superstructure and the changes in the forces of production that are reflected in production relations. Therefore, for the periodization of party history, the development of the capitalist formation in Russia marks the point of departure. The emergence of a proletariat and the beginnings of revolutionary struggle led to the creation of a party of the new type, that is, a party based on Lenin's principles of "democratic centralism."

Using his discussion of periodization to establish the context, Zevelev criticizes the conventional notion that 1936, the year of the adoption of the so-called Stalin constitution, signified the completion of the building of a socialist society. Zevelev proclaims that in fact 1929 was a decisive moment in the history of the party: in that year, Stalin began his departure from Lenin's plan for the "realization of the New Economic Policy both in the city and especially in the countryside." Zevelev ascribed Stalin's decision to subjective factors.[17] But in contrast to traditional party historiography, Zevelev attributes causal (or objective) significance to Stalin's subjective decision to engage in repression, because it resulted in movement away from socialist democracy and in crimes against the party and socialism. Zevelev went on to warn "if we forget this, history will avenge itself upon us."[18]

Zevelev is not the first specialist in party history to ac-

[14]"The only approved way [to talk about the past] is to show that, however bad things may have been for you, you nevertheless remain faithful to the ideas of Communism, always able to distinguish the truly important—our ultimate objective—from minor factors, such as your own ruined life." Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope*, New York, Atheneum, 1970, p. 258.

[15]Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskij, "Myth-Name-Culture," in Daniel P. Lucid, Ed., *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977, pp. 233–52.

[16]Aleksandr I. Zevelev, "Toward the Question of the Periodization of the History of the CPSU," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, December 1987, p. 72.

[17]Ibid., p. 78.

[18]Ibid.

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knowledge subjective factors as causal agents. After all, according to Marx himself—as well as Stalin—ideas, when grasped by the masses, became weapons in their own right. But Zevelev, for the first time in party historiography, gives weight to subjective factors in a periodization scheme and attributes results of world historical significance—the deformation of socialism—to them. In this light, the cult of personality is not merely an excess or an error, but an event that affected the *objective* course of historical development.

In one respect, Zevelev's innovation is modest indeed and should have been made in 1956, because it is compatible with Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It also might be seen as no more than a finger pointed at the naked king.[19] But precisely because the pointing takes place in the context of periodization, it jeopardizes the optimistic framework of party historiography, the view of party history as the story of progress and redemption.

Spirin's observation about periodization is terse but far-reaching in its implications. Although historical scholarship deals with objective reality, he argues that periodization of the historical process is a subjective process: "It is not, however, arbitrary, but reckons with change in historical actuality." Insofar as perception, especially of changing phenomena, has a "subjective character," various schemata of periodization will be put forth. These different schemata are to be expected, Spirin asserts, even within the framework of a single methodology, such as Marxism-Leninism. "The task consists, with the aid of collective discussions, free discussions, of working out a general line, achieving largely agreed-upon viewpoints. . . ."[20] It would seem to follow that subjective common agreement is the goal of periodization, rather than an objectively valid and binding scientific construct.

Potentially the most important aspect of Spirin's position is its legitimation of the existence of rival schemata of periodization of party history. If, in the unfolding of history, each period has a dominant value that serves as the basis for assigning ultimate significance to specific events occurring within that time-frame, then acknowledging that different assessments of periods are possible plays havoc with the very notion that an event has an objective and ultimate meaning.

Spirin uses Lenin and the uniqueness of his genius as an example of the operation of what he and his colleagues refer to as the subjective factor. Before anyone else, Lenin's analysis of Russia's economic and social relations revealed that Russia stood at the brink of a socialist revolution, which is to say that he devised a new schema of periodization. Spirin's implication is that those who disagreed with Lenin were guilty merely of error, because they lacked his foresight; they were not class enemies or counterrevolutionaries. Spirin's immediate point of reference is the Left Communists, the party faction that stubbornly opposed Lenin during the negotiations with the German military command at Brest-Litovsk. It places Spirin in agreement with Mikhail Shatrov's depiction of these events on the Soviet stage. And, like Shatrov, Spirin implicitly abandons the Manichean model of history, which interprets every advance as a triumph over class enemies.[21]

The party as historical actor. Party historiography has traditionally held historical progress to be the outcome of ceaseless conflict between the party itself and its own internal opposition, which emerges as an inevitable manifestation of party life. It is precisely in the course of overcoming the opposition that the party finds the correct, "Leninist," line that impels history forward.[22]

V. A. Kozlov has chipped away at this model on the pages of *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*.[23] He complains about the practice of ordering the past in terms of good and evil, and of ransacking history for rudiments of the present while passing over the "concrete historical contradictions" that characterize the historical process.[24]

Kozlov probes more deeply in condemning the customary research design employed by party historians. The historian, after selecting a particular decision by the party for his investigation, reaches back to the beginning of the period and marks it as a precondition. He then traces the posing of a task and presents the decision itself. He concludes by announcing its implementation. Kozlov complains that this pattern of task and resolution suggests that Soviet party history moved in accord with some sort of "noncontradictory essence."

Party history becomes nothing more than a series of problem-solving exercises—the rational discernment

[19]See the interview with M. Ya. Gefter, "Should They Fear Us?" *Twentieth Century and Peace* (Moscow), August 1987, pp. 42–48.

[20]L. M. Spirin, "Toward the Question of the Periodization of the History of the CPSU," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, September 1987, p. 80.

[21]For a discussion of Shatrov as a historical thinker, see David Joravsky, "Glasnost Theater," *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 10, 1988, pp. 34–39.

[22]George M. Enteen, "The Stalinist Conception of Communist Party History," *Studies in Soviet Thought* (Hingham, MA), 37, 1989, pp. 259–74.

[23]V. A. Kozlov, "The Historian and *Perestroyka*," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, May 1987, pp. 110–22.

[24]Ibid., p. 113. Kozlov's work may be viewed as contemporary criticism of the "Whig interpretation of history," to use the phrase of Herbert Butterfield. According to this interpretation, the past is organized in light of present concerns and the present is viewed as the outcome of the exclusive efforts of the group with which the historian identifies. See, Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London, G. Bell and Sons, 1931.

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of goals followed by the search for appropriate means. For Kozlov, this procedure omits the fact that the "very tasks are formulated amidst sharp clashes of opinion that reflect the contradictions of real life." The results achieved "engender not just 'forward' [movement] but [arrangements that] produce new contradictions."[25] Genuine Marxism, according to the author, sees the exercise of reason resulting not in harmony, but in the creation of conditions that spawn new conflicts.

Case Studies

Two recent examples of party historiography reflect attempts by specialists to mine archives for new materials and to marshal evidence that previously had not appeared in party historiographical literature. On the surface, it would appear that much has changed. These new materials, however, ought to encourage a re-examination of the basic assumptions of party historiography—known as the "Leninist conception of party history"—which was conceptualized to help legitimate Stalin's dictatorship. The two articles show that the fundamental paradigm or the "deep structure" of party history remains intact.

The problem of falsification. In her article about Emelian Yaroslavskiy, a prominent member of Stalin's faction who was a leader in the field of party history, Natalya V. Illeritskaya demonstrates mastery of sources, including some found in the Central Party Archives. She displays knowledge of the extensive body of writings about Yaroslavskiy and has a command of the growing body of theoretical literature on party historiography. Some of the main ideas in the article come from the candidate's dissertation Illeritskaya defended in 1980, and some come from her book about Yaroslavskiy now in the final stages of preparation.

This article is exceptional in Soviet party historical literature for its display of affection on the author's part for the subject of her investigation. Illeritskaya's implicit thesis is that Yaroslavskiy was a victim of Stalin's cult of personality. This thesis contains some truth, of course; Yaroslavskiy, like everyone else, lived and worked in fear of Stalin. But, even slight knowledge of the matter reveals that Yaroslavskiy was a principal creator of the cult of personality. Hence, the ideological stance Illeritskaya assumes may be seen as a classic example of neo-Stalinism, in the sense that she is willing to sacrifice the historical reputation of Stalin for the sake of the Stalinist body of practices, ideas, and values exercised and propagated by Stalin himself, his associates, and his successors.

The ostensible subject of Illeritskaya's study is Yaroslavskiy's growing effectiveness as a biographer of Lenin and his increasing prowess as a historian of the October Revolution. Her views of Yaroslavskiy may be summarized as follows. Yaroslavskiy overcame and rejected illusions as his position increasingly approached present-day views (which she shares). The mechanism of Yaroslavskiy's progress is his growing mastery of Lenin's own interpretation of the history of the Revolution; he gained this proficiency through the need to refute other views, especially Trotsky's. Bringing Lenin's *April Theses* into focus marked a major contribution. Yaroslavskiy achieved this mastery by successfully grasping the *April Theses* both as a major theoretical statement and as an event in the unfolding of Lenin's plan for the peaceful acquisition of power by the working class. The actual seizure of power must be seen as the working out of this plan. Lenin forged this strategy in the course of his struggle against views held by his opponents within the party. In turn, Yaroslavskiy owed his increasing command and authority to his ability to comprehend Lenin both as a historical actor and as a historian.

In Illeritskaya's depiction, Yaroslavskiy exemplifies the basic pattern of Soviet historiography. That is to say, Illeritskaya draws upon a specific paradigm or model of historiographical development and presents Yaroslavskiy as an example of its operation:

The all-round mastery of the Leninist conception of socialist revolution on the part of Soviet historians was the condition for the creation of the scientific history of Great October. This in turn had important practical significance and was persistently bound up with the appraisal of perspectives on the building of socialism in the country, in the struggle against anti-Leninist currents and groups.[26]

Up to this point, Illeritskaya's study is orthodox. However, her work has another dimension that reveals itself when we see how she approaches Stalin and Stalinism. For, in depicting the relationship between Stalin and Yaroslavskiy, Illeritskaya raises the problem of falsification of history, when she writes about Yaroslavskiy's "deviations from historical truth."[27] According to Illeritskaya, these deviations ensued just after Stalin's direct intervention into historical scholarship by means of his

[25]Kozlov, "The Historian and *Perestroyka*," loc. cit., p. 119.

[26]Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 99.

[27]Ibid., p. 98.

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notorious letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* late in 1931.[28] The letter, "Some Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism," marked the establishment of Stalin's ideological autocracy. Stalin dictated the findings historians were supposed to reach and the methods historians were supposed to use. The new version of history—called the Leninist conception of party history—exalted Lenin and elevated Stalin to Lenin's equal. Moreover, Stalin ordered that facts and documents were to be interpreted from the point of view of the present, that is, they were to be used in the political struggle on the side of Stalin against his alleged enemies. Ultimately, history became another means to legitimate Stalin's dictatorship. The Leninist conception of party history was not arrived at by historians studying Lenin's writings in the seclusion of the library. They mastered it amidst clashing expectations and struggles for power; it took shape in the atmosphere of a besieged fortress.

Stalin's letter provoked "unfounded" criticism of Yaroslavskiy, including the branding of some of his views as Trotskyite. But following Stalin's letter, Yaroslavskiy engaged in his own efforts at falsification, which Illeritskaya repudiates. These falsifications include his allegation that the Prague Conference of the party in 1912, which advanced Stalin to the Central Committee, and not the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903, marked the creation of Bolshevism. They also include his tendency, shared by others, to elevate Stalin to a position parallel to Lenin's. His work reveals "zigzags and retreats, silences and exaggerations. It was necessary to squeeze through dogmas, and sometimes, alas, he was their prisoner and guardian. . . ."[29] Illeritskaya is eager to absolve Yaroslavskiy by placing the blame on Stalin.

But in moving toward this objective, she is awkwardly hesitant about Yaroslavskiy's writings before 1931. For example, prior to that year, Yaroslavskiy helped to create silence around and then falsify Stalin's conciliationist stance in February-March 1917 after his arrival in Petrograd but before Lenin's return and proclamation of the *April Theses*. In fact, Stalin shared this position with Lev Kamenev. At that time, Stalin indeed was skeptical about the Bolsheviks' ability to take power in the near future.[30] Yaroslavskiy blames Kamenev entirely.

Yaroslavskiy also helped to create the myth that the October Revolution was led by a party center, in which Stalin figured prominently, and not by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which Trotsky led as Chairman. Illeritskaya does not specifically mention the party center, but she endorses Yaroslavskiy's falsification by commending him for the stress he places on the role of the central organs of the party.[31] As a result, she is not free of complicity in sustaining the dominance of the Leninist conception of party history created under Stalin, and its exaltation of Stalin, despite the evidence she has found to contradict it. Although Illeritskaya cites no primary sources, she repeats all the standard lies and clichés about Trotsky. As a methodologically sophisticated historian, she must suspect the accuracy of her own words about Trotsky, Nikolay Bukharin, and others.

If Illeritskaya had granted that Yaroslavskiy falsified the record before his ordeal in 1931,[32] she would not merely have acknowledged his role in the creation of Stalinism. More important, Illeritskaya's work would have indicated that Stalinism is something different from and greater than Stalin himself, because Stalin's role and actions were beginning to be mythologized even before his directive appeared in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*. Not only was the Leninist conception of party history shaped and governed by the interests of Stalin's faction, but Stalin himself was shaped by this conception, because his own actions were, in part, a response to it.

But the implications of Illeritskaya's argument can be drawn out even further. At one point, she writes that the conditions created by Stalin's letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* "influenced negatively the development of party historiography in its entirety."[33] Consequently, a re-examination on her part of all the premises of party historiography would seem to be in order. For Stalin did not merely terrorize his subjects; he locked into place a basic paradigm of party history that elevated victories over his rivals into the mainspring of historical progress.[34] Thus, Illeritskaya's own received ideas—the Stalinist version of party history that still dominates party historiography—were at fault. Illeritskaya refrained from exploring the implications of her findings for the

[28]J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Vol. 13, Moscow, Politicheskaya Literatura, 1952.

[29]Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 107.

[30]Yaroslavskiy failed to repeat this error, or at any rate, did not impose it on his collaborator, I. I. Mints, in 1929 in the second volume of *Istoriia VKP (b)* (History of the Soviet Communist Party [b]), which he edited. This action provoked the wrath of Stalin in 1931.

[31]Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 103.

[32]See George M. Enteen, "Writing Party History in the USSR: The Case of E. M. Iaroslavskii," *Journal of Contemporary History* (London), 21, 1986, p. 327.

[33]Illeritskaya, "The Party-Historical Creativity of E. M. Yaroslavskiy," loc. cit., p. 106.

[34]See the remarks of M. Ya. Gefter in Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, New York, 1973, pp. 516–18.

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basic paradigm of the party's history. She dealt with the problem of falsification by minimizing, by virtually denying, its impact on historical thought. Illeritskaya would not open her eyes to the conclusion she clearly implied—that hers was the Stalinist version of Leninism.

The cult of personality. I. L. Man'kovskaya and Yu. P. Sharapov have made a conscious and conscientious effort to fulfill the party command of restructuring historical scholarship.[35] Going beyond the mere filling-in of "blank spots," they undertake to begin writing the history of the cult of Stalin's personality in historical scholarship. Two subjects receive most of their attention—the events surrounding the celebration of Stalin's 50th birthday in 1929 and the events following the publication of Stalin's letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* discussed above. The authors create a new perspective in Soviet party historiography by treating the cult of personality as more than incidental and seemingly accidental; they deem it a consequential phenomenon that requires serious investigation.

A picture emerges, drawn chiefly from the Central Party Archives, of Yaroslavskiy's agony in the wake of Stalin's letter; his ordeal persisted for more than a year and made him over into a willing falsifier. Man'kovskaya and Sharapov explain the cult chiefly as the work of two individuals aside from Stalin himself: Yaroslavskiy and Lazar Kaganovich.[36] As a point of contrast they promote Pavel Postyshev—a prominent party official—as the redeemer of party honor, through his effort to limit Stalin's cult.[37] They argue that Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, also deserves commendation. Like Illeritskaya, Man'kovskaya and Sharapov do not consider instances of Yaroslavskiy's falsification that occurred before 1931. They also fail to bring into their account relevant facts that have been established in Soviet historical literature, such as, for example, Stalin's and Kaganovich's instruction to Yaroslavskiy about how party history should be written,[38] and also the trail of falsehoods uttered in the course of Stalin's dispute with Trotsky.

The article exhibits a striking disproportion between the large amount of factual material the authors display and the narrow range of conclusions they draw. Man'kovskaya and Sharapov provide an impressive list of effects of the Stalin cult, but they fail to go beyond generalities in assessing the impact of Stalin's intervention on historical thought. They allege that in elevating Stalin, historians diminished the importance of Lenin, the masses, and the party. Such non-Marxist approaches were propagated as "subjectivism, dogmatism, and arbitrariness in the evaluation of events and people."[39] On the level of methodology, non-Marxist notions about the nature of the historical process gained currency as a result of the personality cult, according to the authors. The contradictory character of the past was lost sight of as the past came to be idealized. The "class approach to history and *partiynost'* of historical scholarship came to be counterpoised to objectivity." The authors manage to make such assertions without raising questions about the influence of the cult of personality on those ideas and assumptions that establish Soviet history as a history of progressive development. Perhaps most important, they manage to close their eyes to the influence of the Stalin cult on the Soviet understanding of Leninism and the Leninist conception of history.

A remarkable feature of this work is the authors' presentation of Stalin. Like Jehovah, he exists everywhere but is seen nowhere. His words are proclaimed from on high; the authors quote no conversations about him or with him or even debates in which he participated. None of his acts come into view. He is known through signs and by the behavior of such agents as Kaganovich and Yaroslavskiy. Coming to grips with Stalin's ghost is still a difficult matter for party historians.

It is remarkable, ingenious, and disquieting how well Sharopov and Man'kovskaya, like Illeritskaya, can accommodate so much new factual material to the traditional framework. They can even examine the cult of personality without forfeiting established assumptions whose origin can ultimately be traced to the cult itself.

Conclusion

First, playwrights such as Mikhail Shatrov and historians such as Roy Medvedev and Yuriy Afanas'yev attacked the traditional understanding of the Soviet past. Then, the mainstream of critical-minded historians, such as those who took over the editorial board of *Voprosy Istorii* early in 1988 assaulted many of the remaining myths. Party historiography, however, has changed much more slowly. Even if its basic assumptions have been impaired, the basic paradigm is largely intact in party journals, although it is scoffed at by society. It remains the story of the construction of a non-exploitative society—despite mistakes—by overcoming

[35]Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality," loc. cit.

[36]It is curious that *Pamyat'*, the ultra-nationalist association, sees these same two individuals—both Jewish by birth—as the chief culprits in the destruction of Moscow and its churches and of Russian culture in general.

[37]Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality," loc. cit., p. 61.

[38]See *Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya*, (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia), Vol. 7, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1965, col. 717.

[39]Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, "The Cult of Personality," loc. cit., p. 58.

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enemies within and without the party. It is still the sacred tale that was originally promulgated by Stalin and his associates.

A mixture of motives seems to be at work in the discourse about historiographical assumptions. Some historians, such as Man'kovskaya and Sharapov, are responding to the orders of the party leadership. They would refurbish the party's image without touching basic assumptions, but that has proved impossible. Only the re-imposition of punitive controls can forestall encroachment on the basic paradigm itself.

The motives of Maslov, Chernobayev, Varshavchik, and perhaps Zevelev and Spirin are somewhat different. They seem to have been awaiting an opportunity to join the issue. And they are driven by the realization that they must respond to the ferment in society as a whole and in the historical profession in particular, if they are to retain a shred of relevance and even a trifle of authority as historians.

But to risk a broader generalization, the party has lost its ability to legitimate its rule on the basis of Lenin's charisma and the myth of socialism. Desanctification of party history, even in party journals, is at hand. The party must seek a rational foundation for its governance, or have recourse to new, and probably stridently chauvinistic, myths.

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Books

Stalin: Revolutionary or Counterrevolutionary?

Robert V. Daniels

ROY MEDVEDEV. *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1989.

ROBERT H. McNEAL. *Stalin: Man and Ruler.* New York, New York University Press, 1988.

MICHAL REIMAN. *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution."* Translated by George Saunders. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1987.

ROBERT CONQUEST. *Stalin and the Kirov Murder.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1989.

HIROAKI KUROMIYA. *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932.* Cambridge, England, and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

FRANCESCO BENVENUTI. *Fuoco sui sabotatori! Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934–1938.* Rome, Valerio Levi, 1988.

HANS-HENNING SCHRÖDER. *Industrialisierung und Parteibürokratie in der Sowjetunion: Ein sozialgeschichtlicher Versuch über die Anfangsphase des Stalinismus (1928–1934).* West Berlin, Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, 1988.

PAVEL CAMPEANU. *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1988.

CAN anything new be said about Stalinism? Indeed, yes. An end to new information and new interpretations is nowhere in sight, and the opening of Soviet sources and of genuine debate among Soviet historians promises to enliven the subject for years to come. At the same time, *perestroyka* seems to have written an end to the era of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, so that one may now begin to look at this era from a somewhat more detached perspective, as a historical phenomenon with a beginning and an end.

The bounteous harvest of recent scholarship on the Stalin era, represented by the eminent works under review here, offers a wealth of new data, or new insights extracted from old sources, to add to the gory but still baffling picture of Joseph Stalin, the dictator who put such a searing stamp on the Soviet body politic. Roy Medvedev, in *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism,* the revised and expanded version of his remarkable work of the 1960's, adds poignant personal stories of the Great Terror, related to him by survivors or other individuals with access to portions of the historical record. The late Robert McNeal re-mined the public record, of which he had such an authoritative command, to cast new light on the Stalin cult in *Stalin: Man and Ruler.* Michal Reiman (formerly of Prague and now of the Free University of Berlin) utilizes the bonanza of documentation that he unearthed in German archives to shed light on the key period of Stalin's takeover, 1927–29, in *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution."* Robert Conquest reworks the story of the Kirov assassination in *Stalin and the Kirov Murder,* with the aid of new memoirs and *samizdat* material.

Robert V. Daniels is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Vermont (Burlington) and author of numerous works on the history of the Soviet Union. A revised edition of his anthology, The Stalin Revolution, *is scheduled to be published this fall.*

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Hiroaki Kuromiya (Indiana University), Francesco Benvenuti (University of Bologna), and Hans-Henning Schröder (University of Bochum) give us flesh-and-blood views of Stalin's industrialization campaign in their respective works: *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932*; *Fuoco sui sabotatori! Stachanovismo e organizzazione industriale in Urss, 1934–1938* (Shoot the Saboteurs! Stakhanovism and Industrial Organization in the USSR, 1934–1938); and *Industrialisierung und Parteibürokratie in der Sowjetunion: Ein sozialgeschichtlicher Versuch über die Anfangsphase des Stalinismus* (Industrialization and Party Bureaucracy in the Soviet Union: A Social-Historical Essay on the Beginning Phase of Stalinism).

A contrasting approach is that of the Romanian dissident sociologist Pavel Campeanu in *The Genesis of the Stalinist Social Order,* the third book of his trilogy on Stalinism (it follows *The Syncretic Society* and *The Origins of Stalinism*), which aims at a highly abstract synthesis of the totalitarian model and the Marxian theory of property (Stalinism as a monopoly over property in the hands of a "supreme entity").

For a long time, the conventional wisdom about Stalin's "revolution from above" in the early 1930's held that Stalin's dictates, although harsh and cruel, were forward-looking and effective in forcing the Soviet Union to modernize and construct the economic base for victory in modern war and for superpower status thereafter. This view, perhaps illustrated most famously in the works of Isaac Deutscher, is being overwhelmed by events, as *glasnost'* under Mikhail Gorbachev reveals how hidebound, inefficient, and impoverished was the Stalinist system that the reformers have inherited. At the same time, the notion of the brutal efficacy of Stalinism is being undermined by the new international wave of careful historical scholarship addressing the critical years of the 1930's. In its progress toward a truer appreciation of early Stalinist events, this scholarship seems to be moving away from facile generalizations about national needs and ideological imperatives, to a recognition of the chaotic character of these events and the often irrational response to them on the part of both the leaders and the led.

ONE of the inevitable difficulties in reconstructing any historical episode is to avoid reading our knowledge of subsequent outcomes into the history of earlier events. This hazard has been particularly apparent in the interpretation of the origins of Stalinism, which became a serious subject of study only after the purges, World War II, and the Cold War had intervened. It is all too easy to see Stalin's earlier moves as calculated steps in the creation of his ultimate despotism, and to attribute to him in the early stages of this grand design more personal power and discretion than he actually disposed of at the time.

The salient virtues of the new studies on Stalinism are that they depict the scene close up and let contemporary documents speak for themselves. They thereby highlight how tentative was Stalin's personal power and the direction of his program, up until the purges. The picture of Stalin that emerges is one of a shrewd opportunist, in the strictest sense of the word, who waited for opportunities to arise that he could exploit to embarrass his political opponents and attack the people he hated. Such episodes are legion. Note, for example, Stalin's maneuvers against the Left and Right oppositionists recounted by Reiman, his exploitation of the 1928 Shakhty sabotage case to work out the technique of the show trial, his orchestration of the murder of Sergey Kirov (as shown convincingly by Conquest) after the designs of a freely-acting assassin had been detected, and his utilization of the Kirov murder as a pretext to launch the ever-widening circle of purges that followed.

This picture confirms that Stalin did not have a master plan governing each step he took, however much the descent of the Soviet system into tyranny made things appear that way. He did, nevertheless, ultimately manifest a set of personal attributes that must have been working all along. His character —"nasty, suspicious, cruel, and power-hungry," in Medvedev's words—made for both political success and despotic use of the power that he had thereby acquired.

Robert McNeal set himself the task of trying to figure out what Stalin's conscious aims actually were and, like other recent authors, showed in the process how much could be learned from the careful use of published sources, even in the Soviet context. If the view of Stalin as a madman or a traitor to socialism is "revisionist," then McNeal is the "post-revisionist," for whom Stalin meant what he said and acted accordingly. McNeal portrays Stalin as a man who continued to believe in the Revolution, the Proletariat, and the Class Struggle, and swung his political weight in this direction when he felt an upsurge of radical sentiment among party members, workers, and the intelligentsia in 1928 and 1929. If McNeal is right, until 1935–36 Stalin was still feeling his way toward the program that would most enhance his own power, encouraging the zealots in every area but calling them back (as in his well-known "Dizziness from Success" statement about collectivization in 1930) when disorder loomed. In McNeal's view, the revolution of the First Five-Year Plan was

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more a revolution from below than from above, a genuine resumption of Lenin's revolution after the hiatus of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

McNeal's picture of a Stalin guided less by a master plan than by the momentum of old attitudes and the opportunities of the immediate situation is underscored by the work of Michal Reiman. Reiman situates Stalin's rise in the confluence of four short-term crises in 1927 that disrupted the Soviet Union of the NEP era: the political crisis over the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition, the economic crisis triggered by overambitious investment plans, the international crisis centered around the rupture of relations with Great Britain (which ruled out easing the economic crisis through foreign credits), and the resulting social crisis of urban unrest and peasant resistance. In his view, Stalinism is explicable neither as an individual aberration nor as the application of genuine socialist ideas. Rather, it "evolved as a special kind of instrument or means of finding a way out of this crisis" (p. 115). More rational paths had been closed off, Reiman believes, by the angry and violent legacy of the "plebian revolution" of 1917 in which "all traditional standards of human communal existence, the entire previous scale of values, had been destroyed" (pp. 116–17). Reiman's views are close to the argument of Robert C. Tucker, that Stalin embodied the "culture of War Communism," as he and his like-minded followers revived the spirit of the Civil War and the crusade against the class enemy.[1] Campeanu makes almost the same point in characterizing Stalinism as the outcome of an "anticipatory revolution" that destroyed more than it could replace (p. 5).

The close-up, "microhistorical" studies of Kuromiya, Benvenuti, and Schröder on Stalin's industrialization drive lend strong support to this appraisal. The Five-Year Plans have widely been regarded (in the works of Deutscher, E. H. Carr, and many others) as a rational and effective answer, though not necessarily the sole or most cost-effective one, to the challenge of carrying Russia's modernization through to completion. The means chosen, in this view, were consistent with Russia's tradition of reform rammed through by the autocracy. Yet seen close up, the industrialization effort does not appear quite so rational or nearly so effective. During years of the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1929–32 and 1933–37), Stalin and his leading lieutenants (notably Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and Andrey Zhdanov) appear—at least off and on—more interested in fighting the class war again than in effectively building the economy.

The crucial question, then, was one of the attitude of the authorities toward management and engineering skills, upon which every industrialization effort must rely. To say the least, the position of the Communist leadership regarding scientists, engineers, and managers was highly ambivalent. Stalin would cry that "technology decides everything" or that "cadres decide everything," at the same time that he would harass the experts and stage show trials of "saboteurs"—the Shakhty trial, the "Industrial Party" trial in 1930, the trial of a team of surviving Mensheviks, including the country's best economists, in 1931, and the Metro-Vickers trial (of British engineers) in 1933. As Medvedev stresses, Stalin really did have a measure of support from below for his assault on the technical intelligentsia; McNeal and Schröder concur. Again and again, industrial workers were stirred up against the managers. Benvenuti finds that the much-touted emphasis on scientific management, including Taylorism and functional organization in the factory, was brushed aside in practice as an impediment to the exercise of authority from above. Instead, reliance was put on enthusiasm, discipline, and heroic bursts of effort, exemplified in the shock worker and Stakhanovite movements.

STALINISM'S great claim to contemporary fame, a proposition that long continued to figure as a self-evident historical assumption, was the preeminent virtue of economic planning, in contrast to the capitalist scene of chaos and depression. It is now becoming clear that under the guise of planning Stalin really instituted an economy of military command and political frenzy. Thanks mainly to the former Menshevik economists serving in Gosplan and other institutions, Soviet Russia was developing a serious science of economic planning during the years of the NEP. As the late Alexander Erlich showed years ago,[2] the great "industrialization controversy" between the go-fast Trotskyists and the go-slow Bukharinists had resulted in a compromise by 1927, although by that time the Trotskyist side was at the point of political extinction. Stalin's adversaries in the Right Opposition were not against planning—quite the contrary: they were against unrealistic and irrational schemes of a Soviet "great leap forward" that were not truly based on genuine economic planning.

The political circumstances of the

[1]Cf. Robert C. Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution from Above," in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation*, New York, Norton, 1977.

[2]Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924–1928*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960.

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adoption of the First Five-Year Plan and the forced collectivization are very revealing in this regard. Stalin, up to 1928 a follower of Bukharin in economics, discovered in the course of dealing with the grain problem and the Shakhty affair that by shifting to a more radical line he could force the Bukharin group into opposition and then liquidate this last obstacle to his own power. Going far beyond the position of the 15th Party Congress in 1927, he used the Supreme Economic Council, where his own man Valerian Kuibyshev was in charge, to outdo the experts of Gosplan in the preparation of more and more ambitious drafts of the Five-Year Plan. Every time the Bukharin group and Gosplan tried to compromise, he raised the stakes. These maneuvers provoked Bukharin's prophetic warning: "The overstraining in capital expenditure will ultimately *retard the speed of development.*"[3] (In fact, as Reiman shows, overstraining was already causing economic disruption.) When the Five-Year Plan was approved by the 16th Party Conference (April 1929) and the Congress of Soviets (May 1929), it was adopted in its optimal variant only—assuming the best as regards the harvest and world prices—and it was back-dated to include the accounting year that had begun in October 1928. (With the declaration at the end of 1932 that the Five-Year Plan had been "fulfilled in four years," the plan had officially been in effect for only three years and eight months.)

The history of the Five-Year Plan testifies to the economically irrational though politically expedient nature of Stalin's major policy decisions, guided by the slogan: "There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot capture." Here was the psychology of the revolutionary underground and civil war. Under Stalin, true economic planning gave way to propaganda campaigns to increase effort and enthusiasm, as though trying harder would compensate for shortages of resources. When shortfalls inevitably appeared, Stalin would intervene with frantic decrees, all enhancing the priority of heavy industry. In effect he was altering an unrealizable plan in mid-stream, while blaming shortfalls in any sector of the economy on wreckers and saboteurs.

The new studies of the First Five-Year Plan era under review here reveal that Stalin's military-political approach to industrialization not only failed to achieve the planned targets, but was an absolute detriment to economic growth. Thus we have in human terms a support and explanation for the conclusions statistically demonstrated by economists such as Holland Hunter and James Millar: the shocks of the First Five-Year Plan actually left the country behind where it would have been had the modified NEP line of 1927 been allowed to continue.[4] The command methods and high tempo demands of the Plan in practice meant colossal waste, inefficiency, and the collapse of quality in the face of the demand to fulfill quantitative targets. Managers were incompetent, engineers were terrorized, workers drifted from job to job. Attempts at scientific management gave way to work styles seemingly grounded in the peasant experience: furious effort at times and on certain projects, as in the Stakhanovite movement and in the "shturmovshchina" at the end of every plan period, but otherwise a totally uneconomic approach to time, productivity, and efficiency at the macro level and over the long haul, and no rational calculation of the effectiveness of capital investments.

In agriculture, of course, the scene was much worse than in industry. Collectivization and dekulakization had such a depressing effect on that sector as a whole that it failed even to serve as an object of economic exploitation to support industry, as the Trotskyists had proposed. Consequently, the main source of economic accumulation for the Plan had to be the urban population and the industrial workers, at the price of an abruptly depressed standard of living. Overall, thanks to the waste and disorganization in industry and the murderous onslaught against the peasants, it can now be said with confidence that the Soviet Union was less prepared for war when it came, in terms of materiel and morale, than it would have been if the Five-Year Plans and collectivization had never been attempted.

If the revolution from above turned out to be so deleterious to the Soviet economy, could not the Bolsheviks have turned to a more sagacious alternative? Could not the NEP itself have been continued, perhaps with gradual modification, if the Bukharin group had been victorious in the power struggle? In economic terms, modification of the NEP would undoubtedly have been a more rational approach. But the political fact is that Bukharin lost, in part, as Reiman shows, because the NEP was experiencing a crisis. Perhaps the crisis was not a fatal one for the economic line of the 1920's, but politically it spelled the end for the exponents of that line.

IT IS commonly suggested today, in the light of Gorbachev's frustrations with the Soviet economy, that "Marxism has failed," or that "Marx-

[3]N. I. Bukharin, "Notes of an Economist," *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1928. Bukharin's emphasis.

[4]See James R. Millar, "Ambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan," *Slavic Review* (Seattle, WA), June 1973; "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan," ibid., December 1974.

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ism-Leninism" has failed. These notions presume that Stalinism and its legacy represented the direct application of those doctrines, and that they are explicable in those terms. The detailed study of the 1930's, represented by the works reviewed here, shows that although the class-war spirit of Marx and Lenin was still alive at the time, the key economic decisions were shaped much more by the personalities and politics of the moment. It credits Stalin with too much intellectual seriousness—and too little Machiavellian maneuver—to suggest that he was really guided by Marxian theory. Indeed, he was opposed by practically every serious Marxist who ever encountered him. We can only say that some of his instincts paralleled Marxism and made it convenient for him to retain the Marxist language, above all with regard to the class struggle. But his ultimate perversion of doctrine, as Soviet writers now stress, was the bizarre notion serving to legitimize the purges, that the class enemy's resistance becomes more fierce the closer he comes to extinction.

Stalin was not a genuine revolutionary, certainly he did not play that role by the time he achieved personal rule. He was a manipulator of revolutionary traditions and sentiments, for the purpose of increasing his own power and destroying those he resented and hated. He willingly synthesized the revolution and the Old Regime, and eagerly grasped the opportunity to impress himself upon history by choosing the worst from both traditions. Thus he fashioned the unique structure of totalitarianism, with a paradoxical economic foundation, seemingly dynamic, but ultimately operating, as Soviet theorists led by Tat'yana Zaslavskaya and Anatoliy Butenko now style it, as the "braking mechanism."

Does it make sense to compare Stalin's "revolution from above" with Mao Zedong's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China? The similarities have led some Sovietologists, Sheila Fitzpatrick for example, to make the parallel explicit.[5] With the new light being shed on the first phase of the Stalinist transformation by works such as those reviewed here, the comparison gains even more substance. Both the Chinese and Russian revolutions, having destroyed (or declassed) the bourgeoisie and landlords of the old order, seem to have been driven (or at least led) to resume the class struggle against the new elite of administrators and experts that emerged to run the post-revolutionary society. In this renewed class struggle, Mao differed from Stalin only in degree: he was more utopian than Stalin, more extreme, and more successful in mobilizing an autonomous popular movement against the bureaucracy.

The Stalin-Mao parallel continues in the unspoken realization in both regimes that the renewed social conflict they had unleashed was getting out of hand. The steps then taken—in China beginning within a year after the Red Guards were first unleashed in 1966, in the Soviet Union from 1931 on (in agriculture, after the famine of 1932–33)—were aimed at restoring authority, discipline, and the role of the experts. Sheila Fitzpatrick's time frame —1928 to 1931—accurately defines the reversal of direction in the Soviet instance. In their subsequent years, of course, the Soviet and Chinese cases diverged totally: Stalin followed up his efforts at social stabilization with his devastating purges of the whole administrative apparatus, whereas in China (as this reviewer observed during a visit in the early 1980's) the sequel to the Cultural Revolution was as if Stalin's purge victims had come back to life and resumed running the system.

The marked change in the character and direction of Stalin's Revolution from Above that occurred after 1931 seems to have been overlooked or underplayed by most writers on the general phenomenon of Stalinism, though it figures clearly in monographic studies on that era. Kuromiya, Benvenuti, and Schröder all recognize this change, expressed in economics in a partial return to monetary accounting, *khozraschet*, greater inequality in pay, and more authority for the managerial hierarchy. Possibly the contrast of chaotic class struggle in the earlier phase of the upheaval, and the search for some basis of order thereafter, helps explain the divergent views of Stalinism, as essentially revolutionary or essentially counterrevolutionary. Upon closer scrutiny, we can observe a distinct shift from the one to the other.

THE idea is an old and familiar one, especially on the non-Communist or ex-Communist Left, that Stalin was the gravedigger of the revolution, who betrayed socialism and the Leninist heritage. Roy Medvedev calls the Stalinist system "barracks pseudo-socialism" (p. 859). Reiman and Campeanu in particular second this view. Reiman terms it "an all-embracing totalitarianism. . . , a system of violent suppression of all contradictions in society" (p. 120), and Campeanu refers to a "suprastate monopoly" governing "a society stripped of every vestige of real ownership of the means of production" (pp. 87, 46). All three embody the tradition, going back to Trotsky and his many polemics against Stalin published in his years of exile, that regards Stalinism as "Soviet Bonapartism,"

[5]See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1978.

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a power not representing the working class but standing above all classes.

Seen from the perspective of the comparative history of revolutions, this analogy is quite compelling. I have proposed elsewhere the concept of a "postrevolutionary dictatorship," naturally following the fanaticism of the genuine revolutionary era, when a broken society invites the consolidation of new authority by an opportunist egomaniac prepared to synthesize suitable elements of the revolution and of the Old Regime.[6] Given 20th-century means of coercion and persuasion at its disposal, this "Bonapartism" or postrevolutionary dictatorship takes the form of totalitarianism, whether its ideological rationale stems from the Left or the Right. So, *mutatis mutandis,* Stalinism, a particular amalgam of rhetoric, old political habits, and warped modernization, corresponds visibly with the "Bonapartist" phase in the history of other revolutions.

The type of society that Stalinism produced differed dramatically from the Marxist vision of a proletarian dictatorship. A familiar interpretation of Stalinist society is the theory of the "New Class" which Milovan Djilas popularized,[7] though the Trotskyists, particularly Khristian Rakovskiy, had originated it in the early 1930's. This conception of Soviet society as being ruled by a new bureaucratic class was a brilliant response to the quandary Marxists found themselves in when they tried to account for a system that was obviously no longer dominated by either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. The argument that the natural outcome of anticapitalist revolution—or evolution—in a technological era is to supplant the property-owning bourgeoisie with the meritocracy of experts and organizers as the ruling class has an intriguing logic to it. Trotsky's erstwhile American follower, James Burnham, made this idea the basis of his theory of the "managerial revolution,"[8] applicable to Communism, Nazism, and capitalism alike.

The actual picture of postrevolutionary Stalinist society, however, was much less simple. Detailed investigation of Stalin's record in economic matters ("policy" would dignify it too much) seriously calls into question the notion of Stalin as the representative of a bureaucratic or meritocratic ruling stratum. There is too much evidence of class war against the experts, systematic in the first phase of the Revolution from Above, and continuing by fits and starts, as Benvenuti shows, until the convulsion of the Yezhovshchina. Campeanu rests his whole theory on the proposition that the bureaucracy as much as the workers and peasants was the subject of the autocrat—a model that recalls the old "statist school" of Russian history-writing in the 19th century. Clearly the nascent meritocracy of the 1930's was more the victim of class struggle than a ruling class in itself, until it had been thoroughly humbled, terrorized, and extensively restaffed with young apparatchiki newly risen from the proletariat and mentally compatible with Stalin's values.

A better way to conceive of the Soviet class structure derives from the distinction offered by Svetozar Stojanović of the University of Belgrade (with traces going back to Antonio Gramsci) between the "ruling class" and the "dominant class," the latter being the social force that distinguishes the social system and keeps it running, though it may not enjoy actual political power.[9] In this sense the meritocracy—the intelligentsia as broadly conceived in Soviet parlance—became the dominant class, without whose services the system could not function. But the ruling class, recruited in the 1930's among the workers (whose fathers or grandfathers had been peasants) and restaffed in the course of the purges, was and has remained profoundly threatened, jealous, and antagonistic toward the dominant class, the meritocracy that it could not do without. Thus Soviet society has suffered until the very recent past from a very high-tension ambivalence of the rulers toward their most valuable human resource.

In these terms, the Gorbachev "revolution" takes on an interesting new aspect. Frustrated by the conservatism of the ruling bureaucratic elite, Gorbachev turned to the "dominant" meritocracy, led by the creative intelligentsia—a personal choice no less decisive than Stalin's choice to fight the same people. In the unprecedented conditions of *glasnost'*, the meritocracy has been able to challenge the old ruling class in the apparatus, and to assert its own claim to rule through a revamped and democratized political structure. It is no accident that in the political upheaval of the spring of 1989, the Soviet intelligentsia finally came into its own.

[6]See Robert V. Daniels, *Is Russia Reformable?*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1988, pp. 89, 59–61; "Stalinism as Postrevolutionary Dictatorship," a paper presented at the Gramsci Institute International Conference on "The Age of Stalinism," in Urbino, Italy (proceedings forthcoming). The parallel has recently been recognized by a Soviet writer, Natan Eidelman, in "Winding up an Epoch of Revolutions," *Moscow News*, July 23, 1989.

[7] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, New York, Praeger, 1957.

[8]James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, New York, John Day, 1941.

[9]Svetozar Stojanovic, "Marxism and Democracy: The Ruling Class or the Dominant Class?" *Praxis International* (London), July 1981.

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The Propagation and Impact of Ideology in the USSR

Jan Feldman

ARCH PUDDINGTON. *Failed Utopias: Methods of Coercion in Communist Regimes*. San Francisco, ICS Press, 1988.

MIKHAIL HELLER. *Cogs in the Wheel: The Formation of Soviet Man*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.

THOMAS REMINGTON. *The Truth of Authority*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.

VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH. *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction*. New York, Praeger, 1986.

VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH. *Soviet Ideologies in the Period of Glasnost*. New York, Praeger, 1988.

IDEOLOGY and reality have met in a head-on collision on the Soviet road to utopia. Of course, the utopian vision suffers less for being postponed than for being announced prematurely. Yet, as communism, like the horizon, keeps fading into the distance as one tries to approach it, it must eventually lose credibility as anything other than an ideal. Nevertheless, as each of the five books under review here demonstrates, ideology has played a crucial role in Soviet society—keeping the idea of communism alive even as the reality resembles the ideal less and less, justifying the political and economic policies of successive leaders, providing a common language and set of values, and helping to legitimize a system that, because it lacks democratic mechanisms for mobilizing popular support, might otherwise have to rely more heavily on coercion in order to maintain itself.

Beyond the evident goal of social control, ideological work in the Soviet Union ultimately seeks to create a "new man," one possessing a special socialist morality. This new man would voluntarily and habitually behave according to socialist values, which would theoretically allow the state, at least in its capacity as an instrument of coercion, to "wither away." The chief characteristics of the new man (whose prototype is the Stakhanovite and the shock-worker) are a willingness to perform unstinting labor without regard to remuneration, a selfless devotion to the motherland, and a subordination of personal interests to those of the state.

The quest for the new man assumes that human nature is malleable and perfectible, almost totally responsive to the environment and unburdened by inborn, or biological determinants of behavior. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) takes as one of its most important tasks the formation of the new man. It cannot simply be left to people to gradually come to reflect in their values and behavior the changes in social and economic relations wrought by socialism; rather, the state must intervene to shape the new consciousness. Herein lies the special task of ideology as conceived by the Soviet regime.

This conception is only remotely related to Marx's understanding of the nature and role of ideology. According to Marx, ideology is part of the superstructure—a product of intellectual activity that reflects the base, i.e., the mode of production, of a given society. Under capitalism, because of the division between mental and physical labor, ideas reputedly become detached from material reality and, instead of depicting the world as it actually is, portray it in such a way as to legitimize the dominance of the capitalist

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Jan Feldman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont (Burlington). She has published on issues of ideology and society in the Soviet Union and on Soviet defense production and trade in weapons.

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class and convince the workers that capitalism is both desirable and inevitable. This "distorted" picture of reality is what Marx calls "false consciousness."

According to Marx, false consciousness is a peculiar affliction of societies that precede socialism. One of the purported effects of the socialist revolution is to bring perceptions of reality into conformity with material reality. Ideology under socialism takes on a different meaning and role than under previous modes of production. It is supposed to be the simple, straightforward, accurate, and scientific representation of material reality, validated by practice.

It is obvious that ideology in the Soviet Union is not at all what Marx envisioned. Rather, its role has become—like false consciousness under capitalism—to legitimate the existing system. Ideology has become a monopoly of the CPSU, the product of an extensive network of institutions that carefully and deliberately craft and disseminate it. Moreover, whatever persuasiveness it has is a function of its monopoly status rather than of its truth as demonstrated either by practice or because it has won out in a market place of freely competing ideas.

Yet, for all this control, the Soviet leadership seems to have met with, at best, mixed results in forging a completely loyal and submissive citizenry. Many Soviet citizens are well aware of the divergence between the myth of Marxism-Leninism and reality. The Soviet system has bred its own brand of false consciousness, but one that both its purveyors and its targets seem to recognize as such.

The leadership is fully aware of the weaknesses of ideological work, and of the declining impact of stale doctrines on the population, particularly youth. Widespread consumerism, alcoholism, crime, and lack of labor discipline indicate that ideological upbringing (*vospitaniye*) has failed. Yet, each successive leader, including Mikhail Gorbachev, has called for strengthening and rejuvenation of ideological work, and has remained officially optimistic about the possibility of creating a society of new, perfect, communist citizens.

Why maintain the ideal of the new man? Why not simply retreat from goals that cannot be attained? Reflection on this issue should help respond to such fundamental questions about the very nature of the Soviet system as:

(1) Is the USSR a totalitarian state, or does something of a tacit social contract exist between the system and its citizens that lends the regime legitimacy?

(2) How does the system achieve external conformity, if not voluntary allegiance, and what is the role of ideology in this process?

(3) Is there a distinctive Soviet personality? If so, does it accord with the Marxist vision of the new socialist man?

(4) What are the prospects for reforming the Soviet system? If, as many argue, these prospects are dim, how can we explain the tenacity of the system?

The books explored here, although primarily interested in the nature, role, and impact of ideology, also illuminate these fundamental matters. The authors share a certain pessimism about the Soviet Union's ability to change in any meaningful way. They all, to a degree, believe that the system is built on a crumbling foundation of deceit, myth, and the threat of force. All believe that the Soviet citizen is a distinctive product of his/her environment, although not at all what Marx or the CPSU imagined the socialist citizen would be more than seventy years after the revolution.

AMONG the four authors, Arch Puddington occupies the extreme position, perhaps explained in part by the fact that he is the only non-academic in the group and, as a journalist, is accustomed to taking an unabashedly political stance. Puddington's orientation is reflected not only in his extreme paucity of footnotes, almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources and like-minded analysts, and anecdotal approach, but in the strong agenda that is clear even in the very title of his book: *Failed Utopias, Methods of Coercion in Communist Regimes*. He uses the term "totalitarian" to describe the Soviet Union, adopting his distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes from Jeane Kirkpatrick without any further reference to the vast literature on the subject. Similarly, he makes no reference to the extensive literature on utopian thought, or even to the rich literature on the Soviet Union. In short, this work is not particularly scholarly. Yet, although it might be of little value to academics, it does present the interested public with something of an antidote to the current Western love affair with Gorbachev.

Puddington's book also distinguishes itself from the others in that it is not restricted in scope to the Soviet Union, but ranges broadly over the world, on the assumption that all contemporary socialist systems, be they East European or Third World, are spin-offs of a monolithic Soviet model. This approach, of course, overlooks the fact that almost all Third World versions of socialism, while somewhat indebted to the Soviet model for their one-party system, for their attempts to collectivize agriculture, and for their excessive haste to implement a program of industrialization, are actually hybrids combining elements of capitalism

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and socialism in their pursuit of national development.

Puddington rejects the possibility that socialist systems have any willing supporters, except, perhaps, among misinformed and naïve social scientists in the West. He begins with the premise that socialist regimes can only maintain themselves through coercion or brutal repression. They "sovietize unwilling societies" (p. 123) through elaborate mechanisms for controlling the tiniest details of daily life, including indoctrination and re-education; restrictions on the press, religion, and travel; the use of terror, concentration camps, and forced labor. "The basic lesson of Soviet history is," the author states, "that an iron will and a vigilant eye count for much more than the support of the masses" (p. 4).

Despite this basic outlook, Puddington arrives at a somewhat ambiguous view of the citizens of communist states. On the one hand, he claims that the Soviet regime owes its stability to its ruthlessness, that "communism draws strength from its contempt for the popular will" (p. 256), and that it succeeded in subjugating an unwilling and resentful population. On the other hand, he observes that years of communist rule have deformed human nature: "In a way, communism has succeeded in creating a new man, someone who knows the boundaries and accepts the rules. People in communist societies think and act differently from people in democratic societies" (p. 6). Because the Soviet people are so resigned to their fate, Puddington admits, the Soviet state feels secure enough to dispense with harsh methods of repression.

This contradictory view—that the Soviet people are simultaneously slavish and coerced—is common among Western analysts. In a recent book, Walter Laqueur claims that *glasnost'* demonstrates that "the spirit of liberty is not dead in Russia," but at the same time he also asserts that uprooting the authoritarian tradition will require a change in people's nature.[1]

Imagine that a sort of "social contract" does exist between the Soviet people and their government. It may be the case that only a slavish people would regard the contract as salutary, but it appears that many Soviet people are content with a paternalistic state that meets their basic needs. Perhaps the very existence of this sort of a social contract helps explain why Gorbachev is encountering so much resistance to *perestroyka* among the workers who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of reform.

Sharing Puddington's contempt for this mentality, party theoretician Aleksandr Tsipko blames the socialist system for stifling the initiative of Soviet workers by treating them like children and relieving them of responsibility for their actions. The result is that a large part of the population not only has become passive but has a stake in maintaining the status quo.[2] The erosion of the traditional security of employment, of the system of fixed prices, and of the relatively egalitarian wage structure is seen as a major betrayal of the contract by many people. As Puddington acknowledges, "communism may have failed in any number of respects, but it has not failed to change the way people think about economic life" (p. 248).

Because Puddington views repressive measures and brutality as a requirement for the functioning of socialism, he must reject the possibility of any genuine reform. To him, socialism "with a human face" is simply a contradiction in terms, and for Western analysts to think otherwise is to engage in dangerous self-deception.

Yet, in spite of this willingness to maintain itself through ruthless measures, Puddington claims, communism is on the decline both in the Soviet Union and world-wide. It is not that the Soviet leaders have lost their stomach for brutality, it is that repression combined with centralization rob the system of the ability to modernize.

MIKHAIL HELLER concludes his book *The Formation of Soviet Man* with the remark that "the fate of mankind depends on an answer to the question: Is it possible to transform human nature?" (p. 263). Indeed, his book does assume that human nature can be changed and that this experiment in social engineering has been not only the primary goal, but one of the most significant "accomplishments" of 70 years of Soviet rule. "From whatever point of view one chooses, Soviet history is, in the final analysis, the history of the formation of Soviet man . . ." (p. 25).

What has been formed is not, however, the self-sacrificing hero with the standardized consciousness enshrined in Soviet literature and official ideology. Yet, neither is he the sinister "new Neanderthaler" of Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. This new man is denatured and passive—permanently "infantalized," to use the author's expression. Heller agrees with Puddington: the psychology of Soviet man *is* different from what came before or what exists elsewhere.

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[1]Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, cited in Marshall D. Shulman, "Beware of Moscow Chic," *The New York Times Book Review*, May 28, 1989, p. 5.

[2]A. Tsipko, "Mankind Cannot Change Its Nature," *Politicheskoye Obrazovaniye* (Moscow), No. 4, 1989, pp. 68–78, discussed in Elizabeth Teague, "Soviet Theoreticians Debate 'The Human Factor'," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 385/89, Aug. 6, 1989, pp. 10–12.

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Heller provides a chilling picture of the effects of ideological education, drawing largely on literary sources. He is indebted to Alexander Zinoviev for the concept of "homo Sovieticus" (the resigned, indifferent, and regimented Soviet citizen), to George Orwell's *1984* and to Yevgeniy Zamyatin's *We* for the concept of anti-utopia, the totalitarian or "unified" state, and to Dostoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor" for his model of how the state goes about stripping humans of their freedom and even making them willing partners in the process.

Although Heller makes a fairly convincing case for why it has been left to fiction writers to take on the task of evaluating the "effect of the ideological steam hammer on the Soviet people"—psychologists and sociologists, he argues, have failed to research the subject (p. 77)—his reliance on literary and artistic sources has its own pitfalls. It is small wonder that his book is full of hyperbole and metaphor. Still, it provides valuable insight into the sometimes subtle and unrecognized instruments used by the regime to shape behavior. These instruments include, in addition to the obvious ones of fear, workplace control, and education, the less obvious "nationalization of time" (i.e., the remolding of human consciousness to measure progress in state-determined temporal terms such as five-year plan targets) and the recasting of language and culture to shape perceptions of the world.

Heller defines totalitarianism as "the union of all vectors (methods of shaping the social environment) for the processing of human material into a single direction—aimed at instilling the conviction that the party is everywhere, that it is everything, and that without it there is nothing" (p. 87). In short, totalitarianism requires the complete subordination of the individual to the state. Clearly, this subjugation can most lastingly be accomplished not through brutal repression but by educating people willingly to identify their interests with those of the state.

Like Puddington, Heller regards as endemic to all socialist regimes the attempt of the Soviet government to regiment every aspect of what had hitherto been private life. He contends that these regimes must attempt to change human nature because of their desire for absolute power. No superficial level of political consent on the part of the masses will do. To that end, the nationalization of culture has yielded a relationship of "co-authorship," which has placed art at the service of the state. Language has come to serve a dual purpose—communication and oppression—akin to that of Orwell's "newspeak." "Marx's statement that 'being determines consciousness' is entirely applicable to the Soviet system if it is agreed that the being, the reality, in which people live is created by language" (p. 254).

The Soviets have officially remained committed to the new man, yet, according to Heller, the ideal has evolved over time. Immediately after the revolution, the new man was conceived of as an active, daring individual, sacrificing everything to the construction of socialism. But ever since Stalin, the new man has been envisioned more and more as a cog in a complex machine, following orders and showing no initiative—the "state's man." People have lost interest in work, and become dependent, passive recipients of government handouts. Their creators are now obliged to meet all of their needs. The Soviet people have become perfectly adapted to the conditions of Soviet life. Thus, Heller argues, the regime no longer needs mass terror.

Whereas Stalin had to deal with the human material in the course of its formation, Gorbachev has to deal with the finished product, and it is clearly not much to his liking. Ironically, the roots of the current Soviet crisis may be found precisely in the "success" of this human experiment.

Ultimately, though, Heller shares the ambivalence of the other authors concerning the success of the attempt to transform human nature. The human material continues to resist. Heller, himself a Soviet émigré, must admit—despite his claim that many Soviet émigrés long for a return to their cog status—that the desire for freedom is not easily squelched.

Prospects for reform of the Soviet system, Heller says, are bleak. He sees no great distinction between Gorbachev and his predecessors. In fact, he draws parallels between the goals and language of Stalin and of Gorbachev. As for Gorbachev's candid revelations of the errors of his predecessors, this attempt to impress the public by speaking a truth that is already well known, simply provides an excuse for the current crisis without implicating the system or suggesting that the disease is endemic. Yet, if the Soviet system is to modernize, it will have to cease to be itself.

Heller shares Puddington's view that the collapse of the Soviet system would be desirable, but he does not suggest that the West take a more active role in hastening the process of collapse, except perhaps by providing the Soviet population access to information. The only way to stop the advance of communism, he argues, is to stop the production of cogs. By breaking the magic circle of secrecy and deception that imprisons the Soviet people, the revolution in international information technology might just disrupt the cog-making process.

THE TITLE of Thomas Remington's

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book, *The Truth of Authority*, is derived from a phrase of Svetozar Stojanović: "the truth of authority replaces the authority of truth." This book, written recently enough to address the changes wrought by Gorbachev, is a valuable addition to the literature on ideology and communication in general, and on the nature and function of Soviet ideology in particular. As a political scientist, Remington has produced a work that is well documented with Soviet and Western sources, accessible to the reading public, and useful to the scholar. Although the approach of social scientists is not entirely free from bias, this work, unlike those by Puddington and Heller, treats the Soviet regime as a true polity, one that—although distinctive in many ways—is not totally different from other polities.

By treating ideological structure as a dynamic political subsystem, Remington recognizes its function for social integration. Accordingly, he is less interested in the content of the message than in investigating the means by which the state maintains itself in power through its ability to draw upon a large proportion of the adult population both as activists disseminating ideology and as audience for it. The book concentrates on two major forms of official ideological work: direct political work carried out by the small cadre of full-time staff officials in the party apparatus responsible for communication and ideology, and the bulk of the mass political work, carried out by a great auxiliary body of part-time speakers and organizers through agitation and propaganda in person and via the print and broadcast media.

Unlike Puddington and Heller, Remington recognizes that ideology is not inflexible or unresponsive to changing political needs and situations. He also does not treat ideology as part of an ambitious plan to transform human nature. Still, he views ideology as an important adjunct of party rule despite its declining impact on the population.

Though one might well wonder how long a system can maintain itself when neither party nor people accept the official world view, the relative longevity of the Soviet regime suggests that the truth of the content may indeed be less important than the structure of its organized dissemination, which relies on members of the managerial and intellectual elite (who often are CPSU members as well) to uphold a set of doctrines and policies that they may not actually believe in. Apparently, much as psychologists understand that role-playing can influence a person's thinking, the Soviets understand the value of enlisting people as purveyors of ideology. In 1985, an estimated 11 million people participated in some fashion as ideological activists, and countless others were subjected to ideological education (p. 54).

Remington finds that "levels of sociopolitical status are closely correlated with incidence of public activism, and that at higher levels of sociopolitical status, activism is likelier to take the form of ideological work" (p. 55). Clearly, recruitment of activists from among the upper echelons reflects the state's interest in extending its influence over society's "opinion leaders."

One might expect, however, that these would be the hardest people to co-opt in that their higher level of education would lead to skepticism if not cynicism about the message and, therefore, to rejection of the activist role. But this does not seem to be the case, at least in terms of what people profess publicly in their professional capacities. In the Soviet Union, career advancement is closely tied to willingness to participate in social rituals. Turning members of the elite into official mouthpieces helps to "preserve political integration among the social elite" (p. 96). It also reduces demands for institutional autonomy.

In spite of the massive organizational resources devoted to ideological education, Remington agrees with the other authors that the inculcation of socialist ideology and values has met with mixed success in the USSR. Although Soviet officials have until very recently been reluctant to carry out public opinion surveys, the leadership has doubtless been aware for years that ideology has become a stale ritual, and that people have become increasingly cynical. The very fact that the leadership nevertheless presses on with massive ideological campaigns supports Remington's contention that ideology continues to play an indispensable role in the Soviet polity.

Remington provides a persuasive discussion of how it is that although Soviet ideology does not represent a coherent or even accurate picture of reality, it can remain an important part of the social and political fabric, and also why even educated and fairly sophisticated people can become, without coercion, vehicles for the transmission of dogmas that they and their audiences do not believe. Moreover, they can be a part of this charade without having been reduced to unthinking cogs. According to Remington, the Soviet people have simply become adept at what he calls "behavioral bilingualism."

Westerners may view this ability as an unhealthy form of cognitive dissonance, but Remington apparently does not believe that this situation amounts to a deformation of human character inconsistent with either happiness or some form of intellectual freedom and dignity. He predicts that the three-way correlation of social or political rank, performance of activist political duties, and regular exposure to courses in

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political theory is likely to continue under the present regime. Gorbachev, no less than his predecessors, needs to preserve political integration among the elite and is making full use of the mighty ideological complex to publicize his goals of restructuring, *glasnost'*, democratization, economic acceleration, and scientific-technological progress.

Focusing on institutional obstacles to change rather than on Gorbachev's personal political attributes or intentions, Remington concludes, as do Puddington and Heller, that Soviet ideology is inherently conservative and creates a real obstacle to reform, specifically to the technological and economic modernization that is most desperately needed. Yet, a dramatic revision of the official ideology would unravel its binding power and lead to a complete breakdown of the structure of political communication on which the regime depends.

IN HIS 1986 book, *Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology,* émigré sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh understands ideology to be a complex, relatively flexible set of doctrines that exists on two levels: the pragmatic, reflecting the realities of material life, and the mythological, which creates abstract values that encourage consensus. Although a noticeable disparity exists between what people say and what they do, Shlapentokh (like Remington) holds that Soviet citizens manage to live fairly comfortably with a complex dual mentality. They have learned how, in Shlapentokh's words, to "decode" official statements. He sees this as typical of the accommodations made by people living in nondemocratic societies.

In analyzing public and party ideology, Shlapentokh defines ideology as "a more or less cohesive system of values and beliefs that defines the primary needs and moral standards of behavior of a society, and that serves to justify or legitimate the existing order of society" (p. 1). This definition draws heavily on the work of Clifford Geertz.[3] The Soviet regime expends great resources and energy on shaping perceptions, and it clearly maintains a jealous monopoly on this capacity. Shlapentokh sees this monopoly as a standard feature of command societies, in which the will to control behavior is not limited to the centralized, planned economy, but manifests itself in every sphere of society, from science to moral education.

The success of this enormous expenditure of resources and energy can be judged limited if we measure success solely by whether the public actually accepts the official propaganda message as valid. But Shlapentokh defines success much as Remington does: despite the declining influence of the official ideology in shaping behavior or even perspectives, what is really required from members of Soviet society, and particularly from its elite, is a measure of acquiescence, even if only the superficial verbal acquiescence of self-seekers, opportunists, social climbers, and careerists. In the Soviet Union, beating the system makes you part of the system.

Although the ideal continues to be the new man, the operation of the Soviet system has proven itself, particularly in the years of Leonid Brezhnev's rule, to be fully compatible with human behavior that is quite antithetical to the ideal. The regime and its citizens seem comfortable, one propagating two visions of reality, the other maintaining a divided mentality that reflects those two perspectives. This, too, is a "social contract."

Shlapentokh shares the judgment of the other authors that an inflexible reliance on mythical views of reality creates a dead weight on the modernization process. He blames the dominant class for peddling a distorted reality in order to maintain its power and interests. This critique is not entirely justified, in that the political elite is as much a *target* as a *purveyor* of ideology.

As Shlapentokh points out, the elaborate, sophisticated, and intricate construction of the subjective world of Soviet citizens is a truly precarious one. Its combination of deception and hypocrisy, which incorporates virtually all members of society in a massive game of role-playing, poisons public morals. Additionally, the detrimental effect of mythology on economic life has long been apparent.

Shlapentokh's discussion raises the question that is implicit in all of the works under discussion: can a regime or an elite really benefit from an ideology that is false, self-defeating, counterproductive, and antithetical to modernization? Shlapentokh answers this riddle indirectly. The official ideology is an obstacle to modernization, but to debunk it would open the door to either radical change or a conservative backlash. The question becomes: which is more threatening to the survival of the regime, reform or maintenance of the status quo?

PUBLISHED in 1988, Shlapentokh's *Soviet Ideologies in the Period of Glasnost* represents both an update and a significant departure from his earlier book. Here Shlapentokh maintains that at any given time, there exist in the USSR several competing ideologies representing the interests of different (though unnamed) constituencies. According to Shlapentokh, a significant reappraisal of ideology is currently

[3]See Clifford Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books, 1973.

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under way in the Soviet Union. This reappraisal, in turn, has caused Shlapentokh to rethink the way he categorizes Soviet ideology.

Socialism in the Soviet Union has been beset by economic problems during the 1970's and 1980's that, according to Shlapentokh, have precipitated widespread public disillusionment with socialism and the rise of competing ideologies —official and unofficial. He proceeds to discuss three official ideologies—two of which he labels dynamic, and one, conservative.[4] The dynamic ideologies are divided into "neo-Stalinist" and "liberal" models; the conservative ideology is associated with Brezhnev's regime. Here, Shlapentokh treats ideological propositions more as sets of policy choices associated with different social and economic consequences than as tools of political legitimation or social control.

The task that Shlapentokh sets for himself in this work is to describe the causes of the economic stagnation, and the various ideological responses to these developments. Here, the author steps boldly into the realm of economic analysis, stating that the main problem with socialist societies is their failure to evaluate and reward economic performance on its merits—the proclivity to promote bad performance, and an inclination toward conformism. In effect, the state has wrongly assumed that it could efficiently allocate resources and control human behavior.

For Shlapentokh, the key to solving the economic crisis lies with the Soviet consumer. Only when the consumer is allowed to pass judgment on the quality of the product, and to reward or punish the producers, can a society avoid stagnation. Although Gorbachev and his advisers recognize the need to enhance the role of material incentives and boost the "human factor," they have not paid sufficient attention to the role of the consumer in evaluating economic performance.

The absence of market pressures and private property is, according to Shlapentokh, a recipe for economic disaster. Of course, were the Soviet Union to institute consumer sovereignty, market mechanisms, and private property, it would cease to be socialist in any meaningful sense of the word. Moreover, as Shlapentokh notes, radical changes of the sort he advocates would cost the leadership its economic, political, and social monopoly.

The selection of a new set of policy choices—a different ideology—raises questions that Shlapentokh neglects, but that would seem to be central to this part of his analysis. How is one ideology among several selected? Is the ideology backed by the strongest constituency, the one most likely to prevail? Is the most practical solution chosen? Or do leaders and their ideologies simply oscillate in some dialectical fashion between pragmatism and orthodoxy?

Clearly, Gorbachev was not selected general secretary on the merits of his *perestroyka* program, because it was almost two years after his selection when he began to state his intentions explicitly. Still, Shlapentokh characterizes Gorbachev's program as an ideological response to the ideological flaws of Brezhnev's rule. The latter's conservative vision of society, his glorification of power, his distrust of the people, and his tolerance of the self-serving, go-slow approach of the bureaucracy were, in turn, an ideological response to the utopianism, "hare-brained schemes," and voluntarism of the Khrushchev ideology.

The two "dynamic" ideologies emerged, according to Shlapentokh, as the only options after the death of Brezhnev. Shlapentokh states that they were adopted sequentially by Gorbachev. At first, the General Secretary revealed himself to be a "neo-Stalinist," when he reacted to the disorder, lack of discipline, and demoralization inherited from the Brezhnev era by attacking corruption and calling for rejuvenation of society.

But Gorbachev evolved (though the impetus behind this evolution is not made clear) in the direction of the "liberal" ideology, which distinguishes itself by blaming the bureaucrats instead of the masses and by advocating social progress. Liberals, unlike the neo-Stalinists, are not hesitant about revealing the flaws of society, although they do not eschew the traditional socialist values or "mythology," and also do not reject the critical role of the party. According to Shlapentokh, Gorbachev is more democratic than Lenin ever was, and should therefore not be identified with him; the current CPSU leader is more like Trotsky in his antipathy for the bureaucracy and more like Bukharin in his promotion of economic decentralization. If one wants to identify the roots of Gorbachev's ideology, one must look to Khrushchev, and, more important, to the West. Shlapentokh trusts that Gorbachev's call for the participation of the masses and the collaboration of the intellectuals is sincere.

But it must be noted that Gorbachev has drawn strict limits to free expression and to the activity of unofficial groups. He has not, contrary to Shlapentokh's claim (p. 162), shown himself to be a supporter of pluralism in the Western sense. The term Gorbachev uses, "socialist pluralism," has a meaning that he

[4]Another, nonideological, consequence of economic decline has been the tendency of Soviet citizens to retreat into the private realm. On this phenomenon, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.

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has been careful to distinguish from the traditional liberal concept. His respect for civil society as the repository of a network of institutions independent of the state is limited to acknowledging the usefulness of these institutions for attacking the bureaucracy and promoting the goals of *perestroyka*. Moreover, he has retained control over the economy and the party, expanding his own role and power—prompting Boris Yel'tsin to charge that Gorbachev is on his way to becoming an autocrat with his own personality cult.

It is puzzling, therefore, why Shlapentokh chooses to characterize Gorbachev's ideology as "liberal" rather than simply pragmatic. Liberalism has a fairly precise meaning, one that Gorbachev seems far from adopting. It includes, for instance, an attachment to inalienable human rights; to the elevation, even sanctification of the individual; to the notion of a social contract between rulers and ruled (which if violated by the former, can be abrogated by the latter); to limited government; to tolerance for a wide variety of interests; and to a clear, law-protected boundary between the private and public realms. By these standards, Gorbachev is hardly a liberal or a democrat. Skhlapentokh's characterization of Gorbachev's ideology as "liberal-authoritative" (see Chapter 8) introduces a contradiction in terms that merely compounds the confusion.

Shlapentokh concludes that the fate of the Soviet Union depends upon which of the three conflicting ideologies emerges as the winner. The factors working against the liberal ideology are several: it is a mixed or inconsistent ideology without roots or real precedent in Soviet history. The premises of classical liberalism are at odds with both Russian tradition and socialist doctrine. Liberalism stresses the primacy of the individual; the sanctity of natural rights; and therefore, limited government. It enshrines competition in a market economy as a means for achieving the common good rather than condemning such competition as destructive of social harmony. The neo-Stalinist ideology, by contrast, is consistent, has a strong constituency (including the bureaucracy), is compatible with the political machinery and with Soviet history, is prepared to resort to repression, and plays to Russian chauvinism.

Shlapentokh arrives at the fairly safe prediction that the Soviet Union will vacillate between periods of neo-Stalinism and of movement toward democracy. It is apparent that opponents, many of them in the Stalinist mold, are waiting in the wings for Gorbachev to slip up. And because stability and change seem to be contradictory concepts to most Soviet leaders, it is unlikely that a given leader will be able to achieve both. Hence the tasks will fall to successive leaders, each attempting to counteract the excesses of his predecessor.

Shlapentokh states in Chapter 4 his intention to evaluate the three ideologies in terms of economic performance. Yet in the end, this concept is left dangling, and it remains unclear whether, or how, Gorbachev's ideology leads him to proceed on this issue. The concepts of consumer sovereignty and economic performance are important ones, but they need to be studied empirically by economists. In the context of the present work, they are not well integrated with the author's treatment of the competition among the three ideologies.

THE AMBITIOUS social experiment that was supposed to yield a glorious new Soviet society based on freedom, the collective pursuit of the common good, and material abundance cannot be judged a success. This experiment, as Arthur Koestler pointed out, was performed upon the living body of a largely unwilling people who have yet to experience their moment of triumph. A "vivisection morality," which treated people as means to an end, was responsible for creating much of the human suffering that it was supposed to alleviate.[5] Even if the end seems a glorious one, and perhaps especially if it is, the builders of the new society are not exonerated when they behave ruthlessly.

Utopian aspirations, though expressing the most optimistic visions and highest ideals of humanity, in practice have proven themselves to be particularly pernicious, largely because in their quest for human perfection, they lose all sympathy for the foibles that afflict us all. Utopias are by nature both idealist and authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, excessive optimism about the flexibility of human nature was combined with the ugliest of repression and contempt for humanity when human beings did not conform to expectations.

Ideology seems to the Soviets better suited than repression to producing lasting changes in human character, because it works on subjective beliefs rather than simply on external behavior. It has, according to all of the authors under review, done its work if its objective has been social control. Whether or not it has transformed human nature, and if so, whether or not the Soviets have gotten what they bargained for, is still a matter for debate.

It would seem that the constant bombardment by ideology has bred a combination of passivity and cynicism. The forced merger of private and state interest has re-

[5]See Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, New York, Macmillan, 1941, p. 128.

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mained artificial and fragile, and instead of fostering public-spiritedness, may have had the opposite effect of promoting a retreat to the private realm.

To date, the failure of the system to respond to the needs of consumers has encouraged a variety of extralegal means for obtaining basic goods—means that, in themselves, place many citizens outside the system as prescribed in Soviet law. While Gorbachev is bent on creating wider latitude for private initiative and providing it with legal and moral legitimacy, the individual is still only encouraged to pursue this self-interest to the extent that personal gain is matched or exceeded by society's gain. The question remains as to whether Gorbachev will recognize that the true foundation of civic virtue may be individual freedom under a government that is bound by law to respect natural rights as ends in themselves.

Recent events in China provide a cautionary tale, demonstrating that there may be a limit to socialist systems' tolerance for reform. China has been attempting to achieve economic reform without parallel political changes. Gorbachev, by contrast, appears to understand that political reform is a prerequisite for economic reform. But it is not clear how far he is prepared, or will be able, to go toward changing the political system in ways supportive of economic change.

Another lesson provided by China's recent turmoil is the capacity of what had been perceived as a moderate socialist regime to bare its teeth. Repression, the alternative to reform, is always at the ready. China lacked any precedent for the army's turning on its own people, but in the Soviet Union, the precedent exists. The possibility of an unrestrained and brutal official backlash in the Soviet Union cannot, therefore, be dismissed.

But the final lesson from China, which pertains as well to the Soviet Union, has to do with the resilience of the human spirit. It would seem that the urge for freedom and democracy is not easily squelched even among people who have never experienced these rights firsthand.

We can thank all the authors for their astute observations about the power of ideology to shape perceptions and behavior, and about the dangers associated with regimes that use ideology as a tool for social control and the transformation of human nature. But perhaps we can draw some comfort from Ilya Ehrenburg, who expressed reservations about the ability of the state ever to fully control humans: "Our contemporaries know exactly what orbit a satellite launched into the cosmos will take. But we do not yet know the orbits human emotions and actions will follow."[6]

[6]Ilya Ehrenburg, *Lyudi, gody, zhizn'* (People, Years, Life), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Khudozhestvennaya Literatura," 1967, p. 437, cited in Abraham A. Kreusler, *Contemporary Education and Moral Upbringing in the Soviet Union,* Ann Arbor, MI, University Microfilms International, 1976, p. 229.

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Education and Cultural Transfer in China

C. Montgomery Broaded

RUTH HAYHOE, Ed. *Contemporary Chinese Education.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1984.

LINDA A. REED. *Education in the People's Republic of China and US-China Educational Exchanges.* Washington, DC, National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1988.

RUTH HAYHOE and MARIANNE BASTID, Eds. *China's Education and the Industrialized World.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

RUTH HAYHOE. *China's Universities and the Open Door.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1989.

IF NOT Chinese education, then at least Chinese students have received a lot of press recently. The massive demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities in April and May of 1989, the government's military assault on student protesters in Tiananmen Square and its environs in early June, and the subsequent widespread repression have focused a great deal of attention on China and the growing demands for political reform in that country.

In the short run, it is difficult to predict how China's various social and political currents will play themselves out. But the books about Chinese education and China's educational relations with other countries under review provide a wealth of empirical data and a number of insightful analyses that can help clarify some of the issues involved in the current social and political unrest in China. In addition to their stated concerns about inflation and official corruption, for example, it is clear that the difficult material conditions under which Chinese college students live and the uncertainty they face in the state job-allocation system played a role in predisposing them to participate in the "pro-democracy" demonstrations. It is also clear that many of the student activists hoped to bring about a fundamental transformation in the relationship of the Chinese Communist Party to the rest of Chinese society.

THE FIRST of the two edited volumes by Ruth Hayhoe under review, *Contemporary Chinese Education,* is by now well known and deservedly well regarded among scholars interested in all aspects of Chinese education. It is perhaps the best collection of essays to provide a broad, descriptive overview of Chinese education in the period since Mao's death and the purge of the "Gang of Four" in late 1976.

The volume is organized in a straightforward manner. Introductory essays by Brian Holmes on general issues in the field of comparative education and by Hayhoe on the evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions are followed by an orderly progression up the educational ladder, from primary and secondary schooling to higher education, teacher training, and adult education. Hayhoe completes the volume with a discussion of Chinese scholarly exchanges with the West since 1977 and an assessment of their implications for Chinese education.

Of the books examined here, *Contemporary Chinese Education* focuses most fully on the structure and dynamics of the Chinese education system itself and its connections with the rest of Chinese society. (The other three volumes deal primarily with aspects of China's historical and contemporary educational relations with the industrialized countries of the West and Ja-

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C. Montgomery Broaded is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Coordinator of Chinese Studies at the University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA). He has published on Chinese education and was in China from mid-May until shortly after the Tiananmen massacre.

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pan.) Written in 1983, the essays in this volume reflect some of the considerable optimism among Chinese educators and other intellectuals in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Yet, they also point clearly to some of the structural problems that led scholars to conclude that China faced a crisis in education in the late 1980's.

The theme of educational opportunity and occupational mobility can serve as an example of these problems, because it runs through a number of the chapters. Where students and their families see little connection between schooling and jobs, demand for education is low and drop-out rates are high. Treating primary education, Billie L. C. Lo points out that the household production responsibility system[1] in the countryside reduces parents' incentives to send their children to school, and the problem is compounded by rural schools' commitment to provide the same academic curriculum as urban schools. Because rural schools can generally provide only a very watered-down version of the urban curriculum, rural children are at an extreme disadvantage in the competition—increasingly mediated by standardized examinations—for advancement up the educational ladder. For the vast majority of rural children, primary schooling is terminal. Rather than trying to compete with urban education, Lo argues, the curriculum of rural schools should be altered to reflect the roles in agricultural production that almost all rural children will occupy once they enter the workforce.

This proposal for what we might call terminal agri-vocational schooling in the countryside may have some appeal from an economic planning perspective, but it ignores social and political realities that make its implementation extremely difficult, if not impossible. The most serious impediment is that both rural parents (and rural cadres in particular) and the central political authorities are strongly wedded to the notion that education should be a channel for mobility into the state-bureaucratic and/or urban sectors of the occupational structure. To adopt a terminal, agri-vocational curriculum in rural schools, and thus openly and completely to foreclose the opportunity for an escape from a lifetime of agricultural labor (no matter how small the actual chances for such an escape are), would result in large declines in rural enrollments, significant morale problems among rural cadres, and a further erosion of the legitimacy of the central political authorities. Thus, the Chinese seem quite likely to maintain the "dual-track" education system of state-supported urban schools and locally-run (*minban*), part-work schools in the countryside, while continuing to claim that able students in both tracks have a genuine opportunity for educational advancement.

Similar problems exist at the secondary level, as Stanley Rosen points out in his very insightful chapter. The reestablishment of a system of key schools to prepare the most able students for higher levels of education has had the unintended consequence of reducing incentives to study for urban young people assigned to non-key secondary schools. Drop-out rates are high and disciplinary problems common among those urban students who have lost hope that they will be able to continue up the educational ladder.

A related problem concerns the balance between general (college preparatory) and vocational secondary schools. Many unrealizable hopes are raised under conditions of rapid expansion of upper secondary schooling, while the number of college and university students is kept relatively low.

In fact this problem is characteristic of the Chinese education system as a whole, as is shown by a particularly interesting chart in Linda Reed's *Education in the People's Republic of China and US-China Educational Exchanges*.[2] The chart, "PRC Education Track (1985)," (p. 61), listing the major levels of the Chinese educational system and the number of students enrolled at each level, portrays the tremendous narrowing of opportunity for formal schooling at each successive level of the system. We see that more than three times as many students are enrolled at the primary level as at the lower secondary level, and that the number of junior middle school students is more than five times that of regular (as opposed to vocational) senior middle school students. This narrowing is maintained in the transition from the secondary to the tertiary level, so that college and university students in China comprise only 1–2 percent of that age cohort in China.

The post-Mao leadership's response to one aspect of this prob-

[1]In the household production responsibility system (*baogan*), families cultivate a plot of land for up to 15 years and deliver a fixed quantity of output to state procurement organs. The household is able to keep or market the excess after its obligations have been met.

[2]This work is a practical rather than a scholarly book, explicitly oriented to the needs of professionals in the field of international education and to the needs of institutions and faculty members involved in educational exchange programs with China. The book offers a brief overview of China's educational transformation over the past century; describes the structure of the current education system and the flow of students through the system; reviews educational exchanges between the United States and China in the past decade; and offers a wealth of nuts-and-bolts information and advice for foreign-student-affairs professionals (admissions officers, advisers, and others) who work with Chinese students and scholars in the United States on a daily basis.

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lem has been to try to reduce the number of general secondary students, while increasing the number of students in vocational schools. This goal has not been easy to accomplish, however, in part because of popular demands for access to higher-status general education.

AMONG the most significant political decisions of the post-Mao leadership was the reaffirmation and considerable expansion of initiatives begun in the early 1970's to re-involve China in the international community diplomatically, intellectually, and economically. In education, the open-door policy resulted in a diverse and rapidly growing range of international educational exchange activities. The nature of China's educational relations with the industrialized nations of Japan and the West and the possible consequences of these exchanges, all examined against a rich historical background, form the subject of *China's Education and the Industrialized World,* edited by Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid.

The work succeeds admirably in most of its aims. An incisive introductory chapter by Bastid maps out the territory and raises some of the central issues involved in the study of cultural and educational interactions between China and a number of foreign countries. Subsequent chapters treat relations between China and specific countries of the industrialized West and Japan, and are arranged chronologically according to the period of each country's greatest involvement with China. Thus, we move from the Jesuits of the 17th and 18th centuries to the involvement of the British in the 19th century, and the Japanese, the North Americans, and the West Europeans in the first half of the 20th century. Soviet influences of the 1950's (and beyond) are assessed in complementary chapters by long-time observers R. F. Price and Leo Orleans. The final three chapters are devoted to China's contemporary (post-1977) educational relations with other countries.

One of the central themes of the book is the balance between foreign efforts at cultural penetration into China on the one hand, and active Chinese efforts to absorb selective aspects of Western knowledge and educational patterns on the other. Representatives of the West, whether of a religious, diplomatic, or commercial stripe, were of course unwelcome suitors in China during much of the period under discussion in this volume. But much of what they had to offer, the Chinese had no particular desire to receive, and it was only through the use or threat of force that China was "opened" to Western influences. Despite their guaranteed access, for example, Western missionaries soon found that direct efforts at evangelization resulted in few converts; they increasingly turned to the establishment of schools and colleges with secular educational content (sometimes of a "modern" sort and sometimes not) in order to attract students, with the hope that Christian values and beliefs could be spread indirectly. Active efforts at religious penetration were blunted by Chinese indifference, and missionary groups had to accommodate their efforts to the interests of the people they were trying to influence. Various foreign efforts at cultural or educational penetration are portrayed as most successful when they were substantially informed by a recognition of Chinese needs and, in the most positive cases, by direct Chinese participation in the formulation of the goals of cultural transfer activities.

Several of the authors in this volume point out the very active role of successive Chinese governments—once the necessity of educational change was recognized—in seeking information about foreign education. Bastid concludes that from 1895 to 1925, the Chinese engaged in a coherent national program of educational borrowing "in no way imposed by foreign powers. . . . Rather, [the foreign models] were desired and sought after by the Chinese on their own initiative" (p. 10). As the Chinese searched for appropriate foreign ideas for the reform of their educational system, they turned first to Japan, as very clearly described by Hiroshi Abe, and later to the progressivism of John Dewey and the American educational model, which is discussed by Hubert Brown.

An interesting parallel emerges in the selection of the Japanese system for emulation in the early years of the 20th century and the Soviet system in the 1950's. In both cases, ideological affinities (Confucianism in the former case, and Marxism-Leninism in the latter) provided a basis of presumed value-consensus, and in both cases the educational system selected for emulation was viewed as already having successfully assimilated the scientific and technical knowledge of the industrialized West.

Although *China's Education and the Industrialized World* succeeds in most of the goals it sets for itself, in one respect it leaves something to be desired. In the preface, Hayhoe states that the chapters drew on dependency theory "to test the view that educational transfers have been used to consolidate political domination and economic exploitation between developed and developing countries by a careful look at China's historical experience with Japan and the Soviet Union, as well as with Western industrialized powers" (p. vii). However, with the exception of Hayhoe and possibly Bastid, none of the authors appears to take dependency

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theory particularly seriously. Some of their discussions, to be sure, implicitly reject the formulation provided in the preface; and Hayhoe returns briefly to the issue in her concluding chapter, where she argues that despite some clear instances of foreign influence, internal conditions and events were always the decisive factors in the development of China's educational system. But the volume does not contain a systematic attempt to conceptualize educational systems using dependency theory. Nor do the authors attempt to derive testable hypotheses from dependency theory or to specify what kinds of evidence might be relevant in assessing the applicability of dependency theory to Chinese education.

This objection aside, *China's Education and the Industrialized World* contains a wealth of empirical data and many valuable insights on the general phenomenon of cultural transfer. Hayhoe's excellent bibliography also deserves mention as a useful research tool.

THE WORK individually authored by Hayhoe, *China's Universities and the Open Door,* represents the culmination of several years of research and writing on the interrelated topics of the evolution of modern Chinese educational institutions; China's historical and contemporary educational relations with other countries; and the implications of those relations for Chinese education, for Chinese society, and for the role that knowledge plays in the contemporary world order. The book focuses on higher education, and is an empirical tour de force in the amount of information it brings together. The first half of the book deals primarily with China's internal educational developments, while the second half is devoted to issues of China's reinvolvement in the world community.

Hayhoe draws on strands from the critical educational theories of British, French, and German sociologists and social philosophers[3] to focus attention on what she calls the "knowledge issue"—how knowledge as such is defined and categorized in society, and the connections between knowledge structures and power relations both within and among societies.

Hayhoe's discussion throughout is informed by her conception of a "fundamental contradiction" that has characterized Chinese education since the late Qing period. Knowledge in traditional China, she argues, was clearly hierarchically structured, with Confucian, moral-political content enjoying the greatest prestige and being closely intertwined with the exercise of political power. However, since the late 19th century, education has increasingly been called upon to serve not only the interests of political control (for which authoritarian Confucian knowledge patterns are appropriate), but also to serve economic development and military modernization. Successive governments have all wanted China's education system to contribute to the rapid modernization of society, but they have been unwilling to accept the democratizing implications that a transformation of traditional knowledge patterns entails.

Surely, the Chinese education system's renewed openness to Western ideas and models since the death of Mao contributed to the emergence of the pro-democracy forces beginning in the late 1970's. As in the past, this openness was dictated by China's need to catch up with the advanced industrial countries. But the Democracy Wall movement in 1978–79, the student demonstrations of 1985 and 1986–87, and of course the student occupation of Tiananmen Square in spring 1989 demonstrate the difficulty of absorbing only those aspects of Western curricula and educational patterns viewed as useful by the regime's leaders.

From their contacts with Western scholars and knowledge patterns, Chinese intellectuals understandably draw conclusions that are congenial to their own interests and structural position in Chinese society. Consequently, they have an elective affinity for Western ideologies that invest expertise acquired through higher education with considerable authority and prestige. And this perspective, of course, ultimately threatens the CCP's hold on power.

Several aspects of Hayhoe's discussion seem particularly valuable. For example, in Chapter 2, she provides a stimulating discussion of the prestige hierarchy occupied by the various fields of knowledge that was established in the 1950's, when China engaged in extensive borrowing of higher educational patterns from the Soviet Union. Hayhoe found that although political science and law, and finance and management had the lowest enrollments, they provided access to the most influential positions in the bureaucracy. The important role of People's University, the final authority in the fields of politics, law, and economics, also emerges clearly from Hayhoe's analysis. She concludes that in the post-1978 period a "gradual transformation toward a less hierarchical structuring of knowledge areas and greater permeability among disciplines and specializations in the organization of knowledge is definitely under way. Yet the leadership remains ambivalent about the implications of this transformation for the political power structure" (p. 57).

In Chapter 3, Hayhoe offers de-

[3]In particular, Hayhoe uses the work of Basil Bernstein, Michael Young, and Jürgen Habermas.

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scriptions of the reform efforts of 10 specific higher educational institutions, ranging from key national universities and highly specialized ministerial institutions to provincial universities, agricultural schools, and more-recently-established short-cycle vocational institutions run by municipalities. Beyond offering a wealth of information on these types of schools, this chapter testifies to the great diversity in Chinese higher education and stands as a corrective to the tendency to make broad-brush generalizations about the system as a whole.

In the second half of *China's Universities and the Open Door,* Hayhoe describes in considerable detail China's educational interactions with a number of Common Market countries, focusing first on those countries' policies regarding cultural and educational transfers to China, and then on concrete examples of educational cooperation and exchange carried on within China. She also deals with the extensive involvement of the World Bank in Chinese education. Hayhoe's concern in these chapters is whether educational transfers will contribute to changes in traditional knowledge patterns in ways that serve economic modernization and political democratization, or whether they will be used to reinforce authoritarian knowledge patterns conducive to centralized political control. Although cautiously optimistic in her conclusions on this issue, Hayhoe recognizes the potential for greater efforts at repression and control as well as for greater openness.

Hayhoe is clearly committed to the view that in trying to understand contemporary issues in Chinese education and society, we need to take seriously China's cultural traditions and historical experiences. It will not do, she implicitly reminds us, to assume that everything important about contemporary China can be explained by reference to events since 1949, or by reference to the ideologies and organizational patterns of the Chinese Communist Party. This point is well taken, and Hayhoe's historical work does indeed contribute to a fuller understanding of contemporary issues. However, in *China's Universities and the Open Door,* the stress on the continuities with Confucian knowledge patterns is sometimes so great that one is left with the impression that Hayhoe attaches only minor significance to the ideologies and structures of domination put in place by the party after 1949.

IN THE wake of the crackdown on the student demonstrations, however, it is precisely these ideologies and structures of domination that are being reasserted by the hard-liners in the central leadership. In seeking to understand the social and political background of the demonstrations and the effects on education of the government's crackdown, we must not only take into account historical continuities and discontinuities in knowledge patterns, but must also recognize that the structural position of intellectuals in contemporary China is fundamentally different from that of Confucian scholar-officials of imperial times. Not only are intellectuals excluded, as a stratum, from direct participation in the exercise of political authority—this position is now being occupied by party functionaries below the level of the central leadership—but they have neither the gentry's land holdings nor elevated social status in local communities to fall back upon during times of political disfavor. Rather, contemporary intellectuals must have jobs; as "state personnel" (*guojia ganbu*), college graduates have, since the early 1950's, been subject to the state job-allocation system, and have had very little to say about the location or the type of work to which they would be assigned. Political subordination and economic dependence are thus fundamental characteristics of intellectuals in contemporary China.

In the decade of economic reforms and (to a lesser extent) political relaxation after 1978, some aspects of the intellectuals' situation improved perceptibly. They were redefined as constituting a part of the working class, and were recruited into the party in fairly large numbers. Restrictions on freedom of academic and artistic expression were eased. Chinese scholarly interactions with the industrialized West increased rapidly. With the growth of a private or quasi-private sector of the economy, employment opportunities for college graduates outside the state sector—and hence not subject to the state job-allocation system—were created.

In the mid-1980's, the state experimented with allowing a portion of each year's graduates to find their own employment, and seriously considered eliminating the unpopular job-allocation system altogether. But by the late 1980's, to the chagrin of many college students, this goal was abandoned. In mid-May 1989, I was told by the president of a major university that almost all of this year's graduates would be assigned to jobs by the state. Many graduates of previous years, he said, had had great difficulty finding jobs, and a large number remained unemployed a year or more after graduation. No doubt this result provides evidence of the underdeveloped state of China's "labor market," but it also suggests that many graduates prefer an indefinite period of unemployment in China's cities to many of the jobs that the state makes available through its job-allocation system.

Although it is too early to assess fully their impact, many of the re-

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gime's stern measures in recent months seem likely to deepen China's current educational crisis, particularly at the tertiary level. Beyond the climate of fear and mistrust created by governmental repression, concerns are widespread that the job-assignment process will be used, as in the past, to effectively banish student leaders and active participants in the demonstrations to remote and politically isolated localities.[4]

Requirements that students, faculty members, researchers, and administrators in colleges and universities study speeches by Deng Xiaoping and other leaders and "unify their thinking" in support of the official definition of the "counter-revolutionary rebellion" of April–June 1989, are a natural extension of the hard-liners' efforts to reassert political control over intellectuals. Decisions have been taken to reduce by about 5 percent the overall number of entrants to higher education this fall; these reductions seem to be concentrated in those institutions and academic departments that participated most actively in the demonstrations. The number of students to be recruited from Beijing Municipality has also been cut significantly, ostensibly because of their prior overrepresentation in universities. The opening of the fall term at Beijing University and other major institutions was delayed until mid-October in order to forestall the possibility of student demonstrations on National Day, October 1.

The government has also announced a plan, the details of which are unclear, to require applicants for graduate level study to spend two years working as laborers in basic-level units in the countryside or in urban productive enterprises prior to entering graduate school.[5] It is uncertain how this program will work in practice, or whether, indeed, it will be implemented, but it would seem to reduce greatly the attractiveness of graduate study among younger intellectuals who are already questioning its value.

Most relevant to Hayhoe's concerns with the "knowledge issue" is that several disciplines in the social sciences, which might be prone to produce graduates critical of party authority, will have their enrollments reduced. Likewise, although the situation remains somewhat unclear at the time of this writing, a significant shake-up seems to be underway at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The institutes most closely associated with the reform program of ousted party leader Zhao Ziyang are likely to be eliminated or reorganized, and their leading scholars demoted or reassigned. Several leading intellectuals from CASS who were already abroad in early June, or who left China soon thereafter, have elected to delay their returns to China.

In international educational relations, one must note the cancellation by the Chinese government of plans for Peace Corps volunteers to work in China for the first time this year, and the suspension of the Fulbright program under which American scholars teach in Chinese universities for an academic term or year.[6] The People's Republic has also indicated that it will reduce the number of students it sends abroad, particularly to the United States, for graduate training.[7] It is too early to tell whether these government policies will result in actual declines in the number of Chinese students in American universities. Earlier pronouncements of this kind have not had the dire results that some observers had expected.[8]

Considerable uncertainty currently characterizes virtually all of the institutional programs of scholarly exchange between the United States and China. Most American programs recalled the scholars who were in China under their sponsorship at the time of the Tiananmen massacre and suspended subsequent exchange activities for the summer and fall of 1989. They have generally delayed decisions about programs for the first half of 1990. Some organizations, such as the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China under the National Academy of Sciences, are accepting proposals for 1990–91 on a tentative basis. Most analysts foresee a period of political instability when Deng Xiaoping, now 85 years old, passes from the scene. It may be several years before the political dust settles enough for educational exchange programs between the United States and China to regain some of the sense of normalcy and openness so painstakingly built up over the past decade.

One source of tension in the US-Chinese educational relations in recent years has been the tendency for Chinese graduate students in the US to extend their studies as long as possible. Many of the approximately 40,000 Chinese students and scholars in the United States participated in pro-democracy demonstrations here and publicly protested against the Tiananmen massacre. They are thus quite concerned about their fate on their return to China, and many will seek to remain abroad indefinitely. An independent association of Chinese

[4]As yet, little concrete evidence indicates the extent to which this is taking place.

[5]*The New York Times*, Aug. 13, 1989.

[6]*Chronicle of Higher Education* (Washington, DC), Aug. 9, 1989.

[7]*The New York Times*, Sept. 3, 1989.

[8]On this issue, see Leo Orleans, *Chinese Students in America*, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 1988, esp. Ch. 2.

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students has been established,[9] and the creation or reinvigoration of several dissident groups abroad means that the Chinese government now faces an opposition in exile that enjoys much broader appeal and legitimacy than earlier Chinese dissident groups in the West. Whether these various organizations will succeed in creating a unified opposition movement remains to be seen.

AFTER a hopeful period from the late 1970's to the mid-1980's, Chinese college students have become increasingly discouraged about their prospects as intellectuals employed in state-sector enterprises and government agencies. Many feel that they "have no future" (*mei qiantu*), particularly in comparison with their age mates who entered the workforce directly from junior or senior middle school. By the time they are assigned jobs, college graduates will have foregone four to eight years of income as well as various improvements of living standards (such as housing assignments) that depend in part on seniority at their place of work.

Although the Tiananmen massacre and the subsequent waves of arrests, purges, and propaganda campaigns have silenced most overt dissent for the time being, they have done little to address the social and political problems that gave rise to the demonstrations in the first place,[10] and they have completely undermined the legitimacy of the current leadership in the eyes of many Chinese intellectuals. If the regime is ever to win back their support, it will have to find ways to convince intellectuals that they do have a "future," and that they will be meaningful participants in socially consequential decision-making processes. But almost all of the measures taken by the regime in recent months seem designed to convey precisely the opposite message. Despite the short-term effectiveness of governmental repression, therefore, recurrent demands for fundamental reforms are sure to be a prominent feature of China's social landscape for the foreseeable future.

[9]*The New York Times*, July 31, 1989.

[10]A crackdown on both household-level and larger-scale private enterprises is proceeding simultaneously with the reassertion of political control over education (*The New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1989). One of the government's goals would seem to be to reduce income inequalities between workers tied to the state wage bill and those in the private sector.

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Decollectivization and Democratization in China

Edward Friedman

DAVID ZWEIG. *Agrarian Radicalism in China, 1968–1981.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1989.

RICHARD MADSEN. *Morality and Power in a Chinese Village.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1984.

PAT HOWARD. *Breaking the Iron Rice Bowl: Prospects for Socialism in China's Countryside.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1988.

ASHWANI SAITH, Ed. *The Re-emergence of the Chinese Peasantry.* London, Croom Helm, 1987.

KANG CHAO. *Man and Land in Chinese History: An Economic Analysis.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1986.

PETER NOLAN. *The Political Economy of Collective Farms: An Analysis of China's Post-Mao Rural Reforms.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

SCHOLARS do not agree on the motives for the implementation of collectivization in China. Consequently, key questions remain unanswered: why did the Leninist-Stalinists in the Chinese Communist Party, knowing of collectivization's severe economic and human costs in the Soviet Union, institute that inefficient and repressive agricultural system in China; why did Maoists conclude that China required a more thorough-going collectivization than the Soviet Union; or why, in the post-Mao era, even after decollectivization liberated enormous productive energies, is it quite plausible that conservatives wishing to retain as much of the Stalinist system as possible could still reverse that liberating decollectivization. After all, collectives repress production and alienate producers. Why then is collectivization still a contested policy? All the books under review shed light on these fundamental political, economic, and moral questions.

IN HIS solid and subtle Kremlinological study of the late Mao effort to force Chinese villagers to live in accord with Communist fundamentals, David Zweig describes the struggle over the question of how much collectivization as one between radicals and moderates. Radical policies, which amounted to terror, tyranny, and poverty, Zweig demonstrates, concentrated all power in the hands of officials who made use of "strong-armed tactics" to establish fiefs "ruled by local cadre autocrats" (p. 193).

Zweig unearthed data showing persuasively that collectivized agriculture turned peasants into "serfs" and "coolies for rural cadres," and strengthened "a voracious state . . . which consumed all the peasant . . . produced" (p. 193). In sum, villagers were forced into economic backwardness to satisfy the selfish needs of the Leninist ruling group. The conclusion, it seems to me, is that decollectivization cannot be considered consolidated in what remains a Leninist state, because no matter how much decollectivization serves popular interests, it also undermines the power and privileges of ruling strata in the Leninist system.

THE GREAT contribution of the marvelously etched study of leadership styles in one pseudonymous south coastal village by Richard Madsen is its focus on the ethical dimension. Madsen presents Mao's super-collectivist project as motivated by a religious ethos. Based on a "quasi-

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Edward Friedman is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he chairs the Center for East Asian Studies. He is co-author of Villagers and State in Socialist China *(forthcoming).*

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religious faith" in Mao, the Chinese revolutionaries tried to mobilize an army of heroes, who would live an ascetic life and fight a war against evil by transforming peasants into selfless individuals. To be sure, Madsen finds, as does Zweig, that in the latter years of Mao's rule, "agricultural productivity . . . stagnated because . . . of unrealistic government policies and failing morale" (p. 256).

For Madsen, "moralistic revolutionary" leaders were a complete failure. He explains why such a mass religious conversion was impossible in the Chinese village. He finds that the moral revolutionary project could not woo villagers who cared primarily about their families and wanted to make a good living so they could enjoy a moral life in accordance with Confucian kinship ideals. The collectivist project alienated villagers because power came from the center of the Leninist state, thus compelling "revolutionary moralists" to compete narcissistically to prove their purity to superiors in the Leninist hierarchy, whatever the impact on local people. And, what support "revolutionary moralists" found in the village tended to come from marginal illiterates with few kinship ties, individuals who used brash physical violence to grab local power and avenge themselves on more respected villagers, whose lives were rooted in kinship networks. Finally, Madsen argues, although it made sense to villagers to sacrifice everything in the revolutionary era to fight real enemies, such as the Japanese invaders, it made no sense to continue similar sacrifices after national victory over the Japanese if those sacrifices meant forsaking family for the socialist state in peacetime.

On this last point, Madsen misreads China's wartime experience. During the patriotic war against Japan, Mao's movement did not ask fighters to forsake family. On the contrary, the family position of army members was guaranteed, even privileged, by the emerging state. The wives of Mao's soldiers were not permitted to divorce them. Their families back home received the first priority for land and animals in the land reform. The truth contrasts with the legend that characterizes the revolutionary era as one of absolute selflessness. In fact, Mao wooed fighters with the most material of incentives.

As Zweig understood the elite debate over how far China should collectivize as one between moderates and radicals, so Madsen regards that debate as one between utilitarian conservatives and revolutionary moralists. Madsen trenchantly describes the politics of the latter group, using such religious categories as apocalypse, good versus evil, confession, purification, asceticism, sainthood, repentant wrongdoers, the sacred, the morally redemptive, zeal, and frenzy. Thus, the peasants worshipped "Mao in place of the old ancestor tablets" (p. 186). "Before meals, each household recited one of Mao's quotes. . . . Before political meetings, the peasants sang a hymn expressing loyalty to Chairman Mao" (p. 186).

This language is not one of liberation, human realization, or material progress. It has little resonance with the Enlightenment or Karl Marx. Rather, the Maoism depicted by Madsen is a form of religious fundamentalism. It uses the language of class struggle to legitimate the destruction of what it deems evil. But that destruction entails, as both Zweig and Madsen show, political terror, social reaction, and economic stagnation. The language of communist fundamentalism and the policies it legitimated are more in line with the telos of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini than with the human solidarity and harmony envisaged by Peter Kropotkin. Fundamentalism—whether of a religious or Marxist-Leninist variety—can win tremendous support because it taps deep fears and anxieties over the mixed impact of modernization, fears and anxieties that are not unique to China. Nonetheless, fundamentalism, however appealing to many, cannot identify or grapple with the roots of modern dilemmas. Indeed, it primarily involves a scapegoating of the innocent, as both Zweig and Madsen detail, rather than confronting the sources of real problems and dilemmas.

IN HER savvy, fact-filled, and lucid account of the dilemmas of decollectivization, Pat Howard rejects the notion that China witnessed "a conflict between good and evil" (p. 176), although she writes from a sophisticated ethical perspective, committed to both popular democracy and market socialism. For Howard, Leninism is a system that exalts industrial production, and collectivization is a means of speeding that industrialization, to the detriment of raising standards of living or properly paying peasants. Howard writes that Chinese peasants found that collectives "roped [them] together to live a poor life" (p. 44). She describes collectivization as an essential part of a process of étatization, "compulsion and self-denial," the "complete dependence of peasants," and "enforced conformity and social ostracism" (p. 185). Howard associates herself with those who see post-Mao reformers, not as moderates or utilitarians, but as socialists seeking a noncapitalist way to win popular support and the material blessings of the modern world for the populace after Maoist fundamentalism proved a disaster.

Howard finds that a successful noncapitalist path would require

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the institutionalization of democratic counterweights—allowing citizens to organize and represent their own interests—to limit the power of those who control the central state apparatus. Therefore, in contrast to Zweig and Madsen who, of course, mention democracy, Howard makes it central to her contrast between civil society trying to represent itself and a dictatorial state crushing free association. Given the continued silencing of democrats and dissidents in China, Howard is not optimistic that the country's Leninist system can carry out political reform. But without political reforms, she argues, economic reforms such as decollectivization cannot win prosperity and dignity for the Chinese people.

The unique contribution of Howard's work is a profound theoretical inquiry—she never forgets for a moment the reality of the power of the Leninist state—into whether the cooperative associations and negotiated contracts engendered in rural China by decollectivization can serve as a basis for market socialism and popular democracy. This inquiry is based on a shrewd understanding of the peasantry's alienation from Leninist socialism, and thus contrasts with media pundits, who, in the wake of the Beijing Massacre of June 4, 1989, wrongly tended to dismiss China's peasants as isolated, ignorant, unconcerned, and certainly not interested in the issue of democracy. In fact, at Nanjing, where speakers from the democracy movement represented diverse sectors of society, it was the peasant representative who spoke the longest and expressed the strongest grievances. Although urban democrats identify all of Mao's tyrannical evils with his alleged peasant essence, in fact democracy is very much an issue for the peasantry. Still, the conservatives in power have shown that they know how to appeal to peasant chauvinism and populist anti-urban, anti-intellectual passions to recruit villagers to reactionary causes.

THE ESSAYS in the work edited by Ashwani Saith compare the circumstances of Chinese peasants under collectivization and decollectivization. These studies are of a consistently higher quality than is the norm for edited volumes. Some of the essays, such as those by Saith himself, Eduard Vermeer, Elizabeth Croll, Stephan Feuchtwang, and Gordon White, are gems.

In their superb chapter, Peter Nolan and Suzanne Paine (whose recent death is a great loss) contrast the "virtuous circle" of growth brought by decollectivization with the stagnation and "abysmally low living standards" of the collective era (p. 94). Nolan and Paine draw parallels between the liberation of productive energies brought about by decollectivization and by "the breakdown of manorialism in medieval Europe" (p. 97). Richard Conroy's solid data depict how Mao's disregard for the wealth generated by modern science and technology combined with a Stalinist policy of scissor prices and high extraction from the peasantry to produce "stagnation or even decrease in peasants' income" (p. 147).

The volume's longest essay, written by Ajit Kumar Ghose, although peppered with good data and sound reasoning, claims—despite the scholarly consensus as exemplified in the materials of Zweig, Madsen, and Howard—that rural performance from 1965 to 1975 was remarkable by any standard (he is silent on the famine in southwest China from 1974 to 1977[1]), including income growth. By contrast, Howard shows that virtually stagnant income over that period permitted a peasant to buy one more pack of cigarettes a year at best.

HISTORY makes clear why collectivization was counterproductive. Economist Kang Chao has penned an elegant work, *Man and Land in Chinese History,* which explores the long-term decline in rural China beginning in the 12th century. Kang shows that in overpopulated rural areas with dispersed land holdings of intensively farmed micro-plots, and in an economy that increasingly assumed the characteristics of a market economy (p. 221), peasants organized in a household division of labor to gain every penny possible from subsidiary, sideline, and off-farm work.

Kang reveals in his study that what China needed to break out of rural misery were technological breakthroughs and population control in order to free people to earn more value off the land, while the land supported fewer people at higher living standards. Mao's collectivization, by contrast, crushed the market, wiped out off-farm income, and locked an ever-increasing population onto the land, while constraining needed technological innovation (as Conroy shows in the Saith volume). Thus, collectivization guaranteed stagnation. The economic failure was not accidental or a matter of bad implementation, the weather, or disconcerting political struggles. It was inherent in the collectivist system.

ALTHOUGH Peter Nolan's compelling description of the achievements and problems of decollectivization in China is in agreement with those of Zweig and Howard, in the first three chapters of *The Political Economy of Collective Farms,* Nolan offers an illuminating analysis of the classical socialist debates over

[1]Described in muted terms in *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 30, 1986.

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collectivization measured against the performance of collectives. This contribution is at the highest level of scholarly excellence. Moreover, Nolan grounds his analysis in the broadest comparative perspective. Nolan finds that the only defense of collectivization that accords with the record is Stalin's non-economic one—building a relatively autarkic, powerful military state (pp. 25, 228). The economic failures of collectives are manifest. Nolan concludes that "the relief of the condition . . . of poor people . . . required harnessing rather than suppressing market forces. . . . The tragedy for the socialist world is that the lesson was not learned in the Soviet Union during War Communism in 1917–21 when the costs of attempting to suppress the dynamic force of market competition were first revealed" (pp. 3–4).

Zweig, Madsen, and Howard go beyond this persuasive analysis of collectives as inherently incapable of delivering the goods to the populace to show, in addition, how the political need to compel peasants to do what is not in their interests produces a police system of institutionalized fear and demagogic scapegoating. Madsen details a life of brutality and hypocrisy. Zweig elucidates how fundamentalist "mobilization entailed . . . coercion and terror" (p. 39). Thus, "only by creating a local setting rife with political and personal insecurity; only by purging leaders with strong ties to the peasants and replacing them with leaders who had few direct links with them; only by beating landlords who in most instances had committed no offenses for twenty years; and only by press distortion, deceit, and the creation of false models could the radicals create the psychological environment necessary to compel cadres and peasants to respond to their goal. . . ." (p. 49).

One murderously logical result of this process (which Pol Pot took to its conclusion, and Zweig brilliantly explores) is that collectivist socialism requires the death of the peasantry, genocide. Mao, like Stalin, legitimated collectivization as class war. Stalin and Mao both justified the use of state violence to exterminate a group defined as class enemies, counterrevolutionaries, and traitors. Howard puts this brutality in a theoretical context that equates Mao's fundamentalism with Marx's notion of barracks communism, a system even more cruel than early capitalism, a system based on envy, anxiety, and leveling-down, a system Nolan characterizes as "equality in poverty" and "wretched socialism" (p. 27).

Opposition to foreigners who are supposedly behind the counterrevolutionary traitors makes a strong military the top priority. The logic of collectivization—seldom followed to its conclusion in real life because of the regime's need for political stability, societal support, and economic growth—is a logic of genocide and militarism. Consequently, an end to tensions brought on by the cold war can help to undermine the brutal logic of tyrannical, militaristic collectivization.

IT IS Howard's book that best explains, given the inherent negativities of traditional Soviet-style collectives that were made far worse by Maoist fundamentalism, why decollectivization is not universally popular and successful. The answer lies in the political continuity of the Leninist dictatorship, which leaves the gains of reform fragile and seemingly fraudulent. For example, it is obvious that those who get rich first should pay taxes to fund the building of the infrastructure that Maoism ignored, and which the peasants locked into the poorest regions require the most. But any taxpayer can see that taxes are ripped off by the corrupt cadres of the Leninist system. No one finds tax-paying just, and therefore no one pays taxes. Ironically, the biggest gainers from post-Mao decollectivization are also the targets of greedy officials and therefore most alienated from the regime.

Rampant corruption makes necessary the formation of a professional civil service to replace the *nomenklatura* of political loyalists who rob the people. But those in power fear that such political reform would undermine their base of power, the political networks of the *nomenklatura*. So, they do not implement needed political reforms.

The result is an intensification of popular corruption, cynicism, and conflict within an outmoded system, whose rulers can still appeal to popular anxieties over losing guaranteed minimums, to envy against those getting rich, and to loyalty to a militarily powerful communist state that claims moral superiority over so-called capitalist states. Therefore, decollectivization cannot be an end in itself, but merely one liberating moment in a prolonged, painful conflict. Decollectivization alone cannot guarantee a peaceful or happy outcome, because without democracy, peasants incapable of representing their own interests cannot erect political barriers to the return of collectivization and its attendant horrors. Leninist dictatorship limits the rich fruits of decollectivization, even as it continues to threaten the first ripe plums.

Howard and Nolan draw our attention to the conflict between supporters of collectivization and decollectivization not as one between radicals and moderates or between revolutionaries and pragmatists, but rather as a struggle between tyrants and democrats. But only Nolan, of these many authors, concludes on a truly (and, perhaps,

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overly) optimistic note when he argues that once decollectivization and market reforms occur, peasants will "demand democratic rights and ensure that the party 'withers away' through popular pressure from below, whatever the views of the matter held by the party leadership" (p. 11). Thus, just as state-coerced collectivization formed part of the imposition of a feudal-like despotism, so decollectivization can be part of a liberating process culminating in genuine democratization.

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Differing Perspectives on Castro's Cuba

Dennis M. Hanratty

ANDREW ZIMBALIST, Ed. *Cuban Political Economy: Controversies in Cubanology*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

WILBER A. CHAFFEE, JR. and GARY PREVOST, Eds. *Cuba: A Different America*. Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1989.

SERGIO G. ROCA, Ed. *Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future Challenges*. Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

THIRTY YEARS after its revolution, Cuba remains a highly controversial subject of study. Scarcely an element of Cuban society or a policy decision by the Cuban government fails to engender deep divisions within the Western academic community. Scholars remain divided over such questions as: Has the government of Fidel Castro met the basic needs of the population? Do Cuba's political institutions promote popular participation in government, or do they hinder such participation? Is the Cuban regime succeeding in its efforts to create a new socialist man?

The three books reviewed in this essay reflect the divisions just mentioned. None of the authors would probably agree with characterizations depicting him as a defender or critic of the revolution. Each would insist, instead, that his assessment is merely objective. Suffice it to say here, therefore, that the scholars who contributed to the Andrew Zimbalist and the Wilber Chaffee and Gary Prevost volumes conclude that the Cuban government is on the right path to addressing its varied challenges, and that the contributors to the Sergio Roca volume do not share this viewpoint.

Zimbalist's book, however, is not so much an examination of Cuban society as it is a broad-based attack on mainstream Cubanology as practiced by such specialists as Roca, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Jorge Domínguez, and Jorge Pérez-López. At various places in his own two essays, Zimbalist contends that these and other Cubanologists have demonstrated distortion; oversimplification; an unscientific marshaling of evidence; a poverty of conceptualization, of theory, and of method; and a lack of understanding of the Cuban economy.[1]

Is Zimbalist correct? Do mainstream Cubanologists distort reality? Do their critics have a clearer understanding of Cuba? In an attempt to shed some light on these issues, I will examine four contentious parts of the Cuban debate: the economy (especially its post-1986 configuration), health care, housing, and the organs of People's Power. Because Zimbalist's target is wider than the Roca book, it will be necessary to refer to other publications not reviewed here.

THE PERIOD 1976–86 saw the Cuban government take several steps in the direction of economic liberalization. Perhaps the most significant action was the establishment of the Economic Management and Planning System (*Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de Economía*—SDPE). Similar in nature to the 1965 Kosygin reforms in the Soviet

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Dennis M. Hanratty is Latin American Unit Supervisor at the Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, and a specialist on Cuba. *The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the United States Government.*

[1]One of the contributors to the Zimbalist volume, Cuban economist José Luis Rodríguez, levels additional charges against the practitioners of mainstream Cubanology. Rodríguez defines Cubanology as pertaining "to that group of Cuban scholars who play a central role in the studies of Cuba in the context of the ideological and political battle against the Revolution" (Zimbalist, p. 27). According to Rodríguez, "historical evidence confirms that the theses of the so-called Cubanology endorsed and were derived from—directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously—the United States' political battle against socialism in Cuba" (ibid., pp. 27–28). Rodríguez dismisses questions of human rights abuses, contending that the analysts who raise such concerns are applying "bourgeois concepts to Cuban reality" (ibid., p. 31).

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Union, the SDPE sought to delegate more authority to state enterprise managers, to introduce profitability as one measure of enterprise performance, to establish a self-financing plan for enterprises, to integrate concepts such as cost accounting and inventory controls into plant decision-making, and to strengthen material incentives for workers. Parallel to this effort was an easing of many restrictions against self-employment. The early 1980's saw the emergence of small manufacturers, a variety of street vendors, an incipient home-construction sector, and peasant and artisans markets. By 1986, all of these entities had come under attack from Castro. At the very time *perestroyka* was getting under way in the USSR, Castro unleashed a campaign known as the "Process for Rectifying Errors and Negative Tendencies," strongly criticized the prior implementation of the SDPE, including its emphasis on material incentives, and closed or curtailed the operations of those engaged in self-employment.

Several questions concerning these events demand our attention. Did decentralization occur under the SDPE? Why did the rectification process take place? Did it eliminate material incentives? Finally, is rectification working?

Based on interviews with former managers, technicians, and other state enterprise officials now living in the United States, Roca has concluded elsewhere that the SDPE did not result in a substantial degree of local autonomy. According to him, national ministries demonstrated considerable reluctance to delegate authority to state enterprises, thereby sharply curtailing the discretion purportedly given to plant managers under the SDPE. In addition, Roca states, the Cuban Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Cubano*—PCC) and its first secretary, Fidel Castro, "exercised a pervasive and detrimental influence at all levels of economic organization and over all functions of economic administration." Interviewees reported that Castro constantly overrode economic planning and local autonomy, exhibiting the classic style of a micromanager.[2]

Zimbalist's assessment is quite different. He judges that a considerable degree of decentralization occurred before 1986 and has remained in effect thereafter. In his opinion: "Direct contracting between enterprises for many inputs is being promoted, enterprise reports to their ministries are being cut back, the number of administrative personnel in the planning system is being reduced, enterprise self-financing of investment is being extended, worker participation in management and plan formulation is more extensive than before, the decentralization of enterprise management into smaller units (brigades) with greater worker control is being universalized in agriculture and extended in industry, and the role of parallel markets where prices are set according to conditions of supply and demand is growing at an accelerated pace" (p. 12).

In a recent article, however, Zimbalist appears to draw back from this optimistic assessment. Although he still maintains that some decentralization has taken place, including the establishment of brigades and the diminution of the numbers and activities of planners, he now appears to qualify his earlier statements on worker participation in management and plan formulation: "Overall, it seems that progress regarding worker participation to date has been partial and uneven, leaving much to be desired." Most striking is his admission that "the SDPE, like the 1965 Soviet economic reforms, did not bring about significant change in underlying centralization of decision-making in the economic mechanism."[3] Although he arrives at this position for substantially different reasons, Zimbalist's conclusion is similar to that of Roca.

Mainstream Cubanologists and their critics differ over the reasons for the emergence of the rectification campaign. Zimbalist contends that the process flowed from the economic crunch that Cuba experienced during 1985–86. He points to a combination of low sugar prices, a sharp decline in petroleum revenues,[4] a severe hurricane, several years of drought, the devaluation of the US dollar, increased levels of protectionism in Western countries, and the US blockade of Cuban goods, which resulted in a reduction of nearly 50 percent in hard-currency earnings in 1986. The output shortages that resulted from the loss of hard currency substantially restricted, in Zimbalist's judgment, the appropriate utilization of material incentives. In addition, consistent with a pattern found in other centrally planned economies during times of economic liberalization, many Cuban state workers had diverted their energies to private-sector activities. In this interpretation, the increased absenteeism and misuse of government resources exacerbated the consequences of the hard-currency shortfall, thus producing the government's response (Zimbalist, p. 11).

[2]Sergio G. Roca, "State Enterprises in Cuba Under the New System of Planning and Management (SDPE)," *Cuban Studies* (Pittsburgh), No. 16, 1986, p. 168.

[3]Andrew Zimbalist, "Incentives and Planning in Cuba," *Latin American Research Review* (Albuquerque, NM), No. 1, 1989, pp. 86, 73.

[4]For a discussion of the economic importance of Cuban reexports of Soviet petroleum, see Jorge F. Pérez-López, "Cuban Hard Currency Trade and Oil Reexports," in Roca, *Socialist Cuba . . .*, pp. 123–55.

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In a rejoinder, Mesa-Lago disputes the notion, implicit in Zimbalist's argument, that economic liberalization works best during periods of growth. According to him, the Cuban state lacks the resources to substitute effectively for the goods and services formerly produced by small-scale businesses. Mesa-Lago maintains that the rectification campaign was grounded in politics and ideology, not economics. Most important, Castro acted to prevent a loss of power that he and the PCC might have experienced if the SDPE had been successfully implemented. In addition, Castro believed that material incentives were eroding worker commitment to defense of the revolution. Finally, Castro was afraid that the growing independence of the self-employed would produce social unrest (in Roca, op. cit., pp. 86–87).

The research of Mesa-Lago and Roca exhibits a troubling inconsistency: If the PCC and Castro were able to intervene continually at the local level to frustrate enterprise autonomy, why would they fear the SDPE? Nevertheless, Mesa-Lago is correct in observing that Castro repeatedly stated in 1986 and 1987 that the PCC had been slighted during the years of economic liberalization. For example, at the 53rd plenum of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (*Confederación de los Trabajadores Cubanos*—CTC) in January 1987, Castro denounced as reactionary and erroneous the assumption that the construction of socialism was merely a question of implementing efficient economic mechanisms. Such a view, Castro charged, negated the primary role of the PCC in constructing a strong economy.[5] Similarly, the report of the Second Plenum of the PCC Central Committee, in July 1986, charged that there had been a serious neglect of political and ideological instruction during the heyday of the SDPE.[6]

But had such instruction been neglected? In the wake of two events in 1980—the Mariel exodus of Cuban refugees and the election of Ronald Reagan—the Cuban government intensified its ideological message at home. The first half of the 1980's saw heightened mobilization by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the reestablishment of the Cuban militia (a force that within five years included more than 10 percent of the nation's population), and the declaration of "the war of all the people." All of these campaigns involved heavy doses of ideological training. Thus, the government did expose Cubans to the message of the revolution. The leadership's problem, however, was that many remained unmoved.[7]

Did the rectification campaign involve the wholesale elimination of material incentives? Zimbalist is correct in pointing out that some mainstream Cubanologists have been too quick in suggesting the demise of material incentives. He observes that "in every speech where the excesses of material incentives are criticized or the deficiencies of the SDPE are analyzed, the leadership has also made it clear that neither are being jettisoned" (p. 15). For example, Castro stated at the Deferred Session of the Third PCC Congress (in December 1986) that Cuba should not give up on the system of determining salaries on the basis of the amount produced. At the same time, material incentives clearly have been deemphasized, whereas moral incentives and revolutionary zeal are currently in vogue. In his speech to the Deferred Session, Castro stressed that economic mechanisms are secondary to political and revolutionary activities. Too many material incentives, Castro stated, will prevent the emergence of the communist man.[8]

As an illustration of the regime's approach, take the case of a textile mill in Santiago de Cuba, whose poor performance was examined by the PCC Central Committee's Second Plenum. The delegates' solution to the mill's construction deficiencies, uncompleted projects, general sense of disorder, and high level of worker absenteeism did not involve material incentives. Instead, the PCC appealed to the sense of shame that such workers must feel and warned them that they were jeopardizing the chances of their province to host the Fourth Party Congress.[9]

Finally, Zimbalist concludes that "the present 'rectification' campaign seems to be bearing fruit. Speeches and press accounts are increasingly referring to enterprises that have turned their productivity performance around, and recent aggregate productivity statistics are more encouraging." Yet, he qualifies that positive assessment with the observation that "the over-

[5]"Fidel Castro Ruz: At the 53rd Plenum of the National Congress of the CTC," *Cuba Socialista* (Havana), January-February 1987, pp. 139–77.

[6]"Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba: The Highest Body of the Party Analyzes the Progress of the Economy and the Process of Rectifying Errors and Negative Tendencies," ibid., September-October 1986, pp. 141–49.

[7]Sergio Díaz-Briquets elaborates on this point: "Casual observers visiting Cuba have noted what appears to be a significant degree of alienation among the nation's youth. In some respects, the Mariel events represent an extreme instance of alienation. This alienation, while in no small measure a consequence of the isolation and extreme amount of social, economic, and political stresses prevalent in revolutionary Cuba—and fueled among the baby boomers by the normal rebelliousness of youth—is exacerbated by the despair many feel as they are incapable of realizing material, cultural, and other aspirations." See Sergio Díaz-Briquets, in Roca, op. cit., p. 172.

[8]*Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Dec. 14, 1986, Supplement, p. 12.

[9]"Second Plenum . . .," loc. cit., p. 145.

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all macro context in Cuba (resulting largely from the foreign exchange situation) remains difficult, and prospects for healthy growth in the near future are dim" (p. 15).

Mainstream Cubanology's evaluation of the rectification process is more pessimistic. For example, Roca concludes (op. cit., p. 118) that "if fully implemented, the Rectification Process will most likely impact negatively on Cuban production and efficiency, with deleterious consequences for the external economic balance."

Roca's judgment appears to be more accurate, even if the evidence is admittedly anecdotal. Take, for instance, the troubled situation in Cuba's ports. For several years, intolerably high levels of port congestion adversely affected other segments of the nation's economy. With the onset of the rectification campaign in 1986, local PCC officials sought to put an end to poor performance through the sponsorship of "combative assemblies" of workers. At these assemblies, many port workers acknowledged their lack of labor discipline and their high levels of absenteeism and resolved to correct these deficiencies. Two years later, however, the port crisis continued unabated. Absenteeism remained a serious problem. More important, rectification had failed to make a dent in the underlying structural deficiencies apparent in the nation's ports, especially in Havana. Workers lacked specialized equipment to load and unload ships efficiently. Because of an antiquated warehouse system, tons of perishable goods were left to rot. In addition, the transportation network for removing products from the ports functioned poorly or not at all.[10]

[10]Drawn from *Bohemia* (Havana), Oct. 17, 1986, pp. 68–72; July 22, 1988, pp. 23–24; and Sept. 16, 1988, pp. 8–10.

HEALTH CARE has long been regarded as one of the major achievements of the Cuban revolution. J. C. Rosenberg's comments in the Chaffee and Prevost volume (p. 125) are typical in this regard. "Whatever one's political philosophy, one cannot deny that the current Cuban government has used its power to make impressive advances in health care. They have implemented a community-oriented primary care system and public health measures that have elevated the health of their people to the level of developed countries."

In recent years, however, this conventional wisdom has come under attack from Cubanologists, who question the accuracy of Cuba's health care data, the degree to which achievements in this field are based on policies of the Castro government, and the efficacy of health services delivery. To what extent are these criticisms valid?

Nicholas Eberstadt has been the most outspoken critic of Cuba's social statistics, strongly suggesting (though not categorically stating) that the Cuban government has tampered with its health statistics. According to official Cuban data, Eberstadt notes, infant mortality climbed from 38 deaths per thousand live births in 1958 to 46 deaths per thousand live births in 1969; thereafter, the rate declined by 60 percent over the next decade to stand at 19 deaths per thousand live births in 1979. Eberstadt observes, however, that indirect infant mortality estimates conducted by demographer Kenneth Hill apparently contradict official claims of declining rates during the 1970's. Finally, Eberstadt suggests that the reported rapid decline in infant mortality is at odds with Cuba's morbidity data.[11]

Nonetheless, other analysts appear to challenge Eberstadt's underlying assumptions. For instance, Sergio Díaz-Briquets—identifiable as a mainstream Cubanologist—observes that the official infant mortality rate for 1958 is part of an unadjusted series that underestimates the actual mortality level during the 1950's. Díaz-Briquets concludes that the infant mortality rate in the 1950's probably ranged between 50 and 70 deaths per thousand live births.[12] If the series is adjusted, Cuba's infant mortality rate actually declined during the 1960's until it experienced a brief rise in 1969; the subsequent decline beginning in 1970 was thus consistent with the pattern of the previous decade and was not a radical departure from earlier trends.[13]

Both Sarah Santana (in Zimbalist, p. 112) and Díaz-Briquets (in "How to Figure Out Cuba . . . ") also note that Cuba has published statistics that reflect poorly on its health care system. For example, Cuba reported that the infant mortality rate in 1986 rose 10 percent from the rate recorded in the previous year. Finally, as Santana observes, Kenneth Hill himself did conclude that the official infant mortality rates from the 1970's should be accepted as valid in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary.

[11]See his article "Literacy and Health: The Cuban 'Model'," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Dec. 10, 1984; and idem, "Did Fidel Fudge the Figures?" *Caribbean Review* (Miami, FL), Spring 1986, pp. 5–7, 37–38.

[12]"How to Figure Out Cuba: Development, Ideology, and Morality," *Caribbean Review*, Spring 1986, pp. 8–11 and 39–42; and idem, *The Health Revolution in Cuba*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1983.

[13]It is unclear whether Eberstadt accepts or rejects the necessity of adjusting the infant mortality series. After noting the increase in infant mortality rates from 1958 to 1969, Eberstadt writes: "To some extent, this jump in death rates may have been a statistical artifact. Cuba was tightening up its vital registration system during those years, and improvements in enumeration could in theory make it seem as if death rates were rising when they were falling. On the other hand, death and birth statistics were reasonably reliable before the revolution." See "Did Fidel Fudge the Figures?" loc. cit., p. 7.

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One can accept the veracity of Cuba's noteworthy infant mortality rates without, however, concluding that they are primarily the result of the Castro regime's policies. Although differences in reporting methods should cause us to be cautious in comparing rates across countries, Díaz-Briquets provides compelling evidence that already in the 1950's, Cuba had a highly advanced mortality pattern for a Third World nation, one that compared very favorably to other Latin American countries.[14] He therefore concludes that the achievements recorded since the revolution actually follow a pattern of favorable trends that began at the onset of the 20th century. Although the Cuban government should be commended for allowing the continuation of such trends by extending low-cost health care technologies to the rural population, other societies with substantially different political and social systems have pursued similar health policies and achieved similar results.[15]

Cuba has one of the world's highest ratios of doctors to inhabitants, yet Cubans are not impressed with the quality of care provided. Díaz-Briquets's observation that Cubans continually complain about the delivery of health services is supported by a 1987 public opinion survey conducted by the PCC in Holguín Province.[16] The survey generated more than 10,000 responses, 87 percent of which were negative. Respondents charged, among other things, that there was a chronic shortage of supplies (medications, syringes, and stretchers); that many doctors continually were absent from their clinics, whereas those on duty had little experience, or expressed contempt for patients; and that favoritism prevailed in the delivery of health services.

At the Deferred Session of the Third PCC Congress, a physician related his experience at a hospital characterized by chronic absenteeism among nurses. The hospital solved its problem, he reported, when the nurses formed a vanguard detachment that "would have to work irregular hours all the time, would not get paid overtime, would be organized along military lines, and would be ready to undertake any national or international mission assigned to them." Filled with socialist fervor, the nurses not only ended their previous pattern of absenteeism but chalked up nearly 3,000 hours of voluntary work in one month alone.[17] Despite this impressive story, it is highly unlikely that health care providers are more responsive than other Cuban workers to the tantalizing reward of a socialist emulation banner.

HOUSING is another area that has generated considerable interest and discussion. Both mainstream Cubanologists and their critics generally agree that for many years, Cuba has faced an acute shortage of quality housing, the result of a pre-1959 housing deficit, of Castro's support for infrastructure development and de-emphasis of residential construction in the 1960's, and of increased demand as the baby boomers of the early to mid-1960's reached marriage age. The more contentious issue, however, concerns the government's current level of commitment to addressing this deficiency.

The General Housing Law enacted in December 1984 signified both the government's recognition of the severity of the problem and its understanding of the mechanisms needed to solve it. The law contained a variety of provisions, including a much-publicized measure under which renters became owners of their apartment units.[18] Specifically in terms of expanding the number of housing units, however, the law's most important measures concerned its encouragement of private construction and allowance of relatively free market sales of land and housing. The government granted individuals rights and encouraged individual initiative in a number of areas, including purchasing undeveloped urban lots and construction materials, hiring services of qualified personnel, renting equipment and tools, and selling completed units to others (the state reserved the right to pur-

[14]Díaz-Briquets, *The Health Revolution in Cuba*, pp. 53–101. Rodríguez does not accept this argument: "It is difficult to take seriously claims that Cuba had reached high levels of health performance by 1958 only when [sic] some 20 percent of deliveries occurred in health institutions, when practically no rural hospitals existed, and when some 36 percent of rural workers suffered from intestinal parasites, 31 percent from malaria, and some 14 percent suffered, or had suffered, from tuberculosis" (in Zimbalist, op. cit., p. 97).

[15]For example, Costa Rica's and Panama's health indicators were roughly comparable to Cuba's in the 1950's and remained so in the 1980's. Statistics compiled by the Pan American Health Organization show Costa Rica, Panama, and Cuba to have life expectancies at birth of 73.0 years (1983 figures), 71.0 years (1982), and 73.4 years (1980–85), respectively. Infant mortality rates for Costa Rica, Panama, and Cuba were 18.6 per thousand live births (1983), 20.0 per thousand live births (1982), and 15.0 per thousand live births (1984), respectively. See Pan American Health Organization, *Evaluation of the Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000: Seventh Report on the World Health Situation*, Washington, DC, 1986, p. 236.

[16]*The Public Survey on the Quality of Health Care in the Province of Holguín, Cuba: A Confidential Report by the Cuban Communist Party*, Washington, DC, Cuban American National Foundation, 1988.

[17]*Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 14, 1986, Supplement, p. 6.

[18]For the draft text of the law (later promulgated without changes), see *Granma* (Havana), Nov. 5, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Latin America Report* (Washington, DC), JPRS-LAM-85-014, Feb. 12, 1985, pp. 69–113. For a useful summary of the law, see Howard Glazer, "Architecture and the Building Industry in Contemporary Cuba," (in Chaffee and Prevost, pp. 92–95).

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chase such units by "paying the legally established price").

According to Howard Glazer, the law began to pay quick dividends: "Even as quickly as early 1985, although the mechanics of implementing the new housing law were still being organized, hundreds of small self-help projects were begun throughout Havana. New second-floor additions, handsome (and occasionally not so handsome) restorations of run-down houses, and hundreds of minor improvements, for example, exterior paint and stucco, were transforming the city" (in Chaffee and Prevost, p. 97).

Glazer's account, which concludes with a rather optimistic assessment of Cuban housing conditions, curiously fails to mention the controversy that enveloped the General Housing Law within 18 months of its enactment.[19] By the middle of 1986, Castro was charging that unscrupulous individuals had abused the liberalized housing law by diverting resources away from state enterprises.[20]

Did the change in government policy that occurred after that speech signify a basic shift away from support for private housing initiatives? In a recent article, Zimbalist contends that no such shift occurred: ". . . the major change in housing policy came with the reform aimed at eventually converting all tenants into homeowners and allowing the private exchange and sale of houses. The private sale of houses is still permitted, but now it cannot take place directly between the buyer and seller. To avoid speculation and exorbitant prices, the state now regulates such sales. The basic change, however, is still in place."[21]

Although Zimbalist is correct in pointing out that private construction remains permissible, the degree of official support for such activity appears to have diminished considerably. A comparison of the general housing laws of December 1984 and of December 1988 reveals a notable shift away from free-market pursuits.[22] (Obviously, Zimbalist cannot be held accountable for the particulars of the 1988 law, which postdates his article, but the shifts confirm that his prognosis was too optimistic.) The preamble of the new law asserts that the legislative revisions are "aimed at intensifying the control that the state must wield over operations involving housing, as well as defining the state's decisive participation in the solution to the country's housing problem." Under the new law, construction minibrigades, not individuals, "constitute the *principal* means for expanding the plan for construction of housing and social projects and also for repairing and rebuilding housing structures."[23]

Moreover, sales of undeveloped lots may now take place only "with prior approval from the Provincial Housing Directorate, which, in any case, may exercise the preferential right to purchase and acquire ownership of the lot for the state through payment of its legal price." Materials must now be purchased from authorized state agencies. Consider also the following new provision: "Grants of housing ownership and exchanges made with an ulterior motive of *profit,* amassing of wealth, or exploitation, in violation of the requirements and procedures ordered in this law, are illegal, and may be penalized with a loss of the dwelling that was the object of speculation, and of the funds acquired from the sale or exchange, through a resolution, with grounds, from the Provincial Housing Directorate or the local organs of the people's government" (emphasis added). By attempting to discourage the profit motive in housing construction, the government may be removing its most effective tool for solving its housing problem.

CRITICS often argue that mainstream Cubanology ignores the importance of municipal, provincial, and national organizations of People's Power. In the view of these critics, the establishment of the People's Power structure in December 1976 demonstrated that the Cuban government was determined to allow democratic participation and to

[19]According to Glazer, "Cuba has already made enormous progress in providing housing for its people. If it is not what Fidel Castro envisioned as he reviewed the plans of *Habana del Este* (1959), it stands in remarkable contrast to every other Latin American country, where tens of millions continue to live in shantytowns and slums often without even the most minimal public services. Given peace, the normalization of relations with the United States, and the opportunity to devote more resources to the problem, Cuba may well demonstrate that the universal problem of housing can be solved in a Third World country" (in Chaffee and Prevost, p. 101).

[20]"Fidel Castro Ruz: On the 25th Anniversary of the Victory of Playa Girón and of the Proclamation of the Socialist Character of the Revolution," *Cuba Socialista,* September-October 1986, pp. 19–33.

[21]"Incentives and Planning in Cuba," p. 91.

[22]For the text of the 1988 law, see *Trabajadores* (Havana), Special Supplement, Mar. 28, 1989, pp. 2–11, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Official Version of 1989 Housing Law," *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC), FBIS-LAT, June 5, 1989, Supplement. The title of the translation was wrong on the year of the law: it was adopted on December 23, 1988.

[23]Emphasis added. Confronted with an estimated shortage of 1 million housing units, the government initiated the construction minibrigade program in 1970. The plan called for the construction of prefabricated apartments by teams primarily composed of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers but headed by skilled workers from the Ministry of Construction. Most analysts contend that the minibrigades stagnated and declined after 1975. Glazer notes that government officials criticized the programs for both poor quality and low cost-effectiveness. The "resurrection" of minibrigades in the latest housing law is not a promising development.

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decentralize political authority. For example, writing before recent developments in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, Chaffee asserted that "People's Power is a unique institution among Communist countries, because its officials at the municipal level are elected by secret ballot of the electorate from a competitive slate of candidates. These officials in turn select delegates to provincial and national People's Power assemblies in indirect elections" (Chaffee and Prevost, p. 22). According to Chaffee, the combination of competitive local elections and the PCC structure provide Cuba with both political stability and the articulation of direct political demands.

Two issues require further examination. First, are the People's Power organizations democratic? Second, do they make a difference?

Mainstream Cubanologists such as Jorge Domínguez contend that the PCC can easily manipulate People's Power elections.[24] Consider, for instance, the process for selecting municipal candidates. Self-nomination is not possible; instead, as Chaffee notes (p. 23), mass meetings in subdistricts containing up to 400 persons propose candidates through a show of hands. Given Cuba's extensive security apparatus, party structure, and mass organizations (especially the CDR), nomination of a Castro critic thus seems impossible. Candidates may only post their pictures and biographies; further campaigning and discussion of issues are prohibited. (These rules would seem to preclude the emergence of a maverick like Soviet politician Boris Yel'tsin.) In addition, municipal delegates do not have a free hand in the selection of those who will serve at the provincial and national levels. Rather, delegates select from lists provided to them by the Communist Party and its mass organizations.

In a rejoinder to these criticisms, Carollee Bengelsdorf contends that such views reflect an inability to understand revolutionary Cuba. In her judgment, Cubanologists who dismiss the People's Power structure are operating from a model "of the idealized electoral process of the idealized society at the apex of the modernization paradigm—in this case, the United States" (in Zimbalist, p. 221).

Bengelsdorf also rejects the contention that the People's Power National Assembly merely ratifies decisions that have been made at a higher level: "Again, such a conclusion directly contrasts with the Cuban view that the fundamental authority at the national level rests entirely with the National Assembly" (ibid., pp. 224–25). This statement undoubtedly reflects the Cuban constitution, but surely no one believes that it accurately reflects political reality. Rhoda Rabkin points out that the National Assembly frequently has been bypassed on important policy decisions; for example, "the decision to open peasant markets in 1980 and then the decision to close them in 1986, never became issues in the National Assembly" (in Roca, op. cit., p. 45). Even assuming that Cuban leaders were prepared to assign a major policy-making role to the National Assembly, its members could not hope to achieve expertise while operating under their current six-days-a-year schedule.[25]

In a review of National Assembly sessions in 1980, Domínguez concludes that although this body had little apparent impact on significant policy issues, genuine debates had occurred.[26] However, the most striking aspect of the five case studies presented by Domínguez was Castro's dominant presence. In each situation, Castro allowed debate to unfold but then announced a resolution of the specific issue at hand—a resolution that was accepted without further discussion.

This last pattern continues to the present. A review of the two-day National Assembly session in July 1988, for example, found the delegates listening intently to Castro's "profound reflections." Much time was also devoted to Castro's lengthy questioning of several provincial government presidents on a wide range of economic and social issues.[27]

It is more difficult to determine the significance of People's Power when the focus shifts from the national to the local level. Bengelsdorf challenges the assumption of some Cubanologists, who contend that municipal and provincial governments have little power: "This assessment, of course, contrasts directly with the Cubans' assertion that Popular Power represents a fundamental decentralization of power, allowing for the active participation of the people in the decisions that most affect their lives" (in Zimbalist, p. 224).

Bengelsdorf's challenge has merit. Municipal and provincial assemblies have authority over a wide range of local services such as schooling, health care, and transportation. In addition, municipal officials are encouraged to identify and address complaints regarding

[24] *Cuba: Revolution and Order*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap, 1987, pp. 287–89.

[25] According to Chaffee, "The National Assembly also appoints a 31-member Council of State to run the government on a day-to-day basis between the Assembly sessions" (Chaffee and Prevost, p. 22). This contention is true in a narrow constitutional sense; in reality, however, the Assembly merely ratifies a higher-level selection of Council members.

[26] "Revolutionary Politics: The New Demands for Orderliness," in Domínguez, Ed., *Cuba: Internal and International Affairs*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1982, pp. 34–38.

[27] See Susanna Lee, "Report on the Third Ordinary Period of Sessions of the Third Legislature," *La Nación Cubana* (Havana), No. 16, 1988, pp. 28–35.

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delivery of local services. Still, as Rabkin notes (in Roca, op. cit., p. 46), such complaints may not extend to fundamental issues of the Cuban polity. Local officials cannot deviate from the basic policy outlines delineated by the PCC. In addition, the dependence of local authorities on funds from the national government often means that they lack the financial resources to address particular problems.

ZIMBALIST concludes the overview essay in his volume by charging that mainstream Cubanology is replete with distortions that have impeded the emergence of a rational and constructive United States policy toward Cuba. After reviewing the evaluations by Cubanologists of the Cuban economy, health care, housing, and People's Power, however, I find little basis for such an indictment. Certainly, the research efforts of the mainstream are not without flaws; indeed, this essay has identified specific points of disagreement with that research. Nonetheless, in each of the four major areas examined here, the more accurate interpretation of events rests with the mainstream, not with its critics.

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Gorbachev's Economic Reforms: Early Assessments

Martin C. Spechler

PADMA DESAI. *Perestroika in Perspective.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1989.

DAVID A. DYKER, Ed. *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform.* London, England, Croom Helm, 1987.

PETER WILES, Ed. *The Soviet Economy on the Brink of Reform: Essays in Honor of Alec Nove.* Boston, MA, Unwin Hyman, 1988.

SUSAN J. LINZ and WILLIAM MOSKOFF, Eds. *Reorganization and Reform in the Soviet Economy.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988.

RONALD D. LIEBOWITZ, Ed. *Gorbachev's New Thinking: Prospects for Joint Ventures.* Cambridge, MA, Ballinger, 1988.

JERRY F. HOUGH. *Opening Up the Soviet Economy.* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1988.

MIKHAIL Gorbachev's stern rhetoric of economic "crisis" and the need for a radical reconstruction (*perestroyka,* broader than mere reform) of the Soviet economy has rightly stirred anticipation in the West. Such readiness for change at the top, together with unprecedented demonstrations of popular discontent,[1] immediately raised demand for expert opinion about the likely course of events. And although real knowledge about the present reforms is still quite limited—the most impressive of the projects announced in 1987–88 are not yet fully implemented—a large number of articles and books (including those reviewed here) have already appeared that would seem, by their titles at least, to satisfy any reasonable demand.[2]

Western observers broadly agree that faced with the relative technological backwardness and declining growth of productivity of the Soviet economy, the General Secretary has entered into a widening spiral of reforms, whose breadth and eventual limits probably no one yet knows. At the same time, we must keep in mind that these reforms take as their starting point the continued social ownership of large-scale industrial production in the USSR and Communist Party monopoly of control over that production: i.e., *perestroyka* is meant to revive Soviet power, not bury it.

The central core of Gorbachev's reform is the rather conservative idea that Soviet officials and workers should be held personally responsible for their actions. *How* they should act is still, in the main, to be decided from above. This means greater bonuses for success and real penalties for failure—instead of the massive subsidies, excuses, and corruption of the late Brezhnev era. A primary

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[1]The strike by a quarter of a million coal miners in summer 1989 is the most dramatic example yet of economic discontent.

[2]In addition to the books under review here, the reader may also examine Marshall Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge,* New York, W. W. Norton, 1987; Ed A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency,* Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1988 (this fine analysis of the Brezhnev system and cataloguing of the early Gorbachev reform decrees was reviewed by the author in *Comparative Economic Studies* [Lake Forest, IL], Spring 1989); the recent compendium of the Joint Economic Committee, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988; Gertrude Schroeder's acute articles in the October-December 1986, July-September 1987, and April-June and July-September 1988 issues of *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC); Abram Bergson, "The Gorbachev Revolution," *Challenge* (Armonk, NY), September/October, 1987, pp. 26–33; and idem, "The Economics of Perestroika: An Inauspicious Beginning," ibid., May/June, 1989, pp. 10–15.

Martin C. Spechler is Associate Professor of Economics and Associate of the Russian and East European Institute, Indiana University (Indianapolis and Bloomington). He is the author of several articles on Soviet planning and foreign economic relations, and is currently revising a monograph on the economics of quality in Soviet industry.

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objective of industrial and agricultural establishments will be to meet a reduced but essential range of state needs. Above and beyond this goal, they are expected to contract with consumers at prices established by the laws of supply and demand. The scope of such decentralized contracting and wholesale trade is gradually to be expanded. Planners and ministry officials are supposed to reduce their interference in routine matters, including small to medium-sized investments. Prices are to be made more flexible by 1990–91, but probably not flexible enough to clear all markets. Control over quality will be exercised by the independent Gospriemka (State Acceptance of Products, under the State Committee on Standards), and hence may be more exacting than the existing "in-house" quality control.

Already, considerable institutional freedom is allowed at the fringes of the state sector—leasing of some collective farm land, liberalization of terms for foreign and joint ventures on Soviet soil, and expansion of the numbers of cooperative and private-service enterprises. Of course, as in Hungary and China, for the "second economy" to prosper, it will require legitimate means—i.e., something other than theft—to gain access to crucial inputs from the "first" economy.

MOST of the reform projects announced have been quite similar to those enunciated 24 years ago by Premier Aleksey Kosygin, as Gertrude Schroeder has rightly reminded us.[3] Only now, say official spokesmen, they will really be carried out! Almost all the Western authors reviewed here agree that the Kosygin-Brezhnev reforms failed because of supply-demand imbalances, bureaucratic resistance, unwillingness to free prices, and perhaps also deeper flaws in the socialist system. But none of the authors provides a detailed analysis of this previous Soviet reform experience, and they pay little attention to the experience with economic reform in other socialist countries.[4] Rather, they all follow the tripartite formula: problems, proposals, and prospects.

With respect to problems—one thing never in short supply in the Soviet economy—most of the writers take the newly aggressive Soviet self-criticism at face value, discounting any contrary optimism as self-serving and reactionary. It is assumed that things are at least as bad as Soviet officials admit. We should not forget, however, that Soviet politicians have always campaigned forcefully against (and hence have tended to exaggerate) their predecessors' errors, partly in order to counter opposing views still represented within the top leadership. The same appears true in the case of Gorbachev.

Most Western writers present Gorbachev's proposals—as amplified by Abel Aganbegyan, Leonid Abalkin, and others—with critical sympathy, although the observers usually find that the proposals conflict with one another and do not go far enough to succeed. What would succeed, it is usually implied, is some form of market capitalism open to international competition. The possibility of alternative, non-capitalist roads to wealth and power is hardly considered.

As to prospects, most Western economists are skeptical that Gorbachev will be permitted to allow creation of the unemployment, inflation, national secessions, foreign influence, social disruption, and threat to communist hegemony that the market pressures to be set in motion by his most radical proposals threaten to bring about. To survive politically, he probably will be forced to limit *perestroyka* to its present, cautious scope. Such is the consensus.

Dr. Hewett's book offers the most thorough analysis of the Brezhnev system and the best catalogue of the early Gorbachev reform decrees. Of course, every book on Gorbachev is outdated before it is in print, and readers will want to supplement their reading of this work with articles in Hewett's very useful journal, *Soviet Economy*, the annual analyses published by the US Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, and the excellent articles collected by John Hardt in the compendia of the Joint Economic Committee. As is true for all the other books here, revelations of *glasnost'* ("openness") had yet to be fully reflected in Hewett's analysis of the previous period of "stagnation" (*zastoy*).

PADMA DESAI, well known for her articles on Soviet industrial productivity, foreign trade, and grain harvests,[5] now offers us in *Perestroika in Perspective* a somewhat expanded version of a lecture given at Michigan State University last year. Desai's slim volume tries, not very successfully, to tie *perestroyka* to *glasnost'*, the "new thinking" on foreign policy, and political reforms.

More promising is Desai's "Schumpeterian" approach, which stresses the importance of the freedom of entrepreneurs to enter into new ventures and to invest for future, uncertain benefits. This Austrian liberal perspective, which downplays issues of monopoly power

[3]See her "Gorbachev: 'Radically' Implementing Brezhnev's Reforms," *Soviet Economy*, October-December 1986, pp. 289–301.

[4]For a stimulating discussion of the applicability of the Hungarian and Chinese models to Soviet reform, see Goldman, op. cit.

[5]Collected in *The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects*, London, Basil Blackwell, 1987.

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and income inequality, contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon outlook, which asks how closely Soviet officials can come to "optimal" conditions, such as marginal cost pricing and market clearing. Unfortunately, Desai does not carry through her novel approach, and she even expresses judgments that conflict with it—for example, she approves the establishment of workers' control over enterprise affairs and emphasizes uniform profit taxation. *Perestroyka,* she thinks, will require greater participation—but in which decisions? If the Soviets tacitly imitate Yugoslavia, who will look after entrepreneurship?

Some of Desai's judgments miss the mark. Her view that the priority given political reform in Eastern Europe "will continue to be lower than in the Soviet Union" (p. 91) has been overtaken by events in Hungary and Poland. And I cannot agree with her opinion that Western credits and technological transfer offer "quick economic benefits," i.e., ones quicker than those, say, that might result from a reduction in military spending. The Soviet military bill is far larger than that for foreign aid (which she urges be cut), and arguably, the opportunity cost of resources currently preempted by the military is *greater* (not smaller, as Desai writes) than their accounting value. Curtailing the ministry of defense's absolute priority in obtaining high-quality inputs could permit redirection of scarce materials to special export plants or premium-price consumer goods.

Indeed, I would argue that the opportunity to cut the military budget is the crucial link between Gorbachev's ambitions for *perestroyka* and his well-publicized ideas for détente with the United States. Cutting the defense budget would be the best way to reduce the Soviet budget deficit and close the gap between available consumer goods and money demand for them. Raising prices and imposing an income tax would be less attractive alternatives ways to make goods available as incentives for efficiency and hard work and as compensation for unpleasant personnel decisions. And without such incentives, *perestroyka* will probably dissipate in bureaucratic sloth. But Desai is surely right in arguing that Gorbachev needs to accumulate some victories soon if he hopes to prevail, not just survive.

THE ESSAYS in David Dyker's new book, too, have fallen victim to the rapid obsolescence of all knowledge about the East these days, reflecting as they do events only through mid-1986.[6] They do, however, give a clear, detailed survey of the Brezhnev-to-early-Gorbachev interregnum, including domestic politics and foreign policy.

Dyker's solid new contribution on industrial and agricultural planning should be read together with his *The Future of the Soviet Economic Planning System,*[7] in which he analyzes the Kosygin-Brezhnev reforms. According to Dyker, overcentralization—not the absence of capitalism—is the cardinal flaw in the Soviet economy, with bureaucratic command making "disproportions and imbalance inevitable" (p. 82). Indeed, supply failure explains a great deal of Soviet inefficiency—the over-indenting for capital goods, the construction delays, the lack of specialized industrial plants, and the poor quality of output—and has caused would-be reformers, including Gorbachev himself, to backtrack on promising ideas, such as bonuses for contract fulfillment, stable norms by which to measure out incentives, and application of the collective contract and the unplanned "normless link" in agriculture.

Slack plans would do much, as Dyker thinks, to facilitate efficient decentralization, but alas, they conflict with Bolshevik reflexes when problems arise. For example, pressure on rural producers to deliver certain crops to territorial RAPO's (district [*rayon*] agro-industrial associations, which date from the 1970's) led to soil deterioration, crop diseases, and falling yields.[8] It is not yet clear that the greater authority Gorbachev wants to give family "links" within collective farms will come to more than previous such decrees have, given pressure transmitted through state procurement agencies to supply more high-quality foodstuffs. Moreover, the continued existence of irrational prices and the lack of meaningful rental charges mean that material incentives can easily have perverse economic consequences.

DESPITE its title, the volume edited by Peter Wiles has little to say about current economic events. One exception is the article on Soviet agriculture by Karl-Eugen Wädekin. Writing in 1984–85, the distinguished West German specialist saw some prospect for improving Soviet yields through more rational *policy* (at the time, one could hardly speak of reform). A better composition of investment, improved conversion-feed ratios and smaller units in animal husbandry, an increase in the numbers of trained personnel, and abandonment of wasteful investments in land-improvement and the agro-industrial complex could,

[6]The book originated in a symposium at the School of European Studies of the University of Sussex (England), and was purportedly an attempt at prognostication.

[7]London, Croom Helm, 1985.

[8]The days of the RAPO are clearly numbered. At the March 1989 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on agriculture, Gorbachev stated that the RAPO's "shall be abolished in those places where they still exist." See the account of his March 15 speech to the plenum in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 16, 1989.

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Wädekin argued, measurably improve on the "stagnation" of the 1978–83 period and perhaps even bring overall self-sufficiency in food.

Of particular interest in the Wiles volume is a lively exchange between Lev Navrozov, a former Soviet journalist now with the Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, and Philip Hanson, the authoritative British economist, on the usability of CIA estimates of Soviet consumption, gross national product, and defense spending. Some of Navrozov's strictures cut deep, but without alternative estimates, we are left only with his suggestion that the Soviet Union is simultaneously poorer and more dangerous than we had been led to believe. Similar articles published recently within the Soviet Union suffer from similar inadequacy,[9] as they must until prices and statistical reporting in the USSR have themselves been reformed.

THE PAPERS reprinted in the volume edited by Susan Linz and William Moskoff appeared in the Winter 1987 issue of *Comparative Economic Studies*, an organ of the Association of Comparative Economic Studies (USA). Since these articles were all written before Gorbachev enunciated the more radical elements of his proposed reform in mid-1987, the rather skeptical tone of most of them regarding Gorbachev's reforms is understandable. If the sum and substance of Gorbachev's approach were only the organizational reforms described by Robert Leggett for the whole economy, by Gertrude Schroeder for industry, and by Rolf H. W. Theen for the agricultural-industrial superministry Gosagroprom—we would all now be yawning.

Several items in the Linz-Moskoff volume are, however, of more enduring interest. In particular, there is the proposal by F. I. Kushnirsky—one of the very few former Soviet economists to make a mark in Western academic circles—that Soviet workers receive shares in their enterprises and that prices be freed on all items except output of natural monopolies.[10] No idea so radical has, to my knowledge, been published by Soviet economists, which points to a poverty of printable discussion in the USSR, as distinct from Poland and Hungary.[11] Apparently, Soviet economists are not as yet permitted to challenge Gorbachev frontally.

In another stimulating chapter, Peter Toumanoff offers a simple econometric test confirming that neither economic reform nor leadership change since Nikita Khrushchev has had a measurable impact on Soviet labor productivity. He does find a bit of evidence indicating that the so-called "Zlobin" brigades may have had a positive effect, but one should remember that this system extended only to about one-sixth of the labor force in 1984, the last year in Toumanoff's sample.[12] But Toumanoff's method is not suited to capturing the short-term benefits of regime change, i.e., those occurring during the first three or four years only, say from the lessening of repression in 1953–58 and 1964–66, or the stress on discipline under Andropov in 1982–83 and Gorbachev in 1985–88.

ALSO suffering from having been written before the July 1987 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on economic reform is the volume edited by Ronald Liebowitz, a geographer who in 1987, organized (along with Catherine Sokil, an economist) the "East-West Conference" of Middlebury College's International Institute for Economic Advancement. Despite the title, the volume has no extended analysis of Gorbachev's "new thinking," and the editor concedes that it is "too early to provide details on the prospects for joint economic ventures," the purported subject of the volume.

The four papers on East-West trade see little significant joint activity on the horizon, for a number of reasons. Victor Mote, a geographer who has studied the BAM (Baykal-Amur Mainline) railway, is skeptical that the Soviets will find it profitable to develop Siberian raw materials for export to the Pacific Rim. Likewise, Michael Bradshaw, another geographer, shows how disappointing trade between the Soviet Far East and Japan has been; this is because the Japanese want hard currency, not compensation deals—in which they provide equipment in return for a share in future output. (There is, unfortunately, no discussion of the strong potential for Soviet trade with China and with India.)

John Parsons of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Techology argues that Western distaste for countertrade has become a barrier to trade with the East. This situation is unfortunate, he argues, because Western companies could receive high prices for their equipment in exchange for assuming the cost and risk of marketing the resulting goods. However, far from reflecting ideological prejudice, as Parsons argues, this reluctance reflects the disappointing record of countertrade (a record he almost entirely

[9]See, e.g., V. Selyunin and G. Khanin, "Cunning Figures," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), February 1987, pp. 181–201.

[10]A "natural monopoly" is an industry where cost economies of scale are so extensive that dividing the market between competitors is impractical.

[11]See, by way of contrast, Tadeusz Kowalik, "On Crucial Reform of Real Socialism," in Hubert Bagrisch, Ed., *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989. pp. 23–86.

[12]Zlobin brigades in construction and other sectors have considerable operational and financial autonomy.

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ignores). Moreover, Western firms hardly can be eager to set up on Soviet soil new competition for their own export production. Production in Southeast Asia or within the European Economic Community avoids Soviet supply bottlenecks as well as Western trade barriers and is simply more convenient. Moreover, as Bradshaw and Gary Meyers show, East-West trade is subject to political barriers and sudden disruptions, in part precisely because its economic value to the West is not highly regarded.

JERRY Hough's brief paperback is argumentative and punchy. Hough, now James B. Duke professor of political science and public policy studies and director of the Center on East-West Trade at Duke University, is renowned for his masterly scrutiny of CPSU personnel policy, and his account here of how Gorbachev built a political base among regional party officials is well grounded and highly instructive. However, on wider matters, Hough allows himself unsupported opinions which can only attract our amazement. According to him, Gorbachev does *not* want to decouple West Europe from America, since he *needs* the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a bulwark against West German nuclear rearmament. Gorbachev *needs* to use a putative threat to national security as a way to justify increased meat prices to the public; he *needs* an open economy to make the reform succeed. National Public Radio listeners will perhaps even remember Hough's confident opinion that Gorbachev *needs* Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative to promote reform. That Gorbachev and his close colleagues deny these positions does not seem to deter Hough.

Hough's identification of the social support for Gorbachev's *perestroyka* is thought-provoking, but hardly conclusive, absent any real evidence. We are told that non-Russians hoping for independence, some enterprise managers wanting reinforced authority, skilled workers hoping for promotion, military men needing high-tech weapons, and fiftyish officials personally yearning for Western things and foreign travel are all likely to favor reform, while the chief conservative opposition is made up of central ministry bureaucrats, who have however been "decisively and conclusively" overcome. The recurrent breaks in the momentum of reform Hough attributes not to opposition, but to the inherent complexity of the new arrangements. However, the events of the June 1988 CPSU conference would seem to have refuted Hough's view that regional party officials loyally support Gorbachev, and Russian dislike for the consequences of liberalization is a force yet to be reckoned with.

Hough's main point is that Gorbachev is serious about launching an "attack on protectionism"—that is, about creating a more open economy, including joint ventures with minority foreign ownership and promotion of manufacture for export by allowing firms to retain part of the dollars earned. Possibly here, too, Hough—and Gorbachev—exaggerate the break with previous policy. Projects within the framework of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance still seem to be preferred, and Soviet borrowing has been very cautious. Trade activity has not accelerated. Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov demonstrates well-placed opposition to massive imports of Western technology, when he expresses preference for development of technology at home.[13] Even Hough makes a great deal of the secrecy in which the joint venture law was promulgated and its sensitivity. If the General Secretary's political base is so secure, why this ambivalence about an important move in opening up the Soviet economy?

IF THE present reviewer may be allowed his own assessment—which, of course, may itself be proven wrong before it even reaches the reader—I would contend that the widespread rejection of the communist regime shown in contested elections for the new Congress of People's Deputies and in enormous national-minority demonstrations in the Baltic and Caucasus would appear to make economic changes more pressing, as a means of salvaging the legitimacy of the communist rulers. At the same time, political disorder makes Gorbachev's ultimate success less likely.

True, Gorbachev has clear control of majorities in the party's leading bodies, and only the armed forces would seem to have the power to dislodge him. Although the General Secretary has built strong support among the creative intelligentsia with *glasnost'* and reduction of oppression, no other organized group has a strong stake in radical economic reform, one that is likely to survive when the going gets tough. One can hardly make a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie, even if students or others can be found to do the dirty work.

Even the revolutionary potential of the situation may make Gorbachev more cautious than he has been thus far. Certainly, in China, Hungary, and Poland, established leaders anxious to retain power appear to have been reluctant to press forward with painful, if necessary, economic reform in the face of the surprisingly strong public expressions of discontent unleashed when repression has been eased.

[13]See "Report of N. I. Ryzhkov at the 27th CPSU Congress, March 3, 1986," in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 4, 1986.

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Corrections

In Bruce Parrott's article "Soviet National Security under Gorbachev" (*Problems of Communism,* November-December 1988), fn. 144 on page 17 should read: "Yakovlev was made a nonvoting member at the January 1987 plenum. He was elevated to voting membership in June 1987."

* * *

The Editor's apologize to Wallace Spaulding for several errors introduced in the published text of his article "Soviet-Line Fronts in 1988" (*Problems of Communism,* January-February 1989, pp. 66–75).

In Table 1 on page 70, the president (Josef Skala) and secretary-general (Georgios Michaelides) of the International Union of Students were omitted. The status of Susuma Osaki as president of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) is not certain and a "(?)" should have appeared after this name. Also, the name of the secretary-general of OSPAAL is Rene Anillo Capote. Finally, the information on the number of OSPAAL affiliates and countries in which OSPAAL has affiliates was not changed from 1987 and hence should not have been footnoted.

The first complete sentence of text in column 1 of page 70 should refer to "joint seminars" (there were two separate events).

The last sentence in the last full paragraph in column 1 of page 71 should read: "In each case, it is the highest level of meeting that the respective organization holds."

The sentence beginning at line 6 of column 2, page 72, should read: "One might also mention the April meeting in Kabul at which 'Soviet, American, and Afghan public figures' discussed the situation in Afghanistan."

Finally, the sentence beginning in column 1 and continuing to column 2 on page 74 should read: "The No. 12, 1988, issue of *Peace Courier* carried an article attributing the depletion of that area to the demand for more beef-cattle grazing, in turn the result of the demand for hamburgers (again, transnational corporations were implied to be the culprits)."

* * *

The last sentence in the first paragraph of column 3, page 128 of Joan Neuberger's article "Urbanization and the Origins of Ethnic Unrest in Imperial Russia" (*Problems of Communism,* July-August 1989) should read: "Shifting our focus from the empire's center to its periphery not only adds cultural conflict to the sources of instability, but it highlights the social fragmentation that hindered peaceful development in Russia's cities."

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